# China Good DAs

### Notes:

It’s basically an impact turn to the aff – China needs to win the AI race, not the US. It’s key to their economy (decline causes war). It’s key to Chinese leadership (multipolarity better). And beating China pushes them to a permanent alliance with Russia.

Almost all the link arg are specific to Artificial Intelligence. Many arguments the neg needs to win (innovation is zero-sum, plan hurts China, etc) are args made in the AI 1AC. CX can help with this too.

All this means that many of these cards can be used to improve the impact work for the AI aff. As you’ll see there are plenty of hegemony good/bad cards and China peaceful/violent cards.

### 1nc – China Growth

#### China’s economic growth depends on AI dominance – they’re on pace thanks to collaborative innovation.

Wu ’20 (Fei Wu, Professor of Computer Science, Zhejiang University; 6/16/20, “Towards a new generation of artificial intelligence in China”, nature machine intelligence, <https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-020-0183-4> DOA 7/2/22)//nm

The past few decades have witnessed many advances in computing and artificial intelligence (AI)-related approaches, due to progress in machine learning, computer processing power, the accessibility of mobile internet, the availability of large amounts of data and data storage technology. This has triggered a series of breakthroughs that enabled AI to become an engine for economic development in many countries, including China. We expect that AI will redefine all aspects of economic activities and will lead to new demands, new products, new technologies and new forms of businesses of all sizes. China should seize the opportunity and trigger a major evolution of the economic structure. Furthermore, we believe that Chinese AI researchers can make great scientific contributions to mankind. In the past 300 years, Western societies have been responsible for major scientific achievements. Today, in the era of AI, China can contribute to important scientific progress, building an open international research platform, and working with researchers and engineers from around the world to tackle the grand challenges that we are facing. An AI plan for a new generation In January 2016, the Chinese Academy of Engineering launched a major strategic consulting research project called AI 2.0 in China. During the launch ceremony, held in March 2016, the attending researchers decided to write a letter to the Chinese government to propose the initiation of megaprojects in AI. In the following months, led by the Ministry of Science and Technology of China, more than 220 AI experts from universities, institutes, companies and governments attended discussions and contributed to drafting the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence (NGAI) Development Plan. In August 2016, according to the State Council, 15 megaprojects with the implementation period ending in 2030 were announced to reflect and incorporate new developments and trends in both national and international science and technology priorities and needs. As the 16th programme, the NGAI Development Plan (2015– 2030) was launched in July 2017 by the Chinese State Council1 , the first systematic and strategic plan in AI for China in this century. It sets out a national top-level plan for the overall thinking, strategic goals, main tasks and supporting measures for China’s AI development through 2030 via three successional steps. First, by the end of 2020, China will close the technological gap with world-leading countries, and China’s AI industry will compete at the highest international level. Second, by 2025, China will have achieved significant breakthroughs in fundamental research of AI and formulated the framework of NGAI, with some technologies and applications achieving a world-leading level, and AI becoming the main driving force for China’s industrial upgrade and economic transformation. Third, by 2030, China is expected to become one of the world’s premier AI innovation centres, and will have developed comprehensive and appropriate regulatory, legal and ethical principles for AI development. By following the Development Plan, China’s new-generation AI is positioned to transform big data into structured knowledge and support human decision making (big data intelligence)2–5 . In addition, it will be able to employ data with different modalities (for example, visual, auditory and natural language) to perform learning and inference (cross-media intelligence)6 and harness the intelligence of crowds to address complicated challenges in a paradigm of computational collective wisdom (crowd intelligence)7 . Furthermore, there will be a step from the pursuit of an intelligent machine to the hybrid-augmented intelligence (human–machine hybrid intelligence)8 . The new-generation AI will also emphasize intelligent systems capable of carrying out operations without human intervention (intelligent autonomous systems)9 . Unlike AI strategies outlined by other countries, China’s AI plan not only consists of science and technology issues, but also provides guidelines regarding education and ethics. The AI plan is intended to cultivate an AI ecosystem in China. Collaboration between universities, government and industry To enable leading AI-related enterprises to fully commit to addressing AI technologies and application demands of NGAI, in the past years the Ministry of Science and Technology established 15 National Open Innovation Platforms based on application-driven, enterprise-led and market-oriented principles, including Baidu (autonomous driving), Alibaba (urban cognition), Tencent (medical imaging), iFlyTek (voice intelligence), Sensetime (intelligent vision), Yitu Technology (visual computing), MiningLamp Technology (marketing intelligence), Huawei (basic software and hardware), Ping An (inclusive finance), Hikvision (video perception), Jingdong (intelligent supply chain), Megvii (image perception), Qihoo 360 (safe brain), TAL Education Group (smart education) and Xiaomi (smart home). To promote cooperation with local governments for demonstrating AI technologies and to pilot experimental policies for AI development, replicable in other areas of the country at a later stage, China will construct around 20 new National NGAI Development Experimental Zones by 2023. Currently, Beijing, Shanghai, Hefei, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Chong Qing, Cheng Du, Xi’an, Ji Nan and the county of Deqing have been selected as new zones. In 2018 and 2020, the Ministry of Science and Technology issued two calls for proposals for megaprojects of ‘science and technology innovation 2030—New Generation Artificial Intelligence’. The calls focus on fundamental AI theories (neural network, causal inference, game theory, collective wisdom, hybrid intelligence and brain-inspired intelligence), technologies (knowledge computing, adaptive perception and artificial systems and applications) and AI chips. In China, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) supports basic research, fosters talented researchers, develops international cooperation and promotes socioeconomic development. In 2018, AI and cross-disciplinary information sciences were newly added into the Directorate of Information Sciences of NSFC, which means that universities and institutes are eligible to apply funding from NSFC to AI. China’s government has become increasingly active in setting up a collaborative innovation system via the interactions among universities, government and industry for AI development. Based on the collaboration, universities, funding agencies, enterprises, and central and local governments in China have been connected together to develop the new generation of AI.

#### Chinese economic collapse leads to war - miscalculation and lash out

**Carpenter, 15** – [Ted Galen, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, The National Interest, “Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?”, 9/6/15, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?page=2>, 6/24/16]

Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that China’s economic growth is slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijing’s official economic statistics. Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful. The focus on the possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.” China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the country’s alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of Chen’s old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwan’s next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The third possible arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From China’s perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as “the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.” Recalling Japan’s invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles. There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance. All of this suggests that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the country’s economic woes. The last thing we should do is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned.

### 1nc – China Leadership

#### China leadership on emerging tech key to their leadership model – it’s the only way they’ll maintain a position of power.

JakeSullivan**,** HalBrands**,** 5-22-2020, (Jacob Sullivan serves as the United States National Security Advisor to Biden, "China Has Two Paths To Global Domination," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,<https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908>) -- sri

In short, it is not clear that Beijing can successfully take a regional path to global power—which raises the question of whether there may be a second road to Chinese global leadership. What if, instead of focusing on regional hegemony before turning to consider global hegemony, China approaches things the other way around? This second road would lead China more to its west than to its east, in service of building a new Chinese-led security and economic order across the Eurasian land mass and Indian Ocean, while establishing Chinese centrality in global institutions. In this approach, China would grudgingly accept that it could not displace the United States from Asia or push the U.S. Navy beyond the Western Pacific’s first island chain, at least for the foreseeable future. It would instead put increasing emphasis on shaping the world’s economic rules, technology standards, and political institutions to its advantage and in its image. The central premises of this alternative approach would be that economic and technological power is fundamentally more important than traditional military power in establishing global leadership, and that a physical sphere of influence in East Asia is not a necessary precondition for sustaining such leadership. By this logic, China could simply keep managing a military balance in the Western Pacific—attending to its immediate periphery and especially its territorial claims through its anti-access/area -denial doctrine, and slowly shifting the correlation of forces in its favor—while pursuing global dominance through these other forms of power. China could simply keep managing a military balance in the Western Pacific while pursuing global dominance through these other forms of power. Here, Beijing would consider a different variation of the U.S. analogy. U.S. leadership of the international order that emerged after World War II and was consolidated after the end of the Cold War rested on at least three critical factors. First, the ability to convert economic might into political influence. Second, the maintenance of an innovation advantage over the rest of the world. And third, the capacity to shape the key international institutions and set the key rules of global conduct. In traveling this second road, China would seek to replicate these factors. This would start with the widening ambition of the Belt Road Initiative across Eurasia and Africa. Building and financing physical infrastructure puts China at the center of a web of trade and economic links spanning multiple continents. And the digital component of the effort, the Digital Silk Road, advances China’s stated goal from the 2017 Party Congress of becoming a “cyber-superpower,” by deploying Chinese foundational technologies, driving standard-setting in international bodies, and securing long-term commercial advantages for Chinese firms. (There are indications that China is even using its head-start in recovering from the coronavirus to advance this agenda by claiming additional market share in key industries where competitors are temporarily laid low.) Combining an aggressive foreign economic policy with massive state-directed domestic investments in innovation, China could emerge as the leading player in foundational technologies from artificial intelligence to quantum computing to biotechnology. As China builds economic power through these efforts, it will sharpen its capacity to convert that power into geopolitical influence. Carnegie’s Evan Feigenbaum has identified multiple types of leverage China can use to “lock in its political and economic preferences,” ranging from latent-and-passive to active-and-coercive. He assesses that Beijing will keep refining a “mix and match” strategy that deploys the full range of these tools in dust-ups with a diverse array of countries, from South Korea to Mongolia to Norway. Eventually, China may well adapt a more systematic ladder of escalation to produce preferred outcomes.

#### Maintaining a path for Chinese leadership stops great power wars – China is worse when they’re in decline.

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Why do great powers fight great wars? The conventional answer is a story of rising challengers and declining hegemons. An ascendant power, which chafes at the rules of the existing order, gains ground on an established power—the country that made those rules. Tensions multiply; tests of strength ensue. The outcome is a spiral of fear and hostility leading, almost inevitably, to conflict. “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable,” the ancient historian Thucydides wrote—a truism now invoked, ad nauseum, in explaining the U.S.-China rivalry. The idea of a Thucydides Trap, popularized by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, holds that the danger of war will skyrocket as a surging China overtakes a sagging America. Even Chinese President Xi Jinping has endorsed the concept arguing Washington must make room for Beijing. As tensions between the United States and China escalate, the belief that the fundamental cause of friction is a looming “power transition”—the replacement of one hegemon by another—has become canonical. The only problem with this familiar formula is that it’s wrong. The Thucydides Trap doesn’t really explain what caused the Peloponnesian War. It doesn’t capture the dynamics that have often driven revisionist powers—whether that is Germany in 1914 or Japan in 1941—to start some of history’s most devastating conflicts. And it doesn’t explain why war is a very real possibility in U.S.-China relations today because it fundamentally misdiagnoses where China now finds itself on its arc of development—the point at which its relative power is peaking and will soon start to fade. There’s indeed a deadly trap that could ensnare the United States and China. But it’s not the product of a power transition the Thucydidean cliché says it is. It’s best thought of instead as a “peaking power trap.” And if history is any guide, it’s China’s—not the United States’—impending decline that could cause it to snap shut. There is an entire swath of literature, known as “power transition theory,” which holds that great-power war typically occurs at the intersection of one hegemon’s rise and another’s decline. This is the body of work underpinning the Thucydides Trap, and there is, admittedly, an elemental truth to the idea. The rise of new powers is invariably destabilizing. In the runup to the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century B.C., Athens would not have seemed so menacing to Sparta had it not built a vast empire and become a naval superpower. Washington and Beijing would not be locked in rivalry if China was still poor and weak. Rising powers do expand their influence in ways that threaten reigning powers. But the calculus that produces war—particularly the calculus that pushes revisionist powers, countries seeking to shake up the existing system, to lash out violently—is more complex. A country whose relative wealth and power are growing will surely become more assertive and ambitious. All things equal, it will seek greater global influence and prestige. But if its position is steadily improving, it should postpone a deadly showdown with the reigning hegemon until it has become even stronger. Such a country should follow the dictum former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping laid down for a rising China after the Cold War: It should hide its capabilities and bide its time. Now imagine a different scenario. A dissatisfied state has been building its power and expanding its geopolitical horizons. But then the country peaks, perhaps because its economy slows, perhaps because its own assertiveness provokes a coalition of determined rivals, or perhaps because both of these things happen at once. The future starts to look quite forbidding; a sense of imminent danger starts to replace a feeling of limitless possibility. In these circumstances, a revisionist power may act boldly, even aggressively, to grab what it can before it is too late. The most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline. As we show in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, this scenario is more common than you might think. Historian Donald Kagan showed, for instance, that Athens started acting more belligerently in the years before the Peloponnesian War because it feared adverse shifts in the balance of naval power—in other words, because it was on the verge of losing influence vis-à-vis Sparta. We see the same thing in more recent cases as well. Over the past 150 years, peaking powers—great powers that had been growing dramatically faster than the world average and then suffered a severe, prolonged slowdown—usually don’t fade away quietly. Rather, they become brash and aggressive. They suppress dissent at home and try to regain economic momentum by creating exclusive spheres of influence abroad. They pour money into their militaries and use force to expand their influence. This behavior commonly provokes great-power tensions. In some cases, it touches disastrous wars. This shouldn’t be surprising. Eras of rapid growth supercharge a country’s ambitions, raise its people’s expectations, and make its rivals nervous. During a sustained economic boom, businesses enjoy rising profits and citizens get used to living large. The country becomes a bigger player on the global stage. Then stagnation strikes. Slowing growth makes it harder for leaders to keep the public happy. Economic underperformance weakens the country against its rivals. Fearing upheaval, leaders crack down on dissent. They maneuver desperately to keep geopolitical enemies at bay. Expansion seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic resources and markets, making nationalism a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats. Many countries have followed this path. When the United States’ long post-Civil War economic surge ended, Washington violently suppressed strikes and unrest at home, built a powerful blue-water Navy, and engaged in a fit of belligerence and imperial expansion during the 1890s. After a fast-rising imperial Russia fell into a deep slump at the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist government cracked down hard while also enlarging its military, seeking colonial gains in East Asia and sending around 170,000 soldiers to occupy Manchuria. These moves backfired spectacularly: They antagonized Japan, which beat Russia in the first great-power war of the 20th century. A century later, Russia became aggressive under similar circumstances. Facing a severe, post-2008 economic slowdown, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded two neighboring countries, sought to create a new Eurasian economic bloc, staked Moscow’s claim to a resource-rich Arctic, and steered Russia deeper into dictatorship. Even democratic France engaged in anxious aggrandizement after the end of its postwar economic expansion in the 1970s. It tried to rebuild its old sphere of influence in Africa, deploying 14,000 troops to its former colonies and undertaking a dozen military interventions over the next two decades. All of these cases were complicated, yet the pattern is clear. If a rapid rise gives countries the means to act boldly, the fear of decline serves up a powerful motive for rasher, more urgent expansion. The same thing often happens when fast-rising powers cause their own containment by a hostile coalition. In fact, some of history’s most gruesome wars have come when revisionist powers concluded their path to glory was about to be blocked. Germany’s rivalry with Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is often considered an analogue to U.S.-China competition: In both cases, an autocratic challenger threatened a liberal hegemon. But the more sobering parallel is this: War came when a cornered Germany grasped it would not zip past its rivals without a fight. For decades after unification in 1871, Germany soared. Its factories spewed out iron and steel, erasing Britain’s economic lead. Berlin built Europe’s finest army and battleships that threatened British supremacy at sea. By the early 1900s, Germany was a European heavyweight seeking an enormous sphere of influence—a Mitteleuropa, or Middle Europe­—on the continent. It was also pursuing, under then-Kaiser Wilhelm II, a “world policy” aimed at securing colonies and global power. But during the prelude to war, the kaiser and his aides didn’t feel confident. Germany’s brash behavior caused its encirclement by hostile powers. London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, Russia, formed a “Triple Entente” to block German expansion. By 1914, time was running short. Germany was losing ground economically to a fast-growing Russia; London and France were pursuing economic containment by blocking its access to oil and iron ore. Berlin’s key ally, Austria-Hungary, was being torn apart by ethnic tensions. At home, Germany’s autocratic political system was in trouble. Most ominous, the military balance was shifting. France was enlarging its army; Russia was adding 470,000 men to its military and slashing the time it needed to mobilize for war. Britain announced it would build two battleships for every one built by Berlin. Germany was, for the moment, Europe’s foremost military power. But by 1916 and 1917, it would be hopelessly overmatched. The result was a now-or-never mentality: Germany should “defeat the enemy while we still stand a chance of victory,” declared Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke, even if that meant “provoking a war in the near future.” This is what happened after Serbian nationalists assassinated Austria’s crown prince in June 1914. The kaiser’s government urged Austria-Hungary to crush Serbia, even though that meant war with Russia and France. It then invaded neutral Belgium—the key to its Schlieffen Plan for a two-front war—despite the likelihood of provoking Britain. “This war will turn into a world war in which England will also intervene,” Moltke acknowledged. Germany’s rise had given it the power to gamble for greatness. Its impending decline drove the decisions that plunged the world into war. Imperial Japan followed a similar trajectory. For a half-century after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan was rising steadily. The building of a modern economy and a fierce military allowed Tokyo to win two major wars and accumulate colonial privileges in China, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Yet Japan was not a hyper-belligerent predator: Through the 1920s, it cooperated with the United States, Britain, and other countries to create a cooperative security framework in the Asia-Pacific. During that decade, however, things fell apart. Growth dropped from 6.1 percent annually between 1904 and 1919 to 1.8 percent annually in the 1920s; the Great Depression then shut Japan’s overseas markets. Unemployment soared, and bankrupt farmers sold their daughters. In China, meanwhile, Japanese influence was being challenged by the Soviet Union and a rising nationalist movement under then-Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek. Tokyo’s answer was fascism at home and aggression abroad. From the late 1920s onward, the military conducted a slow-motion coup and harnessed the nation’s resources for “total war.” Japan initiated a massive military buildup and violently established a vast sphere of influence, seizing Manchuria in 1931, invading China in 1937, and laying plans to conquer resource-rich colonies and strategic islands across the Asia-Pacific. The goal was to build an autarkic empire; the result drew a strategic noose around Tokyo’s neck. Japan’s push into China eventually led to a punishing war with the Soviet Union. Japan’s designs on Southeast Asia alarmed Britain. Its drive for regional primacy also made it a foe of the United States—the country from which Tokyo imported nearly all of its oil with an economy vastly larger than Japan’s. Tokyo had antagonized an overwhelming coalition of enemies. It then risked everything rather than accepting humiliation and decline. The precipitating cause, again, was a closing window of opportunity. By 1941, the United States was building an unbeatable military. In July, then-U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt imposed an oil embargo that threatened to stop Japan’s expansion in its tracks. But Japan still had a temporary military edge in the Pacific Ocean, thanks to its early rearmament. So it used that advantage in a lightning attack—seizing the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and other possessions from Singapore to Wake Island as well as bombing the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor—which guaranteed its own destruction. Japan’s prospects for victory were dim, acknowledged then-Japanese Gen. Hideki Tojo, yet there was no choice but to “close one’s eyes and jump.” A revisionist Japan became most violent when it saw that time was running out. This is the real trap the United States should worry about regarding China today—the trap in which an aspiring superpower peaks and then refuses to bear the painful consequences of descent. China’s rise is no mirage: Decades of growth have given Beijing the economic sinews of global power. Major investments in key technologies and communications infrastructure have yielded a strong position in the struggle for geoeconomic influence; China is using a multi-continent Belt and Road Initiative to bring other states into its orbit. Most alarming, think tank assessments and U.S. Defense Department reports show China’s increasingly formidable military now stands a real chance of winning a war against the United States in the Western Pacific. It is unsurprising, therefore, that China has also developed the ambitions of a superpower: Xi has more or less announced that Beijing desires to assert its sovereignty over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other disputed areas, becoming Asia’s preeminent power and challenging the United States for global leadership. Yet if China’s geopolitical window of opportunity is real, its future is already starting to look quite grim because it is quickly losing the advantages that propelled its rapid growth

### 1nc – Russia Alliance

#### Sino-Russian relations are not anti-western now, but the Ukraine War risks pushing them into a full alliance.

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While the Russia-China relationship has undoubtedly grown in substance for the last decade and a half, Moscow and Beijing have not established a revisionist anti-Western alliance yet. There are meaningful lim- itations as to what each side wants to (or can) do to support the other. More often than not, Beijing and Moscow have engaged in parallel rather than in co- ordinated activities, benefitting from the other side drawing away attention of the West and thus increas- ing their room for manoeuvre. Russia’s war against Ukraine is pushing Beijing to take the decision it has been trying to avoid – how far to support Moscow’s rivalry with the West. Depending on this decision, we may see an increase in China’s economic support for Moscow, which would be related first and foremost to Chinese assessments of the prospects of their relations with the West, the US in particular. The fact that the future of the relationship depends so much on China is another testimony to the asymmetry that has become the key feature of the relationship.

#### Aggressive security policies by the US push China into a full Russian alliance.

Kaczmarski 22 (Marcin Kaczmarski is a lecturer in Security Studies, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. “The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations,” 4/28/22, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1683#\_edn0)ZK

Whereas China has supported Russia politically, the war has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position with regard to the extent of possible material assistance for Russia. At this stage, the scope of Beijing’s possible economic assistance for Russia remains unknown; so far, China has avoided any specific declarations that would suggest readiness to help Russia bypass Western sanctions. On the one hand, Beijing may be tempted to capital- ise on Russia’s weakness. Western sanctions have been gradually depriving Russia of access to partners, cap- ital and advanced technologies. China might be par- ticularly interested in gaining stakes in Russian energy companies as well as in the Russian upstream. Russia’s weakness might enable Beijing to entrench its influ- ence in the Russian energy sector, including the own- ership in Rosneft or Gazprom as well as in the most promising oil and gas fields. China may also be unwilling to allow for Russia failure in the war against Ukraine under the Western pressure. This would not only deprive Beijing of a vi- able partner, leaving China on its own with the em- powered US/West. It would also weaken the position of Xi Jinping, due to his personal investment in the relationship with Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, support for Russia would gener- ate a number of risks for Beijing. Economic assistance for Russia, especially its energy sector, will be difficult to hide from Western scrutiny, which, in turn, would make Chinese companies subject to secondary sanc- tions. China is much more exposed to the world and globalisation process than Russia. The Chinese econ- omy still relies on the openness of the global econ- omy. Moreover, China’s tangible support for Russia may bring the US and European states closer together and strengthen trans-Atlantic unity, a result Beijing has been trying to avoid for the last two decades. A factor that may be decisive in shaping Beijing’s choices is the long-term assessment of China’s re- lations with the US. In case Chinese leaders, and Xi Jinping in particular, recognise the possibil- ity and the value of a “strategic pause” in the Sino-American rivalry, they may favour keeping a certain distance from Russia. While we can expect China to support Russia polit- ically, in this scenario Beijing would refrain from assisting Moscow in bypassing Western sanctions. However, if Chinese leaders do not see the prospects for a Sino-American “truce”, they will be tempted to strength- en Russia as being in the avant-garde of a prolonged conflict with the US. From this perspective, a durable (in the foreseeable future and at least throughout Pu- tin’s presidency) Russian-Western antagonism would offer clear strategic benefits to China, worth risking some deterioration in relations with the US and Eu- ropean states. Finally, the possibility of domestic change in Rus- sia induced by the war remains a risk for China. So far, the war and the sanctions have not generated a decline of Putin’s power, but such developments re- main plausible. The implications of both the change in the Kremlin and a broader domestic change in Rus- sia would be far-reaching for Sino-Russian relations. Regardless of whether politics in a post-Putin Russia would embark on a democratisation path or contin- ue along authoritarian lines, a new leader will gain an opportunity to reassess Russia’s relations with China. While the sceptical voices have been largely silenced for the last decade, the dissatisfaction with the role of a “junior partner” and fear of Chinese nationalism re- main present in the Russian elite.4

#### A Russia-China alliance causes extinction

— cyber-attacks, Russian aggression, and Chinese expansionism.

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While Washington takes a wait-and-see approach, Moscow and Beijing could be coordinating to significantly thwart U.S. interests over the next 15 to 25 years. The two powers may never forge a formal military alliance, but they could still work together in ways that cause major headaches for the United States. Imagine, for example, that Russia and China coordinate the timing of hostile actions on their peripheries. If China made aggressive moves in support of its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea at the same time that Russia made further incursions into Ukraine, U.S. forces would struggle to respond effectively to either gambit. Nonmilitary collaboration between Russia and China could weaken the United States and even threaten its way of life. Both countries are likely to use their cyber and disinformation capabilities to, as the director of national intelligence put it in January, “steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” China currently does not exhibit Russia’s zeal for using such measures, particularly against the United States; but if U.S.-Chinese relations darken, Beijing could plausibly take a page from Russia’s playbook and mount coordinated, deniable cyberattacks or interference campaigns against the United States. China and Russia behave very differently in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, but the combined effect of their actions is often greater than the sum of its parts. In Europe, for example, China has amassed economic influence through growing trade relationships and Belt and Road-related infrastructure investments not contingent on standards for democratic governance and human rights, particularly in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy. This engagement will ultimately translate into political leverage, as it already has in many countries in Asia. Russia, for its part, appears intent on pursuing hybrid tactics that disrupt democratic processes. On their own, each of these activities is already worrisome for the United States and Europe. But a scenario in which each country’s actions amplify the other’s is not hard to imagine. China, for example, could eventually use its growing ownership of European ports and rail lines to slow a NATO response to Russian aggression. Likewise, Beijing could use the economic leverage it has accrued to quietly dissuade an already reluctant NATO member state such as Hungary or Turkey from responding to Russia’s hybrid tactics, which could ultimately serve to discredit NATO’s commitment to collective defense.

## Uniqueness

### China AI Now

#### China is leading in AI regulation but it’s close—EU is on their heels with new tech legislation

**Keane ’22** (Jonathan Keane is a contributor at CNBC, "China and Europe are leading the push to regulate A.I.—one of them could set the global playbook,” <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/26/china-and-europe-are-leading-the-push-to-regulate-ai.html>

As China and Europe try to rein in artificial intelligence, a new front is opening up around who will set the standards for the burgeoning technology. In March, China rolled out regulations governing the way online recommendations are generated through algorithms, suggesting what to buy, watch or read. It is the latest salvo in China’s tightening grip on the tech sector, and lays down an important marker in the way that AI is regulated. “For some people it was a surprise that last year, China started drafting the AI regulation. It’s one of the first major economies to put it on the regulatory agenda,” Xiaomeng Lu, director of Eurasia Group’s geo-technology practice, told CNBC. While China revamps its rulebook for tech, the European Union is thrashing out its own regulatory framework to rein in AI, but it has yet to pass the finish line. With two of the world’s largest economies presenting AI regulations, the field for AI development and business globally could be about to undergo a significant change. At the core of China’s latest policy is online recommendation systems. Companies must inform users if an algorithm is being used to display certain information to them, and people can choose to opt out of being targeted. Lu said that this is an important shift as it grants people a greater say over the digital services they use. Those rules come amid a changing environment in China for their biggest internet companies. Several of China’s homegrown tech giants — including Tencent, Alibaba and ByteDance — have found themselves in hot water with authorities, namely around antitrust. “I think those trends shifted the government attitude on this quite a bit, to the extent that they start looking at other questionable market practices and algorithms promoting services and products,” Lu said. China’s moves are noteworthy, given how quickly they were implemented, compared with the timeframes that other jurisdictions typically work with when it comes to regulation. China’s approach could provide a playbook that influences other laws internationally, said Matt Sheehan, a fellow at the Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “I see China’s AI regulations and the fact that they’re moving first as essentially running some large-scale experiments that the rest of the world can watch and potentially learn something from,” he said. The European Union is also hammering out its own rules. The AI Act is the next major piece of tech legislation on the agenda in what has been a busy few years. In recent weeks, it closed negotiations on the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act, two major regulations that will curtail Big Tech. The AI law now seeks to impose an all-encompassing framework based on the level of risk, which will have far-reaching effects on what products a company brings to market. It defines four categories of risk in AI: minimal, limited, high and unacceptable. France, which holds the rotating EU Council presidency, has floated new powers for national authorities to audit AI products before they hit the market. Defining these risks and categories has proven fraught at times, with members of the European Parliament calling for a ban on facial recognition in public places to restrict its use by law enforcement. However, the European Commission wants to ensure it can be used in investigations while privacy activists fear it will increase surveillance and erode privacy. Sheehan said that although the political system and motivations of China will be “totally anathema” to lawmakers in Europe, the technical objectives of both sides bear many similarities — and the West should pay attention to how China implements them. “We don’t want to mimic any of the ideological or speech controls that are deployed in China, but some of these problems on a more technical side are similar in different jurisdictions. And I think that the rest of the world should be watching what happens out of China from a technical perspective.” China’s efforts are more prescriptive, he said, and they include algorithm recommendation rules that could rein in the influence of tech companies on public opinion. The AI Act, on the other hand, is a broad-brush effort that seeks to bring all of AI under one regulatory roof. Lu said the European approach will be “more onerous” on companies as it will require premarket assessment. “That’s a very restrictive system versus the Chinese version, they are basically testing products and services on the market, not doing that before those products or services are being introduced to consumers.”

#### China will overtake the US in tech leadership – current cyber developments put China as the frontrunner in AI

Lu 21 (Jie Lu is Head of Investments China in the Asia Pacific team. Before joining Robeco in 2015, he worked at Norges Bank Investment Management as a Portfolio Manager in Shanghai from 2011 to 2015, and as an Analyst in Hong Kong from 2009 to 2011, “China: navigating the push towards technology leadership,” Robeco, 5/10/2021, <https://www.robeco.com/us/insights/2021/10/china-navigating-the-push-towards-technology-leadership.html>) - MP

Research and development (R&D) statistics illustrate this ambition. Supported by higher economic growth, China is actually expected to take global R&D leadership this year, and outspend the US for the very first time.1 China now leads the pack in many areas, such as artificial intelligence (AI), 5G telecommunication networks, ultra-high voltage electricity networks or high-speed rail. While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight While China’s technology push is hardly news, rising tensions with the West, in particular with the US, have put it under the spotlight. Over the past few years, Chinese officials have increased their emphasis on the need to become less dependent on foreign technology. Some have even theorized a so-called ‘technology decoupling’, advocating self-sufficiency in a number of critical industries. However, one key consideration to bear in mind is that China’s technology push amid rising tensions with the US does not necessarily herald a full economic decoupling, nor an era of deglobalization, as some have argued.2 For now, US restrictions on exports to China issued in 2020 remain essentially focused on a few select technologies, where non-US alternatives are difficult to find. Meanwhile, China's main policy goal remains to improve the country’s manufacturing capability to produce higher value-added goods and services, and keep the economic growth engine roaring. Policy makers acknowledge that this will be impossible without importing advanced technologies from the US, Europe, Japan, or South Korea. Figure 1: MIC 2025’s ten strategic industries Source: China State Council, MERICS, Robeco, September 2021. China’s technology ambitions were formally articulated in 2015 with the ‘Made in China 2025’ (MIC 2025) initiative, a ten-year comprehensive blueprint aiming to modernize further the country’s industrial base. MIC 2025 identifies ten strategic sectors, including aerospace equipment, medical devices, or high-tech ships, in which China intends to excel and secure a leading position. Focus on a few selected technologies Even under the MIC 2025 umbrella, the designated ten core industries are clearly not all being pursued with the same intensity. In recent years, China has been prioritizing efforts in a small number of emerging technologies, including AI, semiconductors, robotics, and new energy vehicles (NEVs), 3 with colossal efforts being deployed from a human and a financial perspective. Figure 2: Top 20 countries in AI paper output 1997-2017 Source: China Institute for Science and Technology Policy, July 2018, “China AI Development Report 2018”, Tsinghua University. AI, for instance, is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level.4 The Chinese AI-related ecosystem benefits from various supporting factors, including the country’s gigantic market size which provided a unique opportunity to assemble large datasets, and a long-standing friendly policy environment. AI is perhaps the area in which China has achieved the most spectacular results and secured a clear leading position at global level China seems therefore poised to become a leader in AI-empowered businesses, like speech and image recognition applications. At global level, the main AI services providers remain large US technology giants, but Chinese firms are catching up fast. China already employs the world’s largest cohort, by far, of AI professionals, with over 12,000 AI jobs in 2019, versus roughly 7,500 for the US.5 Another area where strong progress has been made NEVs. China has the world’s largest fleet of NEVs in circulation, far ahead of Europe and the US, as well as the world’s largest battery-charging network. And although the country’s NEV car registrations were overtaken by European ones last year, it remains one of the most dynamic markets, largely dominated by local manufacturers. Figure 3: Market share of top five battery makers Source: SNE Research, March 2021. China has also managed to secure a leading position in various areas of the NEV supply chain. This is especially the case for electric battery production, where the largest Chinese manufacturers have emerged as global leaders along with their South Korean and Japanese competitors. Altogether, China accounts for over 70% of global battery cell production capacity. 6 Three investment themes China’s technology push is offering opportunities in many industries, but finding these is not always straightforward. Not all initiatives have lived up to expectations, so far, and political will does not warrant success. Yet that does not mean opportunities in areas where results have been mixed are entirely absent, nor that policy success will necessarily lead to attractive returns for investors. From this perspective, we have identified three major investment themes worth considering: the relentless rise of NEVs, the advent of ‘industry 4.0’ in China, and an increased focus on the localization of supply chains. Given the bright prospects these three trends offer, we believe this is where some of the most interesting opportunities are to be found.

### Cooperation Now

#### **China and the US will collaborate on AI research even through strategic tensions**

Andrews 3/16 (Edmund L. Andrews is a former economics reporter for The New York Times who served as a technology reporter in Washington, European economics correspondent and Washington economics correspondent, “China and the United States: Unlikely Partners in AI,” Stanford University Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, 3/16/2022, <https://hai.stanford.edu/news/china-and-united-states-unlikely-partners-ai>) – MP

Despite both rivalry and rising tensions between the United States and China, the two nations have become the world’s leading collaborators in research on artificial intelligence. The newly released AI Index Report, which tracks AI trends on a host of fronts and is published by the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, finds that U.S. and Chinese AI researchers teamed up on far more published articles than collaborators between any other two nations. Overall, U.S.-China collaborations on AI research have quintupled since 2010 and totaled 9,660 papers in 2021—much faster than the increase in collaborations between any other two nations. Collaborations between the United States and United Kingdom, the second most prolific source of cross-border research, increased almost threefold to 3,560 papers. Read the 2022 AI Index The startling trend highlights a paradox. Even as China and the U.S. race for leadership in what they view as a strategically important technology, researchers on both sides appear to see benefits in sharing expertise and working together. “What’s clear is that the amount of collaboration between the United States and China has gone up dramatically, and it has gone up much more than collaborations between any two other countries,” says Raymond Perrault, Distinguished Computer Scientist at SRI International in Menlo Park and co-chair of the AI Index Steering Committee. To some extent, the surge in U.S.-China research simply reflects the fact that both nations have poured vast resources into artificial intelligence and produce huge amounts of research. On top of that, many Chinese researchers were trained in the United States and retain close professional ties to their American colleagues. But the practice is consistent with patterns observed during previous technological revolutions in textiles, steel, and chemical engineering. Research by Jeffrey Ding, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford HAI, has shown that the full economic impact of historic tech advances stemmed less from which nation pioneered a technology than from which ones were best at applying it across a broad range of industries. That dispersion of technology requires sharing information across industries as well as borders, much as the United States catapulted applied British advances in steel machinery to develop manufacturing approaches that catapulted it to economic dominance. That said, the collaboration in AI comes at a time of growing friction between the United States and China over trade, human rights, and strategic power in the Pacific Rim. Former President Donald Trump villainized China over its trade practices, and President Joe Biden imposed a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics over China's human rights abuses. Indeed, the volume of published U.S.-China collaborations in AI has declined slightly from its peak in 2019. Perrault says it’s unclear whether the recent dip reflects a lag in data, a temporary disruption, or a more fundamental change. Collaborations have also declined slightly between most other nations, such as those between researchers in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Globally, AI research has soared over the past decade. The volume of peer-reviewed AI journal articles has more than doubled since 2015, hitting a new record of 172,000 papers in 2021. On top of that, researchers posted 56,000 pre-print articles in repositories specializing in AI. Chinese researchers have been the most prolific for the past several years, publishing 27.5% of all AI journal articles worldwide. American researchers accounted for 12%. Chinese journal articles also led those of every other nation in citations, an indicator of their scientific importance. And although the United States continues to receive more AI patents than any other nation, China is now filing more than half of all the world’s patent applications in the field. Image Graph showing increase in patent filings in China (51.69% of total) while patent filings in the U.S. fall (16.92%) AI research has also intensified in most other parts of the world, notably in the European Union, Canada, and Japan. The one notable exception is Russia, which has largely gone its own way. “Russia is way, way smaller in this area,’’ says Perrault. In the United States, 1,200 institutions published roughly 3,000 cross-border AI collaborations in 2021. In China, 500 institutions published 2,000 cross-border projects. By contrast only 60 Russian institutions teamed up on 600 AI projects.

### AT: NATO Rhetoric

#### The ‘no limits’ rhetoric is just posturing, Russian Chinese relations still have holes

Huang 22 (Eustance Huang is a reporter based out of CNBC’s Singapore office. “Take China and Russia’s ‘no limits’ relationship with a ‘grain of salt,’ says former PBOC advisor,” 3-31-22, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/31/take-china-russia-no-limit-relationship-with-grain-of-salt-li-daokui.html)

China and Russia’s so-called “no limits” partnership is “situational” and should be taken “with a grain of salt,” according to Li Daokui, former advisor to the country’s central bank, known as the People’s Bank of China. Before Russia invaded Ukraine in late February, Beijing and Moscow announced a “no limits” strategic partnership they said was meant to counter U.S. influence. In a joint statement, both countries said there were no “forbidden areas” of cooperation, but they did not mention Ukraine even though Russian troops were building up on the Ukrainian border at that time. “I choose to believe that China will not support Russia in a military way,” Li, currently Mansfield Freeman professor of economics at Tsinghua University, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia” on Wednesday. ”[The] no limit relationship should be read with a grain of salt.” “However, China will keep on doing business with Russia based on humanitarian principles. That is, to help Russian residents to tough through this very difficult period of time,” he said. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Beijing’s official stance has been to blame the conflict on NATO’s eastward expansion. Chinese authorities have so far refused to fully condemn Moscow’s invasion of its neighbor. It stands in sharp contrast to much of the developed world, where multiple countries have slapped unprecedented sanctions against Russian businesses, banks and individuals that left Moscow with serious consequences for its unprovoked invasion. The Russian economy is expected to fall into a deep recession this year, with the Institute of International Finance predicting a contraction of up to 15% as a result of the war. Li predicted that Beijing, in the meantime, will be “very proactive” in pushing for both Russia and Ukraine to “come to a speedy agreement.” “Let’s keep in mind: both Russia and Ukraine before this conflict have been good friends with China,” he said. “People tend to forget — Ukraine is actually wonderful, wonderful friend of China also, besides Russia.”

### AT: New Strategic Concept

#### Historical context outweighs recent statements – Strong rhetoric, doesn’t translate to policies – the DA is still unique because plan changes the ‘low-key’ approach to recalibrate substantial resources and security policies to China – that causes NATO in-fighting and forces confrontation with China.

Michaels ’21 (Jeffrey H. Senior Research Fellow at IBEI in Spain, “‘A very different kind of challenge’? NATO’s prioritization of China in historical perspective,” Int Polit. 2021 Jul 16 : 1–20, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8284693/)

Having addressed four categories of possible actions the Alliance may take with respect to China, it is now essential to address the degree to which a consensus on these actions exists among member states. The USA has clearly taken the strongest hard-line stance on China. During the Trump administration, Washington viewed its continued support for NATO at least in part on the extent to which the rest of the Alliance accepted the US characterization of China as a strategic competitor. Essentially this amounted to NATO adopting critical rhetoric about China in support of the American position, but not making any major changes to its diplomacy or military posture. Since his inauguration, President Biden has continued to emphasize the security threat posed by China, though typically framing it in the broader context of authoritarian governments versus democracies. The United Kingdom has closely echoed the American rhetoric about China and is considering adapting its military posture to maintain some presence in Asia (Fisher, 2020; Patalano, 2019). A second group of member states, particularly in Eastern Europe, are happy to pay lip service to American policy preferences so long as the USA does not detract too much attention and resources away from defense against threats in its immediate neighbourhood. A third group consists of member states that wish to maintain Alliance cohesion but are also unwilling to oppose China in any significant way, especially not with a public condemnation, largely due to fear of economic retaliation. Both of the latter two groups of NATO members are more or less united in their opposition to the Alliance taking anything other than superficial actions against China. This low-key approach has also been replicated, to some degree, in the formation of EU policy towards China (Brady, 2020; Peel, 2020). Of note has been the lack of a pro-China faction seeking to prevent NATO in the first instance from portraying China as a security problem. China is now established on the NATO agenda and is set to become further enshrined in the forthcoming Strategic Concept. Looking ahead, policy positions within the Alliance will reflect a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. Conclusion Though the NATO 2030 report labelled China ‘a very different kind of challenge’, it does not represent a *new* challenge for NATO. Understanding the evolution of NATO’s approach to China provides important clues about the future relationship. For example, without any historical knowledge, the prospect of China posing a direct threat to the NATO area, including a nuclear threat, as discussed by some present-day officials and commentators, as well as in the 2021 communiqué, might seem an ominous prospect. Yet when placed in the context of NATO officials in the mid-1960s making similar claims, the prospect becomes less menacing. That the Alliance has been reluctant to engage militarily in the Asia-Pacific, despite American requests to do so, also has a long lineage, and there are few indications that the reasons for this long-standing reluctance have altered in any fundamental way, particularly given the omnipresent threat posed by Russia. On the other hand, prospects for meaningful cooperation with China lack precedent. During the heyday of good relations in the 1980s or in the post-9/11 decade, neither side seemed interested in establishing more meaningful ties, despite many common interests. Thus, the historical record of NATO policy towards China offers many insights regarding the spectrum of positive and negative relations. As the Alliance crafts its eighth Strategic Concept, there is little doubt the degree to which China features in the document, beyond what has already been agreed in earlier policy statements, will provoke intense internal debate. Based on historical precedent, the NATO debate will almost certainly be inconclusive given the diversity of views about acceptable and unacceptable actions. Whereas the USA might prefer that NATO replicate its own set of security priorities, essentially by recognizing that China constitutes a more important long-term challenge than Russia, this is not a realistic prospect. It is more likely the Alliance will continue adhering to the US rhetoric on China as a long-term strategic competitor but will avoid any substantive change in policy. It will also avoid making any major institutional transformation to become an active player in the Asia-Pacific, preferring instead to re-emphasize defensive measures closer to home which will have the added utility of strengthening NATO’s defenses vis-a-vis Russia.

### Econ Uniqueness

#### China econ is set to surpass US, but is on the brink of falling short.

Reshma Kapadia, 5-2-2022, ("How China's Economic Pain Could Help Avoid a Global Recession," No Publication, <https://www.barrons.com/articles/china-economy-trouble-recession-51651516408>) --sri

STEVE INSKEEP, HOST: President Biden recently made an obscure statement with big implications. It was a statement about the United States and its great rival, China. In a Wall Street Journal article, the president wrote, the U.S. economy may grow faster this year than China’s economy for the first time since 1976. That would be news if it happened. The U.S. has the world’s largest economy, but China, with its giant population, has drawn closer year by year. So could the U.S. reverse that trend and pull farther ahead? ARTHUR KROEBER: It’s possible. I wouldn’t say that it’s terribly likely. INSKEEP: China specialist Arthur Kroeber gives that assessment. He nonetheless says China faces a lot of uncertainty about its growth, now and in the future. Since money can translate into global power, a lot is at stake. So we talked through China’s economic problems. Problems this spring included massive COVID lockdowns in the economic center of Shanghai. KROEBER: I think, base case, we’re looking at another 12 months, at least, of China being pretty strict in its COVID control and, you know, accepting some economic damage as a result of that. INSKEEP: As an authoritarian system, are there parts of the government that are kind of comfortable shutting down the country and keeping the borders fairly closed? KROEBER: Oh, for sure. I mean, I think the Communist Party has a strong interest in control and surveillance. And then if you look at the border controls, I think for a lot of countries, reopening the borders has been very important because they want to promote travel and, you know, all kinds of economic activity that depends on face-to-face interaction. Chinese government has been, you know, pretty accepting of the idea that we closed the borders. We don’t have too many people coming in. That’s fine. We do our thing. We make our stuff in our factories and send it to the rest of the world. We don’t actually need open borders to run the kind of economy that we want. INSKEEP: What other factors might be dragging down the Chinese economy? KROEBER: Well, so the government initiated a pretty big crackdown on the big internet platform companies - companies like Alibaba and Tencent - that, like the big internet companies in the U.S., reap enormous profits by scooping up lots of consumer data and, you know, doing things that are, you know, maybe questionable from a market power or a privacy standpoint. And some people have said, well, this - also, because these companies are privately owned, this is kind of a signal that the government is more hostile to private enterprise. I think that’s somewhat debatable, but that’s clearly a risk. The other big thing that is a major problem long-term for them is the property sector. They’ve derived a lot of their growth over the last 20 years basically from the biggest property boom in history. And it’s now clear that the sort of underlying rate of demand for housing in urban areas has peaked. So this major source of growth is evaporating. INSKEEP: Does the war in Ukraine affect China’s economy? KROEBER: The main impact is that China derives a lot of its growth still from exports. The major markets for their exports are Europe and the U.S. Europe, in particular, is looking like it’s going to have, you know, very weak growth, maybe even a recession this year. U.S. is maybe not looking so hot. That’s going to hurt the Chinese export sector, and that’s going to bring their growth down a bit. INSKEEP: Does China get some benefit from allying itself with Russia, which has very few other allies in the world? KROEBER: Yeah, well, that’s a great question. And I think beneath the surface in China, there’s a lot of debate about that. I think there are plenty of people within the Chinese system who are quite unhappy with the decision to place all the national chips in the Russia corner. But I think if you look at this from the standpoint of Xi Jinping, why did he do this? I think there’s a judgment that, No. 1, the U.S. is now implacably hostile towards China, wants to contain China, wants to constrain its growth and so they need friends wherever they can get them. INSKEEP: Let’s test Xi’s assumption that you mentioned there. Is the United States actively trying to constrain China’s growth, and are they able to do anything that would actually accomplish that? KROEBER: Well, Secretary Blinken said no, the U.S. is not trying to constrain Chinese growth. I think, though, if you look at actual U.S. policies, which are all about constraining flows of trade, technology and finance to China, it would be reasonable for people in China to look at this and say, well, you’re saying one thing, but actually, your actions show that you’re interested in slowing China’s rate of growth and constraining our ability to rise in economic power. INSKEEP: Can the U.S. do that? KROEBER: I think the short answer is no. China is now the leading trade partner for a majority of the world’s countries. They’re trying to substitute stuff that they import with domestic products. So China can, I think, take itself out of the global economy, but I think it will be very difficult for the U.S. to do that. INSKEEP: So let me circle back to the statement with which we began, the statement by President Biden about the U.S. outstripping China, maybe for a year. We have lived for many years with the idea that China’s economy, at some point, maybe not too far in the future, will be larger than the United States, that the U.S. will no longer be the world’s largest economy, which would have huge implications. Maybe there’s another scenario where China turns out like Japan in the ’80s, where it was thought they were going to surpass the United States, but they stagnated and their population started shrinking and just - things turned out differently. Is it possible that China does not overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy any time soon? KROEBER: Yeah, I think it’s definitely possible. I would basically rate the odds as about a coin flip. They’re pouring huge amounts of government resources to build up their semiconductor industries, other high-tech industries. And their theory is that if they build up these high-tech industries, this will generate a lot of productivity growth. You know, and if that succeeds and they’re right, then China would overtake the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy sometime early in the 2030s. And then there would be a question of how long they could sustain that lead, given that they’re in long-term demographic decline, whereas the U.S. is probably going to keep adding population. But then the other possibility is that they’re wrong, that they can’t generate enough productivity from this technology investment, that they need more sort of market-oriented reforms to deregulate and create more consumer-driven demand. And that if they don’t do that, then they’ll stagnate, which I think, in China’s case, means that they’ll start growing more like 2 to 3% - so maybe slightly more than the U.S., but not that much. And then you can easily construct a scenario under which they never catch up with U.S. INSKEEP: Arthur Kroeber, author of “China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs To Know,” thanks so much. KROEBER: My pleasure.

#### China econ recovering –

While most economies are falling, China’s seem to be on the long path to recovery post omicron shutdowns, expected to peak higher than after first COVID recession, but at a slower rate

Sheng 22 (Sylvia Sheng. Vice president of South China Morning Post, a global strategist on the multi-asset solutions team and responsible for communicating the group's economic and asset allocation strategy. "Chinese economy set to rebound as pandemic risks ease". July 2, 2022. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3183634/chinas-economy-set-rebound-pandemic-risks-ease. 7-1-2022.)-cg

Despite being only halfway through the year, 2022 already seems set to be a remarkable one. Inflation in many developed-market economies is at multi-decade highs, while the S&P 500 had the worst start to the year in half a century. Amid the volatile market environment, the resilience of Chinese equities is notable. China’s benchmark CSI 300 Index has rallied about 10 per cent in the past month. It is one of the few major equity markets to have recorded a positive return in that period, outperforming both developed- and emerging-market equities. Chinese equities look better positioned in the current global macro environment, given more favourable growth and policy cycles than the rest of the world. The core problem across developed economies is elevated inflation rates. In the United States, for example, core consumer price inflation was running at 6 per cent year on year in May, well above the US Federal Reserve’s target of 2 per cent. Euro-zone inflation has also accelerated in recent months. Central banks are tightening monetary policy in the face of these pressures. To successfully contain inflation, they must cool aggregate demand, which means a slower pace of growth. As a result, caution is warranted on the outlook for developed economies as they are likely to experience a period of sluggish growth. In contrast, inflation is not a prevailing issue in China as core inflation remains below 1 per cent. As such, it is unlikely to constrain further policy easing. China’s economic growth is likely to recover in the second half of 2022, helped by strong policy support and the fading impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Policy easing has been ramped up on the monetary, fiscal and property fronts in recent months. There have also been positive developments on technology regulation, including the issuance of a second batch of gaming licences, which suggests we may be past the peak of regulatory tightening. While the magnitude of policy easing introduced so far is modest compared with in the past, the frequency of recent announcements suggests policymakers are increasingly concerned about the risks to growth. Fiscal policy is likely to be the key focus in the near term. Beijing has long turned to fiscal support for infrastructure investment as an important lever to stabilise the economy. The strength and pace of infrastructure stimulus will be central for China’s growth recovery in the coming months. Fiscal funding is important to monitor the progress of infrastructure stimulus. So far, weaker-than-expected fiscal revenue and land sales because of the pandemic and ongoing property downturn are weighing on funding for infrastructure investment from the state budget. So we should expect policymakers to lean more on the government-run policy banks to fill the funding gap. Premier Li Keqiang recently announced an 800 billion yuan (US$119.4 billion) additional quota for policy bank lending specifically designated for infrastructure investment. As Covid-19 restrictions have eased amid falling case counts, the Chinese economy has taken the first steps towards recovery. Stronger-than-expected May activity suggests growth momentum bottomed out in April as the country moved past the worst of the pandemic-induced economic drag. China’s recovery is likely to be led by a resumption of production and supply chain normalisation, followed by a recovery in consumption demand. This would be consistent with the experience of Shenzhen, one of the first major cities in China to reopen after an Omicron-driven lockdown in March. Shenzhen’s “slow life” Covid-19 fight an evolving pandemic strategy from mainland China? High-frequency indicators show that intracity traffic and truck flows recovered in around two weeks to pre-lockdown levels as the city reopened. However, lingering Covid-19 restrictions have made it more challenging for service-sector consumption – such as in-restaurant dining and going to cinemas – to recover. Overall, we should expect a more gradual recovery in the second half of the year, compared with the V-shaped recovery in spring 2020. The unsynchronised lockdowns across major cities are likely to lead to a staggered reopening process, limiting the speed of the rebound. Moreover, China is unlikely to enjoy the same tailwind from global goods demand and a buoyant domestic property sector that it did in 2020. Uncertainties about the virus and the “zero-Covid” policy are also likely to weigh on sentiment. While slowing global growth will constrain the extent of China’s rebound, the expected recovery is a distinctly different path from weakening growth elsewhere. The divergence in policy and growth cycles between China and the rest of the world is likely to underpin Chinese equities’ continued outperformance, relatively speaking, in the coming months.

#### China econ on the brink.

Jane Li et al, 10-15-2021, (Jane Li is a reporter covering China's economy and social trends "China is the engine for global economic growth. What happens if it slows down?," Quartz, <https://qz.com/2072618/could-chinas-economy-collapse/>) --sri

For almost half a century, Chinese officials have overseen one of the greatest economic transformations in human history. The country has gone from collectivized farms and famine to world-leading tech companies and gleaming megacities connected by superfast trains. More than 800 million Chinese have been pulled out of poverty as the Communist Party and its leader Xi Jinping string together (according to the party’s numbers) decades of uninterrupted growth. But the economy is now at another turning point. In an effort to control what it sees as the excesses of the market, and to limit companies’ power and influence, the party has deliberately swept the legs out from under giants like e-commerce titan Alibaba and ride-hailing upstart Didi, wiping out billions of dollars of market value from China’s most dynamic enterprises. Evergrande, the massive property developer on the brink of collapse, shows that China’s real-estate boom could be unraveling, with the possibility of sickening the entire economy. (On Oct. 13, after Evegrande missed yet another scheduled coupon payment, borrowing costs for China’s riskier firms soared to record highs.) If that wasn’t enough, president Xi Jinping also has to manage an electricity crunch—triggered partly by his own aims to cut carbon emissions—that could wear down manufacturing and industry. These problems come at a sensitive time, for both China and the world. At the party congress next year, Xi may look to secure an unprecedented third term in office, after he abolished the term limits on the presidency in 2018. The party depends on muscular economic growth to retain its perennial grip on power. “This was the Faustian bargain, never really explicitly stated but understood, that you get zero political representation but we keep the economy ticking along,” said Fraser Howie, co-author of Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise and a former equity-derivatives trader at Morgan Stanley. But, Howie said, clearly that bargain is “starting to fray around the edges.” Symptoms of an imbalance in the economy include widening inequality, a dangerous dependence on real-estate, climate-change risks, and high levels of both corporate and consumer debt. The government’s reforms aim to make life better for rank-and-file workers and their families, and maintain power, but they could also derail the economy as market forces are replaced with even more party control. Elsewhere too, a slowing-down of the Chinese economic engine—at a time when the world is struggling to recover from the pandemic—presents an alarming prospect for investors and policymakers. The question is unavoidable: What would a contracting Chinese economy mean, for both China and the world? How one building block of China’s economy broke down It’s hard to overstate how important real estate has become to Chinese growth, and it’s a story that goes back three decades. Soon after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the Chinese government instituted a series of economic reforms. One of them was to “put all the responsibility for social services on local governments and yet give them none of the financing,” said Anne Stevenson-Yang, the co-founder of J Capital Research, which publishes reports on Chinese listed companies. A crying student walks towards her family member after the annual national college entrance exam in The solution that the local governments came up with, Stevenson-Yang said, was to monetize land. They’d borrow money to buy up small adjoining patches of farmland or housing, then sell the aggregate to a real estate developer. Everyone seemed happy, Stevenson-Yang said: “The government got taxes from all the cement plants and steel mills and construction companies. The local governments could keep borrowing and selling. The people who lived on these small plots of land could move into the high-rise complexes that were built there. No one had an incentive for this cycle to decline.” For the government, real estate offered an easy way to fend off worries of flagging growth—perhaps too easy. Housing in large Chinese cities is among the most expensive in the world when measured as a share of income. Property, including construction and related industries, now accounts for roughly a third of the country’s gross domestic product, according to now widely cited estimates by Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University and Yuanchen Yang of Tsinghua University. Some have likened the boom in Chinese real estate to those in the US and Japan in earlier decades; house prices in China’s tier-one cities have soared sixfold since 2002, compared with an 80% increase in US home prices between 2000 and 2005 during the subprime bubble. What Evergrande is telling us now is that the market is cresting. But as property developers began to incur extraordinary levels of debt, the state recognized the need to deleverage the sector before the bubble burst to catastrophic effect. Last year, new regulations, known as the Three Red Lines, forced developers to tighten up their financing arrangements. One way to read Evergrande’s struggles is as a giant correction that the government actually wanted: a shake-out of a highly indebted sector, set off by the government’s reforms. “What Evergrande is telling us now is that the market is cresting,” said George Magnus, the former chief economist at Swiss bank UBS. Another way is to see it as a side-effect of China slamming the brakes, slowing down one of the hottest generators of its growth story. Rogoff and Yang argue that a 20% drop in real-estate activity, even without a banking crisis, could take as much as 10% out of the country’s GDP. Experts like Howie say there are few signs of a replacement for the property sector, the rocket-fuel that has been powering China over the past two decades. As Evergrande’s missed bond payments pile up, economists says China will have to find a new engine for growth, such as consumption. “This is a tipping point for Chinese real estate,” Magnus said. The threat of China’s tech crackdown As China’s government wrestles with its property woes, authorities are also fighting on a second front with entrepreneurs, in an apparent bid to both mitigate the worst effects of market forces and exert greater control over the private sector. Beijing has dismayed its private-education sector by enacting strict new rules, trying to limit both the expenses incurred by students and the intense pressures felt by them in a hyper-competitive academic environment. Shares of New Oriental, the leading tutoring company, plunged by 70% in Hong Kong, leading the slump of fortunes for several other education firms. The country’s tech companies, meanwhile, have scrambled to pledge their profits to charity after the government cracked down on gaming time for teenagers, launched some of the world’s strictest data laws, gave record fines to Alibaba and its peers on antitrust grounds, and promised to review companies seeking overseas listings much more strictly. Shares of Didi have shed more than half their value since going public in the US in July. In a viral opinion piece widely republished by state media this year, the columnist Li Guangman read into these crackdowns a profound revolution. “The capital market will no longer be a paradise for capitalists to grow rich overnight,” Li wrote. But more broadly still, it’s easy to wonder if Beijing is turning hostile towards private companies and China’s so-called capitalists altogether. That concern is making some of the world’s top investors think twice about Chinese tech firms. Soros Fund Management said this month that the hedge fund isn’t putting money into China. Cathie Wood, the celebrated stock-picker, told the Financial Times last month that her firm ARK Invest had slashed its China holdings. Wood, ordinarily bullish on China, said that she was focusing only on firms that are clearly “currying favor” with Beijing. “This is a real risk, that they could impinge on many of the forces that have been so dynamic in driving the economy in recent years—the private sector, the internet platform companies, and the entrepreneurial spirit required to drive these innovative companies,” said Stephen Roach, senior lecturer at Yale’s School of Management and the former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia. “I say that as someone who has been optimistic on China for 25 years. I think it’s a big issue.” Not everyone is giving up on China Some others, though, are more optimistic. Ray Dalio, for one. China’s leaders “believe that capitalism is a way of increasing the wealth and power of the country—that’s been key—at the same time that it’s important to redistribute [wealth],” Dalio, the founder of the world’s biggest hedge fund Bridgewater, said in a recent interview with CNBC. According to Dalio’s research and metrics, the US and China are still the most capitalist countries. China is “not going back to what you would call the old communism,” he said. Many of the crackdowns are driven by social goals. Even a slowing economy is unlikely to significantly dent China’s efforts to expand its industries, which are essential for the economy’s long-term success, according to Jacob Gunter, a senior analyst at the German think tank MERICS. Core sectors, such as the manufacturing of chemicals or industrial machinery, will likely be insulated even if growth slows, Gunter said. And Roach says a key underpinning of the expansion of Chinese real-estate—the migration of people from farms to cities—is still in place. He estimates that about 60% of China’s population is urban, and that the number will swell to 75% or 80% in the coming decade. “I don’t subscribe to the idea that this is a US- or Japanese-style bubble,” he said. What happens if China’s economic growth slows? What happens, though, if China can’t make the math work—if the country can’t crank out world-leading growth while handicapping its innovative tech businesses, coping with electricity deficits, and powering down debt and real-estate as the engines of growth? At what point does discontent turn into social unrest? Much will depend on just how much the economy slows, said Gunter, and also how citizens view the benefits of these crackdowns in comparison to the costs. “Many of the crackdowns are driven by social goals—destroying private tutoring means less pressure on families, pushing better working conditions for delivery workers means better and safer jobs, real estate restrictions could make home ownership more feasible for middle-class folks, and cracking down on data abuse means more choices for consumers regarding their data.” Should growth slow to worrying levels, to the point that citizens are hit with steep losses on generational wealth tied up in real estate, China may well witness civil unrest. But given the government’s control over information and protest, a more likely outcome of an economic downshift is upheaval within the party, said George Magnus, the former UBS chief economist. Until now, Magnus said, there has been “little factional rivalry because challengers to Xi Jinping tend to end up punished or in prison.” But that could change quickly if Xi is seen to be losing control of the economy. “I’m not really optimistic that this leadership in China, the incumbent leadership, is going to be able to resolve this kind of contradiction with big business,” he said. A crowd of protesters, one carrying a placard reading &quot;build more public housing, reform tax system&quot;, is pushed back by security workers in Hong Kong, China in 2018.REUTERS/BOBBY YIP Slower economic growth could trigger demonstrations like this one in Hong Kong in 2018. “Build more public housing, reform tax system” reads the protester’s sign. China is so tightly wrapped into the world economy now that a slowdown will cause jitters everywhere. Foreign investors held around 3.5% of China’s equity and bond markets as of last year—a small percentage that nonetheless runs into hundreds of billions of dollars. In turn, China is one of the world’s largest customer for US Treasury securities; if it slows its purchases of these instruments, the US might have to draw other customers by raising interest rates, in turn affecting rates across the US economy. One study showed that a Chinese growth shock would hit emerging economies in Asia and the rest of the BRICS economies harder than it would Western countries. China cannot hit the brakes abruptly without causing a pile-up behind it. Gunter also speculated that an economic deceleration might turn China further into itself. “Any slowdown or economic challenge can always be painted as the result of foreign powers, especially the US, ‘containing’ China,” he said. “Stirring up nationalism as a pressure valve to domestic troubles is hardly new, nor is it something that only the Chinese Communist Party has done.”

### Russia Alliance Uniqueness

#### China-Russia low now –Ukraine war

Taylor and Shullman 22 (Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program, Center for New American Security and David O. Shullman is a Senior Director of the Global China Hub, Atlantic Council. “Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine,” 6-22-22, https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine)ZK

Russian president Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in a difficult position. Putin launched his war of aggression just weeks after meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping and declaring jointly their “no limits” partnership. China’s tacit backing of Russia clashes with Beijing’s stated support for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and jeopardizes Beijing’s relations with Europe. Putin’s war of choice is compounding China’s Covid-19-related economic challenges, causing energy and food prices to rise, and the remarkable resilience of Ukraine and strong allied response have likely prompted China to reexamine its calculus on Taiwan. Some analysts and policymakers have posited, therefore, that Russia’s war in Ukraine will arrest the trajectory of deepening Russia-China relations, weakening the countries’ partnership. Indeed, there are data points that support this hypothesis. Chinese companies and banks have pulled back from new and ongoing initiatives in the Russian market to avoid Western sanctions, and Chinese official media recently granted Ukraine uncensored space to criticize the Kremlin.

#### China doesn’t want a Russian alliance now – afraid of being locked out of global economy

Magnus**,** 3-4-2022, (George Magnus is research associate at the China Centre of Oxford, "China has little to gain but much to lose as Russia’s ally," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/04/china-has-little-to-gain-but-much-to-lose-as-russias-ally>) – sri

In just a few days, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended decades of international relations thinking and practices. Nothing will be the same as before. Even the 5,000-word statement on “international relations in a new era” issued by China and Russia just a month ago in Beijing – to make the world safe for autocracy – has been overtaken by events. In this ugly Russian quagmire, China’s role and behaviour merit close attention, not least as we wonder whether Ukraine today may be Taiwan tomorrow. China and Russia have been getting closer for some time. The binds are visible in bilateral trade, which has more than doubled since 2015 to almost $150bn. China is Russia’s biggest trade partner. While Russia is almost a rounding error in China’s global exports, the two countries collaborate in military exercises, regional security arrangements and technology trade. These binds go some way to counter other differences and long-standing sources of mistrust, for example over Russian far east and central Asia. Yet, the biggest bind of all is geopolitics. Ukraine crisis poses dilemma for China but also opportunity Read more Headed by control-obsessed dictators pledged to remain in power and protect their elites, they have both been gifted political opportunities created by, for example, the long tail of the 2008 “western” financial crisis, Brexit and European political weakness, Donald Trump, and Covid management issues in many democracies. They are joined at the hip in their pursuit of an anti-US and anti-western agenda in which they want to reshape the world order, including by force. Putin’s awkward and brutal invasion of Ukraine doesn’t change any of this but it has changed the Sino-Russian relationship consummated at the Olympics on 4 February, and caused China consternation. Considerable speculation focuses on what Xi Jinping knew. It is hard to believe Xi was not forewarned about something, especially as the US tried to brief him with intelligence only to be rebuffed. We also know Russian troops were subsequently moved from the far east to Ukraine, and China is thought to have bought back previously released oil into its Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Whatever the reality, China is deemed to have been complicit, at least by supporting Russia and backing it since, leaving it uncomfortably on a spiky fence. Xi won’t back away from Putin because to do so would lead to much embarrassment and humiliation at home – a non-starter, especially in this key year ending with the 20th Party Congress. Yet, standing by Putin, and supporting overtly the weak Russian economy associates China firmly with a pariah state and erodes such trust and credibility in China’s statecraft. China’s list of friends globally isn’t that big or impressive anyway. With strong leverage over Russia now, China can help its beleaguered neighbour, which, with its main banks excluded from the global financial system, its foreign exchange reserves frozen, and firms and persons subject to sanctions and asset freezes, has become a vassal state of China. It can buy much more energy and resources, and subject to ubiquitous sanctions laws, make loans, provide funds via currency swap agreements, trade in yuan, and supply semiconductors and other technology goods. Yet, China will have to be careful to calibrate an image which isn’t overly accommodating, and reminds the world both that it can be an agent for important public goods, such as peace-broking in Ukraine, and that it wants the global system to remain relatively open. Remember that, **unlike Russia, China’s ambitions depend on a relatively open world economy** in trade and technology, and on global and regional institutions which it would like to re-shape to suit its own interests. This is **all at risk** now if democracy-supporting nations choose to push a Russia-supporting China further away – or if China doubles down to insulate itself. China was certainly shocked how the EU, in particular, and the US came together purposefully and forcefully to freeze Russia out of the system. China’s continuing dependency on key western technologies and markets remains, despite acts of decoupling and self-reliance. It would certainly **not want to risk being in the cross-hairs of a Russia-type financial war** over, for example, Taiwan.

#### China said they are merely strategic partners with Russia, not allies, and are cagey now.

Feng, 2-28-2022, (John Feng is a contributing editor at Newsweek, "Beijing says China and Russia are not allies," Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/beijing-says-china-russia-are-not-allies-1683131> -- sri

China's "no limits" partnership with Russia is under scrutiny amid Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine, throughout which Beijing's noncommittal position has been interpreted as tacit support for the Russian president's attempts at regime change in Kyiv. China-Russia relations were elevated to a special category in 2019. The "comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era" signaled strong military, political and economic alignment, and close ties described last year as "better than an alliance." But as Putin's military campaign against his neighbors threatens to make his country a pariah on the international stage—through banned airspace, canceled visas and unprecedented economic sanctions—Russia has pointed to China as an example of a major power still offering friendship and support. At a daily press conference on Monday, as the invasion entered its fifth day, China's foreign ministry tried subtly to put some distance between Beijing's relationship with Moscow and the hostilities in Ukraine. "China and Russia are comprehensive strategic partners of coordination. China-Russia relations are based on non-alliance, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third countries," ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said. China's position on the Ukraine crisis is "based on the merits of the matter itself," he said, without elaborating. "We always stand on the side of peace and justice." He then reiterated a description of the situation as "complex," refusing to back Kyiv outright. Beijing's implicit support for Ukraine thus far has come in the form of one oft-repeated phrase: "The sovereignty and territorial integrity of every country should be respected and safeguarded. The aims and principles of the UN Charter should be upheld. This is China's consistent position, and is it a basic norm governing international relations that all countries should subscribe to." "China does not approve of solving problems through sanctions," Wang said. The official added that it was likely to cause new problems and a "lose-lose" economic situation for all. Chinese firms would continue trading with Russia, he suggested. In response to a question about President Putin putting his country's nuclear forces on alert, Wang took the chance to criticize NATO's eastward expansion and said Moscow's "legitimate security demands should be addressed." All sides should "remain calm, exercise restraint and avoid further escalation," Wang said. Chinese Citizens in Ukraine China is facing some criticism at home for failing to pull some 6,000 Chinese citizens out of Ukraine before Russia's full-scale invasion began last Thursday. Despite Russia's troop buildup along the border and non-stop warnings from the United States, China didn't appear to believe Putin would take such drastic action. Days before the attacks began, Beijing was still accusing Washington of "playing up the threat of war." Its embassy remained operational throughout, and it failed to issue a travel advisory or recommend its citizens find a route home. After Russia's forces advanced into Kyiv-held territory and missile barrages began hitting military installations, Chinese officials in Ukraine were unable to arrange evacuation flights and could only ask citizens to stay put. Before fighting broke out, the Chinese Embassy in Kyiv advised citizens to remain indoors or affix Chinese flags to their vehicles if traveling by car. Some 24 hours later, that advice changed to seek shelter and not to actively reveal one's nationality. Chinese state-owned news outlets reported what were said to be government-led efforts to charter planes for its citizens. But the embassy later said the conditions were not suitable for such an evacuation—the airspace had been long closed by then. Spokesperson Wang said the foreign ministry remained in touch with the embassy and would arrange evacuations when possible. Asked whether China had mismanaged the evacuation, Wang said the situation on the ground underwent "rapid changes." He dismissed reports that said U.S. officials had tried warning Beijing about the invasion several months in advance.

## Links

### AI Key to Growth

#### **AI is critical for China’s economy – increasing automation solves their aging population.**

Barton et al 17 [Dominic Barton is a business executive, author, management consultant, and diplomat. Jonathan Woetzel is the global leader of the Cities Special Initiative and the Asia-based director of the McKinsey Global Institute. Jeongmin Seong is a Senior Fellow at the McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey & Company's business and economics research arm. He leads MGI research teams in China, working on global as well as China-focused themes. Qinzheng Tian is a consultant in McKinsey's Beijing office. “Artificial Intelligence: Implications for China”. 04/2017. McKinsey Global Institute. [https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/China/Artificial%20intelligence%20Implications%20for%20China/MGI-Artificial-intelligence-implications-for-China.ashx. Accessed 7-2-2022](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/China/Artificial%20intelligence%20Implications%20for%20China/MGI-Artificial-intelligence-implications-for-China.ashx.%20Accessed%207-2-2022); MJen]

AI represents a significant opportunity for China to accelerate productivity growth, which is a crucial concern as the population ages. However, policy makers will also need to consider and prepare for the potential labor market disruptions it could unleash. In the past few decades, China has benefited greatly from a “demographic dividend,” as its expanding labor force fueled economic growth. But China will lose that momentum as its population ages. The country’s working-age population has already peaked and will continue to shrink in the decades ahead. This demographic trend implies that China would fall well short of the workforce needed to sustain economic growth at current productivity levels. The only alternative for maintaining momentum would be to sharply accelerate productivity growth.12 AI could partially close this gap. AI systems can improve productivity by completing existing job activities more efficiently, either by assisting or replacing humans. Intel, for example, collects mass data alongside its chip manufacturing process, and the company used to rely on human employees to do root-cause analysis with the data if an error appeared. But now machine learning can complete this task much faster than humans; algorithms can sift through thousands of data points about each chip to find the common patterns among those with defects. Furthermore, AI can make industrial machinery, supply chains, logistics routing, and other processes more efficient. AI applications could create dramatic efficiencies by predicting failures, identifying bottlenecks, and automating processes and decisions. A large share of the Chinese economy consists of accommodation and food services, manufacturing, agriculture, and other sectors in which a disproportionate share of the work consists of routine tasks that can be automated. According to an MGI report, AI-led automation can give the Chinese economy a productivity injection that would add 0.8 to 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth annually, depending on the speed of adoption. In addition to improving productivity, the rise of AI is also likely to create new products and services, and hence new occupations and businesses. Just a few decades ago, no one would have imagined the many jobs now associated with the Internet economy, and AI could have a similarly transformative effect.

#### **Chinese AI development will add $600 billion to its economy**

Shen & Ting 6/7 (Kai Shen and Ting Wu are partners in McKinsey’s Shenzhen office, and Xiaoxiao Tong is a consultant in the Shanghai office, where Fangning Zhang is a partner, “The next frontier for AI in China could add $600 billion to its economy,” Quantum Black AI by McKinsey, 6/7/2022, <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/quantumblack/our-insights/the-next-frontier-for-ai-in-china-could-add-600-billion-to-its-economy>) - MP

In the past decade, China has built a solid foundation to support its AI economy and made significant contributions to AI globally. Stanford University’s AI Index, which assesses AI advancements worldwide across various metrics in research, development, and economy, ranks China among the top three countries for global AI vibrancy.1 On research, for example, China produced about one-third of both AI journal papers and AI citations worldwide in 2021. In economic investment, China accounted for nearly one-fifth of global private investment funding in 2021, attracting $17 billion for AI start-ups.2 Today, AI adoption is high in China in finance, retail, and high tech, which together account for more than one-third of the country’s AI market (see sidebar “Five types of AI companies in China”).3 In tech, for example, leaders Alibaba and ByteDance, both household names in China, have become known for their highly personalized AI-driven consumer apps. In fact, most of the AI applications that have been widely adopted in China to date have been in consumer-facing industries, propelled by the world’s largest internet consumer base and the ability to engage with consumers in new ways to increase customer loyalty, revenue, and market valuations. So what’s next for AI in China? In the coming decade, our research indicates that there is tremendous opportunity for AI growth in new sectors in China, including some where innovation and R&D spending have traditionally lagged global counterparts: automotive, transportation, and logistics; manufacturing; enterprise software; and healthcare and life sciences. (See sidebar “About the research.”) In these sectors, we see clusters of use cases where AI can create upwards of $600 billion in economic value annually. (To provide a sense of scale, the 2021 gross domestic product in Shanghai, China’s most populous city of nearly 28 million, was roughly $680 billion.) In some cases, this value will come from revenue generated by AI-enabled offerings, while in other cases, it will be generated by cost savings through greater efficiency and productivity. These clusters are likely to become battlegrounds for companies in each sector that will help define the market leaders. Unlocking the full potential of these AI opportunities typically requires significant investments—in some cases, much more than leaders might expect—on multiple fronts, including the data and technologies that will underpin AI systems, the right talent and organizational mindsets to build these systems, and new business models and partnerships to create data ecosystems, industry standards, and regulations. In our work and global research, we find many of these enablers are becoming standard practice among companies getting the most value from AI. To help leaders and investors marshal their resources to accelerate, disrupt, and lead in AI, we dive into the research, first sharing where the biggest opportunities lie in each sector and then outlining the core enablers to be tackled first. Following the money to the most promising sectors We looked at the AI market in China to determine where AI could deliver the most value in the future. We studied market projections at length and dug deep into country and segment-level reports worldwide to see where AI was delivering the greatest value across the global landscape. We then spoke in depth with experts across sectors in China to understand where the greatest opportunities could emerge next. Our research led us to several sectors: automotive, transportation, and logistics, which are collectively expected to contribute the majority—around 64 percent—of the $600 billion opportunity; manufacturing, which will drive another 19 percent; enterprise software, contributing 13 percent; and healthcare and life sciences, at 4 percent of the opportunity. Within each sector, our analysis shows the value-creation opportunity concentrated within only two to three domains. These are typically in areas where private-equity and venture-capital-firm investments have been high in the past five years and successful proof of concepts have been delivered. Automotive, transportation, and logistics China’s auto market stands as the largest in the world, with the number of vehicles in use surpassing that of the United States. The sheer size—which we estimate to grow to more than 300 million passenger vehicles on the road in China by 2030—provides a fertile landscape of AI opportunities. Indeed, our research finds that AI could have the greatest potential impact on this sector, delivering more than $380 billion in economic value. This value creation will likely be generated predominantly in three areas: autonomous vehicles, personalization for auto owners, and fleet asset management. Autonomous, or self-driving, vehicles. Autonomous vehicles make up the largest portion of value creation in this sector ($335 billion). Some of this new value is expected to come from a reduction in financial losses, such as medical, first-responder, and vehicle costs. Roadway accidents stand to decrease an estimated 3 to 5 percent annually as autonomous vehicles actively navigate their surroundings and make real-time driving decisions without being subject to the many distractions, such as text messaging, that tempt humans. Value would also come from savings realized by drivers as cities and enterprises replace passenger vans and buses with shared autonomous vehicles.4 Already, significant progress has been made by both traditional automotive OEMs and AI players to advance autonomous-driving capabilities to level 4 (where the driver doesn’t need to pay attention but can take over controls) and level 5 (fully autonomous capabilities in which inclusion of a steering wheel is optional). For instance, WeRide, which achieved level 4 autonomous-driving capabilities,5 completed a pilot of its Robotaxi in Guangzhou, with nearly 150,000 trips in one year without any accidents with active liability.6 Personalized experiences for car owners. By using AI to analyze sensor and GPS data—including vehicle-parts conditions, fuel consumption, route selection, and steering habits—car manufacturers and AI players can increasingly tailor recommendations for hardware and software updates and personalize car owners’ driving experience. Automaker NIO’s advanced driver-assistance system and battery-management system, for instance, can track the health of electric-car batteries in real time, diagnose usage patterns, and optimize charging cadence to improve battery life span while drivers go about their day. Our research finds this could deliver $30 billion in economic value by reducing maintenance costs and unanticipated vehicle failures, as well as generating incremental revenue for companies that identify ways to monetize software updates and new capabilities.7 Fleet asset management. AI could also prove critical in helping fleet managers better navigate China’s immense network of railway, highway, inland waterway, and civil aviation routes, which are some of the longest in the world. Our research finds that $15 billion in value creation could emerge as OEMs and AI players specializing in logistics develop operations research optimizers that can analyze IoT data and identify more fuel-efficient routes and lower-cost maintenance stops for fleet operators.8 One automotive OEM in China now offers fleet owners and operators an AI-driven management system for monitoring fleet locations, tracking fleet conditions, and analyzing trips and routes. It is estimated to save up to 15 percent in fuel and maintenance costs. Manufacturing In manufacturing, China is evolving its reputation from a low-cost manufacturing hub for toys and clothes to a leader in precision manufacturing for processors, chips, engines, and other high-end components. Our findings show AI can help facilitate this shift from manufacturing execution to manufacturing innovation and create $115 billion in economic value. The majority of this value creation ($100 billion) will likely come from innovations in process design through the use of various AI applications, such as collaborative robotics that create the next-generation assembly line, and digital twins that replicate real-world assets for use in simulation and optimization engines.9 With digital twins, manufacturers, machinery and robotics providers, and system automation providers can simulate, test, and validate manufacturing-process outcomes, such as product yield or production-line productivity, before commencing large-scale production so they can identify costly process inefficiencies early. One local electronics manufacturer uses wearable sensors to capture and digitize hand and body movements of workers to model human performance on its production line. It then optimizes equipment parameters and setups—for example, by changing the angle of each workstation based on the worker’s height—to reduce the likelihood of worker injuries while improving worker comfort and productivity. The remainder of value creation in this sector ($15 billion) is expected to come from AI-driven improvements in product development.10 Companies could use digital twins to rapidly test and validate new product designs to reduce R&D costs, improve product quality, and drive new product innovation. On the global stage, Google has offered a glimpse of what’s possible: it has used AI to rapidly assess how different component layouts will alter a chip’s power consumption, performance metrics, and size. This approach can yield an optimal chip design in a fraction of the time design engineers would take alone. Enterprise software As in other countries, companies based in China are undergoing digital and AI transformations, leading to the emergence of new local enterprise-software industries to support the necessary technological foundations. Solutions delivered by these companies are estimated to deliver another $80 billion in economic value. Offerings for cloud and AI tooling are expected to provide more than half of this value creation ($45 billion).11 In one case, a local cloud provider serves more than 100 local banks and insurance companies in China with an integrated data platform that enables them to operate across both cloud and on-premises environments and reduces the cost of database development and storage. In another case, an AI tool provider in China has developed a shared AI algorithm platform that can help its data scientists automatically train, predict, and update the model for a given prediction problem. Using the shared platform has reduced model production time from three months to about two weeks. AI-driven software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications are expected to contribute the remaining $35 billion in economic value in this category.12 Local SaaS application developers can apply multiple AI techniques (for instance, computer vision, natural-language processing, machine learning) to help companies make predictions and decisions across enterprise functions in finance and tax, human resources, supply chain, and cybersecurity. A leading financial institution in China has deployed a local AI-driven SaaS solution that uses AI bots to offer personalized training recommendations to employees based on their career path. Healthcare and life sciences In recent years, China has stepped up its investment in innovation in healthcare and life sciences with AI. China’s “14th Five-Year Plan” targets 7 percent annual growth by 2025 for R&D expenditure, of which at least 8 percent is devoted to basic research.13 One area of focus is accelerating drug discovery and increasing the odds of success, which is a significant global issue. In 2021, global pharma R&D spend reached $212 billion, compared with $137 billion in 2012, with an approximately 5 percent compound annual growth rate (CAGR). Drug discovery takes 5.5 years on average, which not only delays patients’ access to innovative therapeutics but also shortens the patent protection period that rewards innovation. Despite improved success rates for new-drug development, only the top 20 percent of pharmaceutical companies worldwide realized a breakeven on their R&D investments after seven years. Another top priority is improving patient care, and Chinese AI start-ups today are working to build the country’s reputation for providing more accurate and reliable healthcare in terms of diagnostic outcomes and clinical decisions. Our research suggests that AI in R&D could add more than $25 billion in economic value in three specific areas: faster drug discovery, clinical-trial optimization, and clinical-decision support. Rapid drug discovery. Novel drugs (patented prescription drugs) currently account for less than 30 percent of the total market size in China (compared with more than 70 percent globally), indicating a significant opportunity from introducing novel drugs empowered by AI in discovery. We estimate that using AI to accelerate target identification and novel molecules design could contribute up to $10 billion in value.14 Already more than 20 AI start-ups in China funded by private-equity firms or local hyperscalers are collaborating with traditional pharmaceutical companies or independently working to develop novel therapeutics. Insilico Medicine, by using an end-to-end generative AI engine for target identification, molecule design, and lead optimization, discovered a preclinical candidate for pulmonary fibrosis in less than 18 months at a cost of under $3 million. This represented a significant reduction from the average timeline of six years and an average cost of more than $18 million from target discovery to preclinical candidate. This antifibrotic drug candidate has now successfully completed a Phase 0 clinical study and entered a Phase I clinical trial. Clinical-trial optimization. Our research suggests that another $10 billion in economic value could result from optimizing clinical-study designs (process, protocols, sites), optimizing trial delivery and execution (hybrid trial-delivery model), and generating real-world evidence.15 These AI use cases can reduce the time and cost of clinical-trial development, provide a better experience for patients and healthcare professionals, and enable higher quality and compliance. For instance, a global top 20 pharmaceutical company leveraged AI in combination with process improvements to reduce the clinical-trial enrollment timeline by 13 percent and save 10 to 15 percent in external costs. The global pharmaceutical company prioritized three areas for its tech-enabled clinical-trial development. To accelerate trial design and operational planning, it utilized the power of both internal and external data for optimizing protocol design and site selection. For streamlining site and patient engagement, it established an ecosystem with API standards to leverage internal and external innovations. To establish a clinical-trial development cockpit, it aggregated and visualized operational trial data to enable end-to-end clinical-trial operations with full transparency so it could predict potential risks and trial delays and proactively take action. Clinical-decision support. Our findings indicate that the use of machine learning algorithms on medical images and data (including examination results and symptom reports) to predict diagnostic outcomes and support clinical decisions could generate around $5 billion in economic value.16 A leading AI start-up in medical imaging now applies computer vision and machine learning algorithms on optical coherence tomography results from retinal images. It automatically searches and identifies the signs of dozens of chronic illnesses and conditions, such as diabetes, hypertension, and arteriosclerosis, expediting the diagnosis process and increasing early detection of disease.

### AT: Growth Not Sustainable

#### AI creates a “virtuous cycle” of economic growth in China.

Lambert ’21 (James Lambert is a director of Economic Consulting, Asia, at Oxford Economics, “AI giants can benefit other nations,” China Daily, 2021.07.10, <https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202107/10/WS60e8ed89a310efa1bd660f95.html)-> HL

Of course, it's right to recognize the supremacy of the US and China. The AI research infrastructure they have built has translated into an unassailable advantage over other competing countries in Europe, North America and Asia. This is due to a number of factors: the depth of their capital markets, the richness of their skills bases, the dominant position of their cash-rich technology companies, and the data generation capacity of their vast populations. However, the economic dividends from AI are not reserved for the researchers. The majority of the economic value promised by the AI revolution will be captured through innovation and application of AI technologies in industry. Enterprises and policymakers the world over should recognize that the AI dividend is theirs for the taking. AI is a fundamentally open science. It is fierce, open competition in academia that drives global research forward. The relatively open borders to data flows and digital services mean the latest technological breakthroughs in one part of the world are quite quickly made available, and adaptable, to businesses everywhere else. When it comes to AI application in industry, ambitious economies can learn from China's achievements. China has managed to establish a culture of technology adoption and data sharing in consumer interactions and business practices that give it a distinct edge. There are three factors behind this. The first is Chinese businesses' openness toward technological trial and error. Chinese enterprises have demonstrated a fundamentally positive and flexible attitude to digital solutions over the past two decades, which served to accelerate AI integration and innovation. International executive surveys, such as the World Economic Forum Future of Jobs report, consistently rank China No 1 in the world－or close to it－for its people's attitude toward AI adoption. Second, technology uptake is helped by China's robust and ambitious policy framework. The country's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) crystallizes the national goal of "deep integration" of the internet, big data, and AI into various industries. And the Chinese government has recently begun to tighten regulation on AI development and internet companies, but the repercussions of China's broadly positive policy footing can be seen in the rate of investment taking place. The publicly funded, $2.1 billion AI-focused technology research park on the outskirts of Beijing is one example. More broadly, China accounts for almost 40 percent of new industrial robot installations globally, over three times more than second-placed Japan. And third, China has established a world-class skills base to not only develop AI solutions but integrate them into industries too. The rapid expansion of China's pool of computer science and engineering graduates in recent years has been a core pillar of economic planning. China ranks third in the world for "AI skills penetration", according to Stanford University's AI Index report. Which means AI skills are 1.4 times more likely to be required in Chinese occupations than the global average. These three factors have created a virtuous cycle in China. Rapidly growing Chinese companies are bringing AI products to the market and competing to pursue AI solutions that are customized to fit into Chinese scenarios. These solutions are embraced by receptive businesses, willing to quickly test, adopt, and integrate AI products into their activities. In doing so, they generate vast amounts of data in return, which allow developers to constantly and nimbly improve their AI products, and lead to innovative spill-over applications in different industries. What's more, the growing domestic market justifies high levels of investment in the technology industry. The openness to AI across the wider economy is indirectly fuelling Chinese innovation in high-tech computer chip manufacturing and software development. Other Asian countries can benefit from China's recent experience in AI, in pursuing their own virtuous cycle of AI integration. That means cultivating an open attitude toward AI adoption and integration within industry, emphasizing technology skills development and retention, as well as being open to foreign investment and technology trade. Chinese technology enterprises are major sources of funding for tech entrepreneurship in the wider Asian continent－which itself leads to valuable knowledge spill-overs around the region. The AI economic dividend is not a prize being fought over by two international heavyweights. It's a universal economic opportunity that all Asian countries can pursue and will shape the competitive landscape across the region over the next decade.

#### **AI is key to China’s future economy - GDP growth and innovation are crucial.**

Barton et al 17 [Dominic Barton is a business executive, author, management consultant, and diplomat. Jonathan Woetzel is the global leader of the Cities Special Initiative and the Asia-based director of the McKinsey Global Institute. Jeongmin Seong is a Senior Fellow at the McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey & Company's business and economics research arm. He leads MGI research teams in China, working on global as well as China-focused themes. Qinzheng Tian is a consultant in McKinsey's Beijing office. “Artificial Intelligence: Implications for China”. 04/2017. McKinsey Global Institute. [https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/China/Artificial%20intelligence%20Implications%20for%20China/MGI-Artificial-intelligence-implications-for-China.ashx. Accessed 7-2-2022](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/China/Artificial%20intelligence%20Implications%20for%20China/MGI-Artificial-intelligence-implications-for-China.ashx.%20Accessed%207-2-2022); MJen]

On the plus side, AI’s effect on productivity could be crucial to China’s future economic growth as the population ages. According to a McKinsey Global Institute report, AI-led automation can give the Chinese economy a productivity injection that would add 0.8 to 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth annually, depending on the speed of adoption. With its biggest tech companies driving significant investments in R&D, China is one of the leading global hubs of AI development. Its advantages include a vast population and diverse industry mix that have the potential to generate huge volumes of data and provide an enormous market. But China will need to focus on building its innovation capacity. The United States and the United Kingdom are currently producing more influential AI research, and the more robust US ecosystem nurtures more competitive AI startups. Realizing AI’s economic potential in China also depends on its actual adoption—not just among the technology giants but across China’s traditional industries. Achieving this goal will require building strategic awareness among business leaders, developing technical know-how, and overcoming implementation costs. AI capabilities have exciting and far-reaching potential to enhance human welfare by improving health care, the environment, security, and education. At the same time, AI also raises complex ethical, legal, and security questions surrounding issues such as privacy, discrimination, liability, and regulation. Prudential governance should be put in place as AI is introduced into society on a broader scale. Although the market will drive the development and adoption of AI, the right policy framework can establish a healthy environment for growth. Five priorities can form the basis of China’s AI strategy: building a robust data ecosystem; spurring adoption of AI within traditional industries; strengthening the pipeline of specialized AI talent; ensuring that education and training systems are up to the challenge; and establishing an ethical and legal consensus among Chinese citizens and in the global community. The technology industry is becoming increasingly global. China has the capability and opportunity to lead international collaboration in the development and governance of AI, ensuring that this breakthrough technology will positively contribute to the general welfare of all humanity.

### AT: Collapse Inevitable

#### AI key to sustainable Chinese econ growth.

Fan and Liu ’21 (Decheng Fan, Kairan Liu, “The Relationship between Artificial Intelligence and China’s Sustainable Economic Growth: Focused on the Mediating Effects of Industrial Structural Change,” Sustainability 2021, 13, 11542. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su132011542

With the rapid development of the technological revolution, China is facing a dual challenge of technological upgrading and economic growth. The wide application of artificial intelligence has gradually become a new way to achieve high-quality economic development. This study explored the impact of AI on China’s economic growth and the role of industrial structure in this relationship. The empirical results show the following: China’s economy has entered a period of slowdown, and industrial changes alone can no longer meet the new demands of development. It is even facing the structural irrationality formed by the excessive pursuit of structural upgrading. The application of artificial intelligence makes a significant positive contribution to economic growth, and AI has gradually become the core driver of China’s sustainable economic growth. AI development not only directly promotes regional development, but also enables economic growth by avoiding excessive industrial upgrading. Although the change in resource allocation ratio may lead to a lower rationalization of the industrial structure, the total effect of AI on economic development remains positive. The relationship between AI and economic growth has significant regional differences. For the central and western areas, the direct effect of AI on the economy is not obvious, but the mediating effect by inhibiting the upgrading of industrial structure is always significant. And AI upgrading may cause a lower level of industrial structure rationalization, but this mediating effect also benefits regional economic growth. The role of AI is influenced by the economic environment. Before the financial crisis in 2008, the level of R&D and the application of intelligent technology was low and could not fully play its role in driving the economy. Additionally, in the late financial crisis, the rise of AI gradually became an important support for economic recovery and stable development.

### AT: Growth Resilient

#### AI key to China manufacturing model of economic stability.

Lee ’21 (Dr. Kai-Fu Lee is chairman and CEO of Sinovation Ventures, a leading venture capital firm that manages a 2.5 billion USD fund focused on developing the next generation of Chinese high-tech companies. He is also president of Sinovation Ventures Artificial Intelligence Institute, which works to infuse AI inside traditional companies and venture build AI startups, “China Is Still the World's Factory—And It's Designing the Future With AI,” Time, 2021.08.11, <https://time.com/6084158/china-ai-factory-future/)-> HL

For many years now, China has been the world’s factory. Even in 2020, as other economies struggled with the effects of the pandemic, China’s manufacturing output was $3.854 trillion, up from the previous year, accounting for nearly a third of the global market. But if you are still thinking of China’s factories as sweatshops, it’s probably time to change your perception. The Chinese economic recovery from its short-lived pandemic blip has been boosted by its world-beating adoption of artificial intelligence (AI). After overtaking the U.S. in 2014, China now has a significant lead over the rest of the world in AI patent applications. In academia, China recently surpassed the U.S. in the number of both AI research publications and journal citations. Commercial applications are flourishing: a new wave of automation and AI infusion is crashing across a swath of sectors, combining software, hardware and robotics. As a society, we have experienced three distinct industrial revolutions: steam power, electricity and information technology. I believe AI is the engine fueling the fourth industrial revolution globally, digitizing and automating everywhere. China is at the forefront in manifesting this unprecedented change. Chinese traditional industries are confronting rising labor costs thanks to a declining working population and slowing population growth. The answer is AI, which reduces operational costs, enhances efficiency and productivity-, and generates revenue growth. For example, Guangzhou-based agricultural-technology company XAG, a Sinovation Ventures portfolio company, is sending drones, robots and sensors to rice, wheat and cotton fields, automating seeding, pesticide spraying, crop development and weather monitoring. XAG’s R150 autonomous vehicle, which sprays crops, has recently been deployed in the U.K. to be used on apples, strawberries and blackberries. Some companies are rolling out robots in new and unexpected sectors. MegaRobo, a Beijing-based life-science automation company also backed by Sinovation Ventures, designs AI and robots to safely perform repetitive and precise laboratory work in universities, pharmaceutical companies and more, reducing to zero the infection risk to lab workers. It’s not just startups; established market leaders are also leaning into AI. EP Equipment, a manufacturer of lithium-powered warehouse forklifts founded in Hangzhou 28 years ago, has with Sinovation Ventures’ backing launched autonomous models that are able to maneuver themselves in factories and on warehouse floors. Additionally Yutong Group, a leading bus manufacturer with over 50 years’ history, already has a driverless Mini Robobus on the streets of three cities in partnership with autonomous vehicle unicorn WeRide. Where is all this headed? I can foresee a time when robots and AI will take over the manufacturing, design, delivery and even marketing of most goods—potentially reducing costs to a small increment over the cost of materials. Robots will become self-replicating, self-repairing and even partially self-designing. Houses and apartment buildings will be designed by AI and use prefabricated modules that robots put together like toy blocks. And just-in-time autonomous public transportation, from robo-buses to robo-scooters, will take us anywhere we want to go. It will be years before these visions of the future enter the mainstream. But China is laying the groundwork right now, setting itself up to be a leader not only in how much it manufactures, but also in how intelligently it does it.

### NATO Links

#### NATO is anti China – its global security threats are growing

Erlanger and Shear 21 (Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winning reporter in the Washington bureau, where he covers President Biden, with a focus on domestic policy, “Shifting Focus, NATO Views China as a Global Security Challenge,” New York Times, 6/14/21, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/14/world/europe/biden-nato-china-russia.html>) - MP

BRUSSELS — China’s rising military ambitions are presenting NATO with challenges that must be addressed, the 30-nation Western alliance said Monday, the first time it has portrayed the expanding reach and capabilities of the Chinese armed forces in such a potentially confrontational way. The description of China, contained in the communiqué issued at the conclusion of a one-day summit meeting attended by President Biden and others, reflected a new concern over how China intends to wield its rapidly growing military might and offensive cyber technologies in the coming years. At the Group of 7 meeting in Britain that ended on Sunday, Mr. Biden and his counterparts agreed to jointly counter China’s growing economic dominance. On Monday, NATO countries warned that China increasingly poses a global security problem as well, signaling a fundamental shift in the attentions of an institution devoted to protecting Europe and North America — not Asia. The first minor reference to China in a NATO statement, not even a communiqué, was at the London summit in 2019, but global concerns have rapidly accelerated since then. Both Mr. Biden and President Donald J. Trump before him put more emphasis on the threats they say China poses, as an authoritarian political system with growing military spending and ambitions, including a budding military cooperation with Russia. China is at the center of Mr. Biden’s assertion that democracies are in an existential confrontation with autocracies. “The democratic values that undergird our alliance are under increasing pressure, both internally and externally,” the president told reporters Monday evening after the summit meeting. “Russia and China are both seeking to drive a wedge in our trans-Atlantic solidarity.” On Monday, NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, said China’s rapid expansion of its military forces presents the alliance with challenges that must be addressed together.China’s growing influence on international policies presents challenges to alliance security. Leaders agreed that we need to address such challenges together as an alliance, and that we need to engage with China to defend our security interests. We are concerned by China’s coercive policies, which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems. NATO leaders called on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in space, cyber and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power. And of course, the important thing is that we agreed how we should strengthen and adapt the alliance by doing more together. But if we are going to do more together, we also need more investments together and, therefore, I welcome that. Today, we agree on all three budgets, not only the military budget, which was the original proposal. In its communiqué, negotiated by consensus from all 30 members, NATO is cautious in its characterization of China. Russia is repeatedly described as a “threat” to NATO in the document, with criticisms of the buildup in Russian weaponry, its hacking and disinformation assaults on Western countries, the 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and other aggressive acts. By contrast, China is described as presenting “challenges.” But those challenges are considerable. The NATO secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, has said China now has the second-largest military budget after the United States and the world’s largest navy. Beijing is strengthening its nuclear stockpile and developing more sophisticated missiles and ships. “China is not our adversary, but the balance of power is shifting,’’ Mr. Stoltenberg said on Monday. “And China is coming closer to us. We see them in cyberspace, we see China in Africa, but we also see China investing heavily in our own critical infrastructure,” he said. “We need to respond together as an alliance.” China has sent ships into the Mediterranean and through the Arctic; it has also conducted military exercises with Russia in NATO’s backyard, built bases in Africa, and owns significant infrastructure in Europe, including the Greek port of Piraeus. China’s army has hacked computers to steal industrial and military secrets all over the globe and engaged in disinformation in NATO societies. And with its effort to deploy 5G networks across Africa, the Middle East and Europe, Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, has created new anxiety that it could control the communications infrastructure needed by NATO. In a discussion of “multifaceted threats” and “systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers” in the communiqué, NATO says that “Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” While China is not called a threat, NATO states that “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an alliance.” NATO promised to “engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the alliance’’ and said it planned to increase partnerships with more countries in the Indo-Pacific. Much further into the document, China comes up again, described as presenting “systemic challenges” to the “rules-based international order.” In a gesture toward diplomacy and engagement, the alliance vows to maintain “a constructive dialogue with China where possible,” including on the issue of climate change, and calls for China to become more transparent about its military and especially its “nuclear capabilities and doctrine.” Chinese officials reacted sharply to the NATO communiqué, as they have to other statements from G7 leaders made in the previous days. The alliance’s characterization of the challenges posed by China was “a slander of China’s peaceful development, a misjudgment of the international situation and its own role, and a continuation of the Cold War mentality,” the country’s mission to the European Union in Brussels said in a post on Weibo. NATO leaders on Monday also agreed to spend next year updating the alliance’s 2010 strategic concept, which 11 years ago viewed Russia as a potential partner and never mentioned China. New challenges from cyberwarfare, artificial intelligence and disinformation, as well as new missile and warhead technologies, must be considered to preserve deterrence, the alliance said. And Article 5 of its founding treaty — an attack on one is an attack on all — will be “clarified” to include threats to satellites in space and coordinated cyberattacks. This NATO meeting was mostly a warm embrace of President Biden, who in contrast to his predecessor has expressed deep belief in the alliance and in the importance of American participation in the multilateral institutions Washington established after the horrors of World War II. The contrast to Mr. Trump’s May 2017 NATO summit was remarked on by many other leaders. Then, Mr. Trump was particularly angered by the expense and lavish use of glass in NATO’s new $1.2 billion headquarters. Mr. Trump also defied the expectations of even his own aides and refused to announce support for NATO’s Article 5, a central tenet of collective defense. Mr. Biden quickly declared Monday that the alliance is “critically important for U.S. interests” and called Article 5 a “sacred obligation.” He added: “I just want all of Europe to know that the United States is there.” Prime Minister Mario Draghi of Italy spoke for many when he connected this summit with the Group of 7 summit meeting just concluded in Britain and compared them unfavorably with the period of Mr. Trump. “This summit is part of the process of reaffirming, rebuilding the fundamental alliances of the United States,” which were “weakened by the previous administration,” Mr. Draghi said. And he pointed to Mr. Biden’s similarly important meetings on Tuesday with the leaders of the European Union, which Mr. Trump considered an economic competitor and even a foe. “We are here to reaffirm these alliances, but also to reaffirm the importance of the European Union,” Mr. Draghi said. Another key element of Mr. Biden’s European tour, which will conclude on Wednesday in Geneva, where he meets President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia for a highly anticipated conversation, is how the democracies of Asia and the West can stand up to the authoritarian challenge. While Russia is a particular threat to NATO and the Euro-Atlantic world, it is not an economic rival. Biden Criticizes Trump at NATO Summit President Biden criticized his predecessor on Monday at a press conference after a one-day NATO summit, accusing former President Donald J. Trump of “phony populism.” The Republican Party is vastly diminished in numbers. The leadership of the Republican Party is fractured, and the Trump wing of the party is the bulk of the party but it makes up a significant minority of the American people. It is a shock and surprise that what’s happened in terms of consequence of President Trump’s phony populism has — has happened. And it is disappointing that so many of my Republican colleagues in the Senate, who I know know better, have been reluctant to take on, for example, an investigation because they’re worried about being primaried. But at the end of the day, we’ve been through periods like this in American history before, where there has been this reluctance to take a chance on your re-election because of the nature of your party’s politics at the moment. I think this is passing — I don’t mean easily passing. That’s why it’s so important that I succeed in my agenda. The agenda, whether it’s dealing with the vaccine, the economy, infrastructure, it’s important that we demonstrate we can make progress and continue to make progress. And I think we’re going to be able to do that. Speaking Monday night, Mr. Biden called Mr. Putin “a worthy adversary” and said he would look for areas of cooperation with Russia, while laying down red lines about Russian efforts to disrupt democratic societies. “I’m going to make clear to President Putin that there are areas where we can cooperate, if he chooses,” Mr. Biden said. “And if he chooses not to cooperate, and acts in a way that he has in the past, relative to cybersecurity and some other activities, then we will respond. We will respond in kind.” It is the rise of a rich, aggressive, authoritarian China, however, that Mr. Biden identifies as a major challenge to the United States and its allies, and his intention in Europe is to solicit allied support for efforts to meet that challenge — militarily, technologically and economically. While NATO has a role to play, so does the European Union, the largest economic bloc in the world, with deep trading ties to China. The European Union has been hardening its views of China in the face of Beijing’s human rights behavior at home and trade and espionage practices abroad. But the Europeans do not see China as quite the threat perceived by Washington. That disparity is also true in NATO, despite the new communiqué on China. Some NATO members, especially those nearest to Russia in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic nations, are anxious that the shift in focus to China does not divert resources and attention from the Russian threat. Mr. Biden made a point of meeting the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in Brussels before his meeting with Mr. Putin. NATO troops are deployed in all four countries. But even Britain, probably Washington’s closest ally, expressed some wariness about confrontation with China. Asked at the NATO meeting about China, Prime Minister Boris Johnson warned against a “new Cold War,” while acknowledging that China’s rise was a “gigantic fact in our lives.” Similarly, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany said after the meeting: “If you look at the cyberthreats and the hybrid threats, if you look at the cooperation between Russia and China, you cannot simply ignore China.’’ But she also said: “One must not overrate it, either — we need to find the right balance.”

#### **NATO will increase focus on China’s growing aggressiveness**

Gallo 6/24 (William Gallo is the VOA Seoul bureau chief and regional correspondent. His main focus is U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Prior to coming to Seoul, William covered U.S. foreign policy and international affairs for VOA at the White House, Pentagon, and State Department, “Why NATO’s China Focus May Endure,” Voa News, 6/24/2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/why-nato-s-china-focus-may-endure/6631280.html>) – MP

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA — When the top leaders of NATO countries meet next week in Spain, the discussion will be dominated by the Ukraine war and how to deter further Russian aggression in Europe. But in the latest sign the Western military alliance is trying to expand its focus eastward, the NATO summit will also deal with the challenges posed by China, perhaps in a more direct way than any of its previous meetings. For the first time, the NATO summit will include the top leaders of four Asian countries: Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. None are NATO members, but each is wary of China’s growing influence and coercion. Since 2020, NATO has stepped up cooperation with the four Asian democracies, which it refers to as “Asia-Pacific partners." The engagement underscores a profound shift in the scope and priorities of NATO, which was meant to focus on the collective defense of its North American and European member states. But China’s growing global presence, as well as its expanding military cooperation with Russia, has made it much harder for NATO to ignore. While there is no talk of NATO accepting Asian countries as members, the alliance’s new Asia focus will likely endure, according to many observers. “I do not expect that NATO will now expand into the Indo-Pacific and create a new Asian NATO kind of organization,” said Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, a former political adviser in the European Parliament. “I do expect, though, that cooperation with [Asian] countries that face the growing threat of China's economic coercion and aggressive behavior … will converge more and more with European democracies as well as the United States,” said Ferenczy, assistant professor at National Dong Hwa University in Taiwan. Europe sours on China NATO’s eastward shift reflects not only an intensified U.S.-China rivalry, but also changing European attitudes toward Beijing. For decades, Europe prioritized stable ties with China, which in 2020 overtook the United States as the European Union’s biggest trading partner. But European views of China have soured under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party chief Xi Jinping, whose government has become more authoritarian at home and more aggressive abroad. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg speaks during a media conference after a meeting of NATO defense ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels, June 16, 2022. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg speaks during a media conference after a meeting of NATO defense ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels, June 16, 2022. Under Xi, China has obliterated democratic opposition in Hong Kong, increased military threats against democratically ruled Taiwan, and been accused of genocide against Uighur Muslims. Xi has also steadily expanded China’s military presence beyond its shores, most notably in the South China Sea, where it has created military outposts over the objections of its neighbors, which have overlapping territorial claims with China. As part of its new “wolf warrior” approach to diplomacy, China has made clear it will retaliate against countries that criticize Beijing or enact policies that go against its wishes. After Lithuania opened a de facto embassy in Taiwan, which Beijing views as its own territory, China downgraded diplomatic ties and imposed what some say amounts to a trade boycott. The unannounced embargo affected not only Lithuanian products, but also other European countries’ goods that incorporated Lithuanian components. The pandemic has also helped worsen Europe-China relations. China has been accused of not cooperating sufficiently with a World Health Organization investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, which first appeared in central China. Instead, Chinese government-controlled media have suggested the virus originated elsewhere, such as the United States or Italy. Changing NATO approach Europe’s growing skepticism of China can also be observed in NATO’s recent history. In 2019, China was included for the first time in a NATO statement – but only in a single sentence saying Beijing “presents both opportunities and challenges.” By 2021, NATO’s tone had shifted. A joint communique issued in Brussels said China presents “systemic challenges to the rules-based international order.” The statement also slammed China’s “coercive” policies, “opaque” military modernization, use of “disinformation,” and military exercises with Russia in the Euro-Atlantic area. A major reason for NATO’s more combative tone is the Ukraine war, which coincided with Beijing and Moscow declaring a “no limits” partnership. Just weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Beijing, where they announced a broad plan to counter Western influence around the world. Since Russia’s invasion, China has attempted to portray itself as a neutral party. But many European observers are not convinced, noting China has consistently defended Russia from global criticism and instead blamed Washington for engaging in a "Cold War mindset" that provoked Moscow. Pierre Morcos, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Ukraine conflict has “confirmed the growing strategic rapprochement between China and Russia.” “The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that the Euro-Atlantic area and the Indo-Pacific region are deeply inter-connected. A crisis in a region can have deep impacts on the other one,” he said. That explains why like-minded Asian countries are eager to play an active role in supporting Ukraine and pushing back against Russia, Morcos said. “I think that we will see growing coordination and consultations between NATO and these countries in the future notably to discuss the aftershocks of the war in Ukraine but also exchange about China’s capacities and activities,” he added. Speaking at a forum earlier this week, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insisted the alliance does not regard China as an adversary. However, he suggested the coming summit would result in a statement acknowledging “China poses some challenges to our values, to our interests, [and] to our security.” China has responded angrily to NATO’s eastward focus. At a Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry briefing Thursday, spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused NATO of engaging in a “highly dangerous” effort to create hostile blocs in Asia. “NATO has already disrupted stability in Europe,” he said. “It should not try to do the same to the Asia-Pacific and the whole world.”

#### NATO leaders see increasing dangers from China

Herszenhorn and Momtaz 21 (David M. Herszenhorn is chief Brussels correspondent of POLITICO, Rym Momtaz is POLITICO Europe’s Senior Correspondent, France, “NATO leaders see rising threats from China, but not eye to eye with each other,” POLITICO, 6/14/2021, <https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-leaders-see-rising-threats-from-china-but-not-eye-to-eye-with-each-other/>) - MP

Boasting of restored unity thanks to the arrival of U.S. President Joe Biden, NATO leaders on Monday declared that China poses increasing dangers to the security of Western democracies. But they then revealed deep disagreements over the urgency in confronting Beijing, or even if it should be NATO’s role at all. In their closing communiqué of an afternoon summit at NATO headquarters in Brussels, the leaders used remarkably forceful language to describe China as now their most troublesome rival after Russia — given Beijing’s fast-expanding nuclear arsenal, stepped-up military cooperation with Moscow, and increasing use of disinformation. “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security,” the leaders wrote. “We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty,” NATO’s founding charter. The historic shift in focus comes partly at the urging of Biden, who has made clear he sees China as a growing threat. And NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, eager to please the richest and most powerful ally, has taken up the charge. Stoltenberg stressed that China was “not an adversary” but posed challenges that must be answered, and he insisted that NATO was not shifting operations to Asia but protecting itself close to home. “This is about taking care of a core responsibility to be able to protect and defend all allies against any threat from any direction,” Stoltenberg said at his closing news conference. “Because we see China is coming closer to us in cyberspace, we see them in Africa, we see them in the Arctic, we see them trying to control our infrastructure, we had the discussion about 5G.” He noted that the first-ever mention of China in a NATO leaders’ communiqué was from a summit in London in December 2019. “Before that, we didn’t have any language at all,” he said. “In the current Strategic Concept, China is not mentioned with a single word. Now, you can read a communiqué and you see that we have seen a convergence of views among allies.” But there didn’t seem to be much convergence when French President Emmanuel Macron spoke to reporters just minutes later. “On China, as I said during the meeting, I think I can say we shouldn’t confuse our goals,” Macron said. “NATO is a military organization, the issue of our relationship with China isn’t just a military issue. NATO is an organization that concerns the North Atlantic, China has little to do with the North Atlantic.” “So, it’s very important that we don’t scatter ourselves and that we don’t bias our relationship with China,” he continued. “It is much larger than just the military issue. It is economic. It is strategic. It is about values. It is technological. And we should avoid distracting NATO which already has many challenges.” Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, the wealthiest European allied nation, stressed that Moscow still represented the biggest threat — a point evidenced by it being mentioned 62 times in the communiqué to just 10 mentions of China. “Russia, above all, is a major challenge,” Merkel said. “China is playing an increasing role, as is the entire Indo-Pacific region. This is of course related to the fact that the United States of America, and of course the transatlantic partners as a whole, are also a Pacific nation. Here, the economic and also the military rise of China is of course an issue.” But she also cited a risk of overreaction. “If you look at the cyber threats, the hybrid threats, if you look at the cooperation between Russia and China, then you cannot simply negate China,” Merkel said. “In this respect, I do not think that we should overestimate the importance of this, so we have to find the right balance.” Adding another layer of discord, Macron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte engaged in a terse exchange of words during the leaders’ meeting over their differing views on how Europe should approach military and security policy. Macron, who has pushed for greater military cooperation among EU countries and the development of strategic autonomy, claimed most other EU leaders were with him and said it was up to Rutte “to clarify his thoughts.” Security analysts cite a growing risk of a deep rift within the 30-nation NATO alliance if China becomes too great a focus, particularly because European militaries are relatively limited in their capabilities and the U.S. could not simultaneously manage a military conflict in Asia while also protecting Europe along its borders with Russia. Biden, at his own news conference after the summit, sought to focus on his overall revitalization of transatlantic bonds, which were strained almost to a breaking point by his predecessor Donald Trump. “Everyone in that room understood the shared appreciation, quite frankly, that America is back,” he said, adding strong words about U.S. fidelity to NATO’s collective defense clause. “The U.S Commitment to Article 5 of the NATO treaty is rock solid and unshakeable,” he said. Biden suggested that Russia and China posed similar risks to NATO. “Russia and China are both seeking to drive a wedge in our transatlantic solidarity,” he said. And the president noted that when NATO last focused on its overall strategic outlook, in 2010, “Russia was considered a partner and China wasn’t even mentioned.” But some allies made no mention of China whatsoever in their public comments, a reflection of how, especially in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, Russia is the sole focus. “The U.S. is aware of the threats faced by the Baltic States and is well informed about Russia’s increasingly aggressive posture and its aim to integrate Belarus into Russian military structures,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said in a statement following a meeting with Biden. One Central European official said that there was clear recognition that Washington puts a priority on containing China and European countries were not disappointed. “They understand that China must be part of a new ‘transatlantic bargain’ to preserve NATO’s relevance for the U.S.,” the official said, adding: “Plus, the attention given to Russia was pretty substantial and outspoken.” Indeed, Biden’s news conference focused overwhelmingly on Russia, largely because of his summit meeting on Wednesday with President Vladimir Putin. Asked about Putin’s laughing, during a recent television interview, over Biden saying he believed the Russian president was a killer, Biden laughed dramatically. Asked about his approach, in the context of Reagan’s famous “trust but verify” approach toward the Soviet Union, Biden reversed the phrase. “I’d verify first, and then trust,” he said “It’s not about trusting, it’s about agreeing. You know when you write treaties with your adversaries, you don’t say ‘I trust you.’ You say this is what I expect and if you violate the agreement we made, then the treaty is off, the agreement is off.” Biden did not retract the killer accusation but said he hoped Putin might adopt a new approach. “I am hoping that President Putin concludes that there is some interest in terms of his own interest in changing the perception the world has of him in terms of whether or not he will engage in behavior that is more consistent with what is considered to be appropriate behavior for a head of state,” he said. A second official from Central Europe agreed that allies were willing to put some emphasis on China: “I think everyone, with very few exceptions in the room, kind of recognized that both Russia and China are becoming challenges to address and one can’t talk just about one without mentioning the other.”

### AI Key to Hege

#### AI development is key to Chinese heg globally—unparalleled investment and development in the AI sector will put them at the front.

**Pattanaik et al. 21** (Dr. Jajati K.Pattnaik is Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.; Dr. Rudra P. Pradhan is Associate Professor at the Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, BITS Pilani, “China’s AI-Driven Techno-Economic Hegemony,” <http://mainstreamweekly.net/article10983.html>,)

China is seen to be investing heavily in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven techno- economic domain to shape and control the transnational space in order to gain global market advantages. It is noticed that the world mode of production which has evolved from manufacturing economy to knowledge economy — a phenomena of fourth Industrial Revolution [1] — largely thrust upon algorithm, big data and decision tree as new mode of wealth creation to integrate production variables for higher profitability. Taking a cue from this, Beijing has provided sufficient scope to boost AI culture through computer gaming like ‘Alpha Go’ which is defined as an abstract strategy of computer programme-based board game played between the two players. The event was moderately covered in Western media. In China, however, it was a major national event and some 280 million viewers watched the game live and Beijing described the event as ‘Sputnik moment’ for AI development in China. [2] While the older generation Chinese familiar with revolution, cold war, and contradictions of capitalism and communism may not appreciate or understand the new generation themes and market potentials of gaming, it is the young and tech savoir-faire younger generation that drove the cyber market as the largest users. China’s 2016 AI strategy clearly highlighted its AI investment plans and long-distance objectives. The document clarified that it would focus on linking Chinese economic development through higher AI investments and explored possibilities for funding its sources. [3] The State Council- the chief administrative authority of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) released the country’s AI strategy document titled as “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” in July 2017. The strategic plan has three clear objectives. First, it aims to become AI world leader by 2030. Second, to capitalize and monetize AI economy as a trillion Yuan industry i.e. US $ 150 billion and finally, to emerge as the driving force in defining AI governance in the world. [4] The perspective plan proposed to inject a financial intervention of US $ 150 billion for AI intervention in the Chinese industrial productivity. [5] Grand objective is indeed to become AI Super Power by 2030- a 15 year vision plan! If the global movement towards AI becomes a reality which is likely to be the case, future super powers will not wage wars with bombs and armed forces but those who would be waging war from their AI labs with far reaching consequences. They will be able to alter enemy country’s financial data, disrupt their energy supply, change climate and river course and much more with huge damaging impact. Further, China’s “Three Year Action Plan for Promoting Development of a New Generation AI Industry (2018-20)” added AI as a national priority while benchmarking the already accomplished task on the sector. The plan categorically outlines China’s AI development focus areas and its proliferation strategy including investment and possible AI infrastructure. In order to develop AI ecosystem, specific industries and sub-technologies within the scope of AI were to be built or supported with necessary infrastructure. China’s prominent AI driven industries, technologies, and products are: (a)Integrated AI Systems- drones, service robots, networked vehicles, image assisted medical diagnostic systems, video image identification systems, voice-interface systems, translation modules and smart home appliances etc.; (b) smart hard ware and soft ware Consolidation Modules: neural network chips, sensors, open source platforms and several such modules; and(c) network security and other industrial public support systems to improve the artificial intelligence development environment standard testing and intellectual property service platform, intelligent manufacturing and industrial support resource pool, intelligent network infrastructure and range of such industrial and domestic use systems. [6] AI Economy & Global Investments AI economy could grow up to US $ 15trillion by 2030 as per Oxford Insight. Global North is far well positioned than their Global South counterparts to benefit from the emerging AI economy and ecosystem. As AI driven economic advantages begin to benefit the North more, the countries of South are expected to lose out leading to rising global inequalities. The fourth Industrial revolution driven by algorithm and AI therefore could drive Global South countries to further economic challenges as was the case in earlier industrial revolution period. As the narrative goes, China is investing far too many dollars than the US in the emerging AI sector and certainly spending more in military AI for a distant future world order advantage. Washington policy circles further intended to caution the US policy planners that their country’s global tech advantage as well as their economic security and their deep rooted democratic values could be well under threat from Beijing’s AI aggression. Irrespective of the narratives, China’s AI investments are certainly a matter of concern for the American policy planners and undoubtedly there is Washington-Beijing AI super power race and rivalry. Beijing meanwhile has a very conducive industrial climate. It has achieved a visible alignment between the government, private sector, investors, and the academia towards a larger ‘China Dream’- the great geopolitical game in which AI is a techno weapon. Dozens of Chinese MNCs and several other critical players and stakeholders are projected towards this end in a rather covert and closed loop ecosystem. Moreover, China’s large domestic market, 1.4billion population and large consumer data base increasingly open to ‘AlphaGo’, cyber gaming and myriad formats of AI based economic modules add to its advantages as well. [7] What does it mean to the World? AI driven techno-economic incorporation in economic globalization is also maturing to its next generation to encompass digi-currency, block-chain, beidou navigation system to smart warfare including cyber aggression that propose to change the way business of the world ever operated. Economy to Warfare, productivity to travel and even currency and global transaction modes are all set to undergo transformation. Technology and factors of production being in spectacular alliance to deliver windfall economic gains and unusual control over global resources, there is huge global competition to take advantage of this alliance and all its possibilities. While Western Europe followed by North America and later Japan were the industrial leaders in the last century, the game of leadership is visibly shifting to Asia in the 21stcentury. China’s emergence as a techno-economic power in the last over two decades is set to recast the language and order of the game itself. Beijing’s decisive control over strategic and critical industrial use materials like steel and rare-earth brings it to an enviable position of global techno-economic productivity landscape. Assured of this economic success and confident of huge forex reserve, China’s export led economic growth has nourished a larger ambition- popularly referred as ‘China Dream’ which is a native Chinese imagination of creating a ‘World Order’ that is Sino-centric in character. It seems to alter ‘White’ and ‘Euro Centric’ world order and replace it with Chinese variant large called as ‘Tianxia System’ [8] - a Confucian model of governance and engagement order. As it is seen today, President Xi Jinping has taken all cudgels to see the ‘China Dream’ take visible shape and the country to gain the lost glory and emerge as a world leader both in terms of material and global value system. China monopolizes the global supply chains through block chain technology under the carpet of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). [9] To materialize China dream, President Jinping visualizes block chain as “an important breakthrough” and Beijing would “seize the opportunity” [10] Moreover, it will “take the leading position ... occupy the commanding heights of innovation and gain new industrial advantages”. [11] Quite parallel to this, Professor Michael Sung- Chairman and founder of ‘Carbon Blue Innovations’ has very optimistic view of Chinese Block Chain future. Michael Sung envisages that “Chinese initiated Block chain-based Services Network (BSN) will be the backbone infrastructure technology for massive interconnectivity throughout the mainland, from city governments to companies and individuals alike. [12] The network will also form the backbone to the Digital Silk Road to provide interconnectivity to all of China’s trade partners around the globe. Simultaneously it is anticipated that under the pretext of BSN, Beijing is working towards dismantling of dollar as a global currency, trimming down global technological reliance on the US. [13] Alarming developments indeed! Global supply chains suddenly got disrupted in the wake of COVID-19 pandemic. Restoration of supply chains is highly necessary to augment growth and inject liquidity into the market. The neo-liberal pundits opined that Block Chain Technology (BCT) would fill the business vacuum in the post covid-19 period providing universal access to information on the production, distribution and consumption patterns in the public domains. At a moment, if agreed to those opinions, it might accord a fresh lease of life to many of the battered industries in the recession period. But the most debatable point is that Beijing in the process has managed great command over BSN and its gateway access as well. Hence, the question arises; would the economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America have scope of universal and transparent access to the BSN? Or they would succumb to the interests of China and the Chinese corporate giants?

### Russia Alliance Links

#### NATO action means that China allies with Russia

Kaczmarski 22 (Marcin Kaczmarski is a lecturer in Security Studies, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. “The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations,” 4/28/22, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1683#\_edn0)ZK

Russia’s war against Ukraine has only reinforced the strategic, political and normative dimensions of the Sino-Russian relationship. Beijing has benefitted from the US efforts and attention being redirected from Asia-Pacific to Europe. The war has also provided the Chinese leadership with unique lessons concerning the conduct of war against a relatively well-equipped en- emy. It also offered a way to study the Western reac- tion to the use of military force, including the Western readiness to impose sanctions and the difficulties to maintain unity over a longer period of time. Politically, the Chinese government and state media have repeated and amplified Russian narratives. Bei- jing has accepted Russia’s justifications for the use of force, including shifting the blame on NATO and the Alliance’s enlargement process as well as condemn- ing the US as completely responsible for the conflict. The Chinese media and netizens have spread Russian conspiracy theories, related for instance to alleged US biological laboratories in Ukraine. Beijing has incurred certain reputational costs as the US and the EU ac- cused China of tacitly supporting Russia – this seems to be a relatively low cost to China. The war offered Beijing the opportunity to peddle the critique of US “hegemony” and portray itself as a neutral third party.

#### Military Alliances against China and Russia only strengthen Putin-Xi relations

BBC News 22 (2/4/22, “China joins Russia in opposing Nato expansion,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60257080)ZK

China has joined Russia in opposing further Nato expansion as the two countries move closer together in the face of Western pressure. Moscow and Beijing issued a statement showcasing their agreement on a raft of issues during a visit by Russia's Vladimir Putin for the Winter Olympics. Mr Putin claims Western powers are using the Nato defence alliance to undermine Russia. It comes amid tensions over Ukraine, which he denies planning to invade. Some 100,000 Russian troops remain at the border with Ukraine, which is a former Soviet republic. Mr Putin, who has written that Russians and Ukrainians are "one nation", has demanded that Ukraine be barred from joining Nato. While the lengthy joint statement did not refer directly to Ukraine, the two countries accused Nato of espousing a Cold War ideology. The talks, which the Kremlin said were "very warm", were held ahead of the Games opening ceremony. It was the first time the leaders have met face-to-face since the start of the pandemic. "Friendship between [Russia and China] has no limits, there are no 'forbidden' areas of cooperation," the statement reads. Security alliance The two countries said they were "seriously concerned" about the Aukus security pact between the US, UK and Australia. Announced last year, Aukus will see Australia build nuclear-powered submarines as part of efforts to boost security in the Asia-Pacific region. It is largely seen as an effort to counter China, which has been accused of raising tensions in disputed territories such as the South China Sea. Meanwhile Russia said it supported Beijing's One China policy, which asserts that self-ruled Taiwan is a breakaway province that will eventually be part of China again. However, Taiwan sees itself as an independent country, with its own constitution and democratically-elected leaders. They had lunch, they had talks then they went off to see a show together - a big show. Vladimir Putin is the star guest in Beijing for the start of the winter games. Of more significance to this visit is the increased co-operation and shared view of the world that Presidents Xi and Putin are keen to show. Although Ukraine wasn't mentioned it was clearly hinted at when they both said they oppose the enlargement of the Nato alliance. For China this is a delicate balance. Beijing has relations with Ukraine - political and economic. Any Russia invasion or military attack there could be damaging for President Xi's standing. Amid a growing war of words, the US on Wednesday accused Russia of planning to stage a fake Ukrainian attack that it would use to justify an invasion. Russia denied it was planning to fabricate an attack, and the US did not provide evidence to support the claim.

#### No risk of a link turn – Chinese distrust means that any NATO action is perceived poorly.

Standish 22 (Reid Standish is an RFE/RL correspondent in Prague and author of the China In Eurasia briefing. He focuses on Chinese foreign policy in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. “China Takes Aim At NATO,” 5/11/22, https://www.rferl.org/a/china-nato-ukraine-war/31845030.html)ZK

China increasingly sees the war in Ukraine -- and the roles of the United States and its NATO allies in backing Kyiv against Moscow -- as a reflection of future tensions to come between the military bloc and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. Ever since Russian tanks first crossed into Ukraine on February 24, Beijing has walked an awkward line between not giving outright support to Moscow's invasion while accusing the United States and other NATO countries of provoking the war by allowing the security alliance to expand eastward despite protests from the Kremlin. Now, as the war continues to grind on with the Russian military suffering major setbacks on the battlefield, China has ramped up its rhetoric to warn about NATO and the United States' footprint in Asia. "NATO, a military organization in the North Atlantic, has in recent years come to the Asia-Pacific region to throw its weight around and stir up conflicts," Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said in late April. "NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?" Wang's comments were in response to earlier remarks from U.K. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, who called for boosting NATO in the wake of the Ukraine war and warned China that it should "play by the rules." The added focus on NATO from Beijing comes as both China and the United States see Russia's invasion as a foil for future tensions between the two countries in Asia. NATO said last year that it intended to focus more on China and Beijing is expected to play a large role in the bloc's strategy moving forward. Likewise, Washington is increasingly convinced that the conflict provides it with an unexpected advantage in the long term, with Bloomberg reporting on May 10 that U.S. officials believe that bolstered European defense spending and a weakened Russia could allow it to accelerate a security shift toward China. Those aims are part of the shared distrust toward NATO and the United States that has led Beijing and Moscow to become closer in recent years and why many analysts believe that China has not abandoned Russia throughout its brutal war in Ukraine. Similarly, experts and Western officials warn that Beijing is closely watching the response to Russia's invasion and drawing potential lessons for any tensions over Taiwan, which China claims as its territory and has threatened to invade if Taipei refuses to submit to its control. People watch a TV broadcasting the news of Russian troops launching their attack on Ukraine at a restaurant in Hong Kong on February 24. "If China joins the West in condemning Russia, it will be much applauded in Washington and most European capitals. But it will lose Russia's partnership," Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, a retired officer of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), wrote in The Economist on May 9. "And it is only a matter of time before America takes on China again. The Biden administration's policy towards my country is 'extreme competition' that stops just short of war." Ukraine War As a 'Mirror' The parallels drawn between U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific and NATO's expansion in Europe are not new, with both China and Russia underlining this point in the 5,000-word joint statement they released in February when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin declared a "no-limits" partnership. The document voiced their opposition to the "further enlargement of NATO" and pledged to "remain highly vigilant about the negative impact of the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy." Despite Chinese protests, experts point out there are key differences between NATO's role and U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, which also includes a wider range of economic and political policies beyond the bloc and the United States dealing with its long Pacific Ocean border. Still, the Ukraine war is set to affect the region, with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Yucheng saying in March that the crisis could be used as a "mirror" to view the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. For the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, the move toward Asia is seen as critical and long overdue. Washington has increasingly warned about China abusing its military and economic clout in the region, pointing to the country's moves to exert greater control over Hong Kong, expand its military presence in the South China Sea, and crack down on human rights in Xinjiang Province, which has seen more than 1 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities interned in camps. But while both U.S. and Chinese officials see parallels between the Ukraine war and rising tensions in Asia, they are each drawing different lessons. U.S. officials continue to view increased defense spending in Europe, as well as both Finland and Sweden on an immediate path toward NATO membership, as positive security developments that could allow the United States to follow through on its long-delayed "pivot to Asia." That policy was first outlined by U.S. President Barack Obama and the move is seen as necessary as U.S. policy circles increasingly view China, not Russia, as the country's main military adversary. Chinese officials and experts, however, are reaching different conclusions from the reflections they see in Ukraine. Beijing -- and Xi in particular -- has long supported "strategic autonomy," a concept pushed by French President Emmanuel Macron that calls for Europe to play a more independent role in its defense that relies less on the United States. In a May 10 call with Macron, Xi pushed the French president and other European leaders to take security "into their own hands," echoing earlier comments from a May 9 call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. While the long-term implications of the Ukraine war are still uncertain, as is the future of European "strategic autonomy," Beijing increasingly seems to believe that it could further delay the U.S. strategic pivot to China and lead to a lasting division among European and NATO allies. "Joe Biden had hoped to put Russia policy on a 'stable and predictable' footing in order to focus on America's Indo-Pacific strategy. The war in Ukraine undoubtedly will distract America's attention and [siphon] away resources," wrote Zhou, the retired PLA officer. "The question is...how long Mr. Biden will allow Ukraine to remain a distraction."

### Hege Causes Russia Alliance

#### Pursuit of hege causes Russia-China alliance.

Feng 15 (Huiyi, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, “WILL CHINA AND RUSSIA FORM AN ALLIANCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?”, Defence and Security Studies, https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer\_2015/diis\_report\_07\_the\_new\_geostrategic\_game\_web.pdf) KM

Despite divergent economic and strategic interests, the rapid development of bilateral relations in the second decade of the 2000s is remarkable. The “full partnership” between the two states is primarily driven by the perception of common threat from the United States. The common threat and economic interests have mutually reinforced the strengthening of bilateral relations between the two nations. Will this “full partnership” become a formal military alliance against the United States, or challenge the Western order in the future? The answer is: it depends on what the United States does. Right now, the “full partnership” between the two powers is at best a “soft balancing” strategy against the United States. However, if the United States continuously pushes Russia through NATO and China through its “rebalancing” in the Asia Pacific, it will certainly drive Russia and China to move closer to each other. The deepening economic and security cooperation between the two will not only serve to beef up their military capabilities, but it might also create a military platform for alliance formation. When US threats towards both countries reach a certain point, a Sino-Russian alliance could become a harsh reality for the United States and the Western order. Russia’s arms trade with China is not all about money. It is by no means easy for China and Russia to move to a military alliance. Their bitter history may preclude them from trying, because of what they had experienced during the Cold War. In the new geopolitical game, in which the United States, at least for the time being, remains hegemon, the US actually holds the first-move advantage to determine how the game will play out. It is natural for the hegemon to try hard to preserve its hegemonic position. Moreover, as Quansheng Zhao (2007) points out, the rise of China does not necessarily mean the decline of the United States and the “managed great power relations” between the United States and China might lead to a peaceful power transition in the 21st century. Nevertheless, if the United States tries to take both Russia and China down simultaneously in the game, it might produce a self-ful lling prophecy: that successful soft balancing by the Sino-Russian partnership will accelerate US decline instead of safeguarding US hegemony. US policymakers and European leaders should therefore reflect on their policies toward China and Russia. Why can two former enemies move so close despite their previous huge ideological, material and ideational differences? It is time for the United States and European countries to consider how to reset their relations with China and Russia before it is too late. China and Russia will also need to be cautious in testing the red lines of the US and the West in general. Even though a Chinese-Russian alliance is formidable, the differences between the two major powers are obvious, and the areas of possible frictions are ever-mounting. Neither has the intention to sever completely their relationship with the West, particularly with the US, nor to sacrifice their Western link for the sake of the alliance.

#### Pursuit of hegemony is unsustainable and motivates a Sino-Russian coalition — causes fiscal and military overstretch, domestic polarization, and global war*.*

Porter, 19 — Patrick Porter, PhD, is a professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham, Chair of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter, Academic Director of Strategy and Security Institute and Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI. (“Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition;” *The Washington Quarterly*; 42:1; pg. 14-15; //GrRv)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.” If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more.

Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources.

To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place.

Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

### Sanctions Module

#### China is treading the line on helping Russia with sanctions now but still has not done anything

Arab News 6/1 (“China’s Russia dealings irk US, but don’t breach sanctions” ,6/1/22, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2094126/world)ZK

BEIJING: China’s support for Russia through oil and gas purchases is irking Washington and raising the risk of US retaliation, foreign observers say, though they see no sign Beijing is helping Moscow evade sanctions over its war on Ukraine. Beijing’s importance as a lifeline to Russian President Vladimir Putin rose Monday after the 27-nation European Union, the main market for fossil fuels that supply most of Moscow’s foreign income, agreed to stop oil purchases. President Xi Jinping’s government declared ahead of Russia’s Feb. 24 attack that it had a “no limits” friendship with Moscow and has kept the West guessing about whether it might bail Putin out. China rejects the sanctions as illegal because the United States, Europe and Japan cut off Russia from their markets and the global banking system without working through the United Nations, where Beijing and Moscow have veto power. The sanctions don’t prohibit China, India or other countries from buying Russian oil and gas. But President Joe Biden has warned Xi of unspecified consequences if Beijing helps Moscow evade sanctions. That leaves open the risk Chinese companies might be punished by losing access to valuable Western markets. Beijing appears to be complying. But state-owned companies are buying more Russian oil and gas, which gives the Kremlin export income. They also are potential investors in Russian energy projects as Western companies leave. “The Biden administration will likely become increasingly exasperated at China’s continued support for Russia,” Neil Thomas of Eurasia Group said in an email. That increases the likelihood of “unilateral moves to punish Beijing” and “allied coordination on economic security measures aimed at countering China,” Thomas said. The conflict adds to tension with Washington over Taiwan, Hong Kong, human rights, trade, technology and Beijing’s strategic ambitions. China poses the “most serious long-term challenge to the international order,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a May 26 speech. Xi’s government has tried to distance itself from Putin’s war by calling for peace talks, but it avoids criticizing Moscow. Other governments ”must not harm China’s legitimate interests in any way” in dealing with Ukraine, warned a foreign ministry spokesman, Zhao Lijian. Monday’s decision by EU leaders will cut imports of Russian oil by 90 percent, according to the head of its executive branch, Ursula von der Leyen. European customers have been paying Russia as much as $1 billion per day for oil, gas and coal. Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, responded on Twitter: “Russia will find other importers.” Moscow is tiny as a trading partner for Beijing but an ally against what both resent as US dominance in global affairs. China sees Russian oil and gas as a way to diversify supplies for its energy-hungry economy. China bought 20 percent of last year’s Russian crude exports, according to the International Energy Agency. The two sides announced a new 30-year gas contract on Feb. 4, three weeks ahead of Moscow’s attack on Ukraine, that the state newspaper Global Times said will increase annual supplies to China by about 25 percent. While the two are friendly, China is taking advantage of the situation to get cheaper energy and favorable business deals, said Maria Shagina of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “They would always capitalize on Russia’s isolation,” said Shagina. “But they would be very cautious not to violate sanctions outright.” On May 24, while Biden was visiting Tokyo, Russian and Chinese warplanes carried out “strategic air patrols” above the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and the western Pacific. The Japanese government said bombers flew near Japan. Biden warned Xi during a March 18 video meeting not to give Moscow military or economic aid. Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said in March that Washington wouldn’t tolerate China or any other country helping Moscow work around sanctions. The White House has criticized Beijing’s “rhetorical support” for Putin. Washington is “monitoring closely” Chinese dealings with Moscow, the American Embassy said in a written response to questions. “We have not seen the provision of military equipment,” it said. Asked about economic sanctions and possible violations, the embassy said it had nothing further. After BP and ExxonMobil announced they were pulling out of Russian oil and gas projects, “there are rumors state-owned Chinese companies might step in and acquire stakes,” said Shagina. China’s imports from Russia rose 56.6 percent over a year earlier in April to $8.9 billion, according to customs data. That helped Putin’s government record a current account surplus, the broadest measure of trade, of $96 billion for the four months ending in April. Washington also is frustrated that India, the No. 3 global oil importer, is buying more from Russia to take advantage of low prices. The Biden administration is lobbying Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government to stop. In March, the US government told Asian and European allies that American intelligence had determined China indicated to Russia it would be willing to provide military support for the campaign in Ukraine and financial help to limit the impact of sanctions. Russia has been expelled from the global SWIFT network for bank transfers. China’s credit card processor, UnionPay, refused to work with Russian banks after Visa and MasterCard stopped serving them, the Russian news outlet RBC reported in April. It said UnionPay worried it might be hit by “secondary sanctions” and cut off from the Western-controlled global financial system. China gave Moscow an economic lifeline following Western sanctions imposed over its 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. Beijing agreed to buy Russian gas in a deal estimated to be worth up to $400 billion over three decades. Moscow turned to Chinese state-owned companies to help pay for oil and gas development after Crimea-related sanctions cut off Western financing. “The help will never come for free,” Shagina said.

#### China could successfully bail out Russia, but they don’t want to be economically isolated.

Ren 22 (Shuli Ren is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asian markets. “Why China Won’t Help Russia Around Sanctions,” 3/8/22, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-08/why-china-won-t-help-russia-around-sanctions)ZK

China is the wild card. President Xi Jinping has vowed that the friendship between China and Russia has “no limits,” and he certainly has the tools to help soften the blow of unprecedented sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European Union on Vladimir Putin’s wartime economy. Beijing could buy some of Russia’s $130 billion hoard of gold held by the Russian central bank and pay for it in U.S. dollars. It could reactivate a currency swap line, which was established after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and serve as the lender of the last resort. It could also step up trade with Russia, buying more oil, natural gas, wheat and fertilizers. Even better, China could buy stakes in Russian energy and commodities companies — although such deliberations are at an early stage, according to Bloomberg News. Plus, China has a long history of working around U.S. sanctions. In the past, it has used small, systemically unimportant banks to do business with Iran. But provoking leaders of its two dominant markets is the last thing China needs right now. With its property industry slumping and small businesses suffocating from a strict zero Covid policy, resilient international sales are perhaps the economy’s saving grace. China doesn’t want to alienate the U.S. and the European Union, which together account for about 35% of its exports, especially if it still aims to reach its ambitious 5.5% growth target. The math won’t work. Real estate, which represents about a quarter of the economy, has extended its nosedive into a second year. Last month, home sales of the largest 100 developers slumped 47.2% from a year ago, more than January’s 39.6% decline. New construction starts were down 33% in December, the latest data available. A 1 percentage point decline in real-estate investment will reduce China’s GDP growth by 0.13 percentage points, even as policy makers step up counter-cyclical support, estimates Bloomberg Economics’ David Qu. As the National People’s Congress convenes this week, Premier Li Keqiang took pains to lay out in his annual work report the steps the government is taking to help businesses. This year, tax cuts and rebates, which prioritize small and medium enterprises and manufacturers, will amount to 2.5 trillion yuan ($400 billion), more than doubling last year’s cuts. The largesse reflects the government’s own nod that its zero tolerance to Covid is hurting private enterprises. Retail sales growth was practically flat in December, while catering services, dominated by small business, fell from a year ago, according to the latest data. A recent survey of small businesses showed that average sales were at only 30.6% of the pre-pandemic level, and their cash pile could run out in less than three months if there was no incoming revenue. As China confronts its worst outbreak since the early days of the pandemic, the road to economic recovery remains long and winding. Meanwhile, China is churning out a record 10.8 million university graduates this year, and they’ll need jobs. But crackdowns last year on Big Tech and real estate cut off prized career paths. New job postings in the real estate sector fell 29% from a year ago, while roughly half of those working for internet companies said their employers have been laying off staff, according to a survey by Zhaopin, an online job recruiter. The government is keeping its urban unemployment target of no more than 5.5% unchanged this year. What’s left is exports. During the pandemic, China benefited tremendously from the world’s demand for masks, medical supplies and work-from-home equipment, such as computers and keyboards. In December, exports soared to a record high of $340 billion. Would China risk turning off the U.S. and Europe to give Putin a hand? Granted, Xi’s friendship with Putin may be genuine — they share the world view that expanding Western influence and the U.S. are their top mutual antagonists. But putting that view into practice on behalf of an ally who invaded its neighbor risks undermining Xi’s top priority: stability, a key phrase emphasized at this week’s Congress meetings. Starting a war that sends the price of oil soaring above $125 a barrel does not promote stability. By attacking Ukraine, Russia is piling a potential energy crisis onto a friend that is still trying to defuse a financial time bomb started by its ambitious and distressed property builders. No matter how “rock solid” Beijing claims the relationship to be, China isn’t likely to come to Putin’s aid.

## Impacts

### 2nc – Diversionary Impact

#### Even if China’s economy doesn’t completely collapse, slowing growth causes. Xi to launch a diversionary war to regain domestic support – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

### Econ Impact – Diversionary War

#### Chinese slow growth causes SCS conflict – rally around the flag effect

**O’Reilly 15** [Brendan - China-based writer and educator from Seattle. He is author of The Transcendent Harmony. “The Implications of China’s Growth Slowdown”, World Affairs Council of Western Michigan, March 5, 2015, <http://www.worldmichigan.org/the-implications-of-chinas-growth-slowdown/>] bjs

The once extraordinary rate of Chinese economic growth is slowing. In 2014, China’s GDP grew at an official rate of 7.4 percent, slightly less than the stated goal of 7.5 percent. Although more recently monthly data have been more robust, the trend towards slowing growth seems inexorable. A decelerating Chinese economy, coming at a time of global economic uncertainty (especially in the eurozone), could have dramatic economic implications throughout the world. However, the repercussions of a Chinese economic slowdown would not be limited to the economic sphere. Given the incredible importance of economic growth to political stability – both within China itself and East Asia in general – adapting to a dampened Chinese economy will be a pivotal challenge in the Asia-Pacific. While an official GDP growth rate of 7.4 percent would be the envy of most major economies, this figure represents China’s lowest economic growth since 1991. And of course, economic data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics is not completely trusted by all observers. Local officials (and the central government itself) have a vested interest in exaggerating their economic performance. Capital Economics, a London-based research group, monitors the Chinese economy by looking at the five factors of electricity output, freight shipmen, construction, passenger travel, and cargo volume. According to this China Activity Proxy, recent annual growth is closer to 5.7 percent. Regardless of the statistical specifics of the Chinese slowdown, this development poses some degree of political risk for the Chinese state. For more than two decades economic growth has been the major factor in ensuring political stability in China. Many Westerners forget that the massive protests that rocked Beijing and other Chinese cities in 1989 coincided with the biggest economic crisis of the post-Mao era, with annual inflation of 30 percent leading to panic buying throughout the country. Since 1990, China has been governed by a social contract in which the material lives of ordinary citizens improve dramatically while the Party keeps a monopoly on political power. Rising wages and standards of living helped ensure political stability. Historically most revolutions, including the recent upheavals in the Middle East, only reached critical mass when a majority of a country’s people lost hope in the economic capabilities of the governing political structure. Recent initiatives by the Chinese state can be understood in light of these economic concerns. Since coming in to power in 2013, the administration of President Xi Jinping has launched several populist measures. Posters throughout the country combine traditional Chinese themes with Communist Party slogans to promote the “Chinese Dream.” Xi’s campaigns against lavish banquets and other government waste led to a significant drop in the price of high-end liquor soon after his rise to power. Perhaps most important has been a massive anti-corruption campaign, which has netted thousands of corrupt officials, from minor bureaucrats to the massively powerful former head of internal security. The anti-corruption campaign in China has been so far-reaching that it is now having negative effects on the Chinese economy. These effects create something of a contradiction in the Chinese polity, because although the anti-corruption campaign enjoys widespread support, it appears to be having some detrimental effects on the main economic pillar of Chinese political stability. Besides dampening the high-end liquor market, the anti-graft and ant-waste campaigns have had deleterious effects on industries from tourism and gambling to real estate. Mao Daqing, deputy chief executive officer of the largest property developer in China, openly warned ofthe economic impacts of the political campaign: “For us developers, the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on the sales of high-end property is very serious.” China’s once-booming housing market is now deflating, with prices falling in a majority of cities. Prices appear to be dropping because the rapid increase in housing supply in recent years has outstripped demand. Problems in the real estate market are mirrored by other macroeconomic troubles. Much of the low-hanging economic fruit in China has been plucked. Rising wages in China have led many manufacturers to relocate to countries such as Vietnam or the Philippines. China’s historically strong international trade is also taking a hit, with exports down 3.3 percent from a year ago and imports dropping nearly 20 percent. In June 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pledged to maintain a robust growth rate: “China’s economy needs to grow at a proper rate, expected to be around 7.5 per cent this year… Despite considerable downward pressure, China’s economy is moving on a steady course. We will continue to make anticipatory and moderate adjustments when necessary. We are well prepared to defuse various risks.” Indeed, since this pledge and the subsequent slowdown, the central government has used macroeconomic tools to boost growth. The People’s Bank of China cut interest rates in November, and more recently lowered the reserve requirement ratio, freeing up $100 billion for lending. China has weathered previous economic predicaments, for example the 2008 global financial crisis, and emerged stronger. A hard landing is by no means a foregone conclusion, and China still has many macroeconomic advantages. However, for all the policy tools at Beijing’s disposal, China’s leaders cannot guarantee rapid economic growth forever. It may be necessary to lower economic expectations, while shoring up the state’s popular legitimacy through non-economic means. Back in 2013, Xi criticized the myopic focus on economic growth, saying “We should never judge a cadre simply by the growth of gross domestic product.” More recently an article in China’s NetEase quoted Fudan University Department of Finance professor Kong Aiguo as saying, “Since we are entering what is called the ‘new normal’, we should not worry about the speed of GDP, bur rather we should focus on livelihood issues, public welfare issues, entrepreneurship issues, and financial transparency issues.” Adapting to China’s “new normal” of lowered GDP growth will be an important challenge for leaders in China and around the world. China does more international trade than any other country on earth. Besides issues of trade, any problems in the Chinese financial system could have serious global impacts, especially coming at a time of relative global economic uncertainty. If China does face a prolonged period of economic difficulty, the political repercussions could be volatile. The Chinese state might be forced to look for alternative sources of popular support. China’s leaders could implement additional populist measures. It is also possible that increased nationalism could come in to play, especially in the unresolved territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Regional and global powers would be wise to monitor China’s economic situation closely.

#### Yes diversionary wars --- nationalism --- they escalate

Morimoto, 14 - The Chicago Council on Global Affairs [Andy, “Can China Fall Peacefully?” November 19, 2014 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-china-fall-peacefully-11703?page=show]

Which brings us to our second theory—one that I believe is more likely to materialize. This theory posits that an economic downturn in China will cause a crisis in legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party, who will in turn point to external threats to bolster its internal legitimacy. China’s leaders, in other words, will play the nationalism card, perhaps provoking an international conflagration in one or more of the aforementioned flashpoints.

We’ve seen this movie before. Following World War II, the Chinese economy was in shambles, yet China’s leadership did not turn inward, but rather to the Korean peninsula. Similarly, during the economic catastrophe that was the Cultural Revolution, China’s leaders turned to Vietnam. Zhang Lifan, a Chinese historian, explains that “historically, during every period with many deep conflicts within the country, there has been a surge of anti-foreign sentiments from the party.” Things are no different today.

This year alone, China’s state-run newspaper, The People’s Daily, published forty-two articles blaming China’s domestic problems on foreign forces. Even in the midst of this month’s APEC meeting (which is typically a golden opportunity to show off diplomatic credentials and feign bridge-building enthusiasm), President Xi Jinping publicly praised a young blogger who is now famous for his nationalistic writings—some of which border on xenophobia.

Chinese leaders won’t be able to easily turn off the nationalist anger that is created. And if China’s economy does indeed sink, we should expect more of this strident nationalism, not less. Unfortunately, it isn’t hard to picture a scenario in which a nationalist fervor sweeps across China, leading to escalation, miscalculation or an accidental conflict.

#### Economic decline causes diversionary tactics and aggression

Browne, 16—Senior Correspondent and Columnist, The Wall Street Journal [Andrew, “China puts nationalism into play amid market chaos” January 12, 2016 The Australian http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/wall-street-journal/china-puts-nationalism-into-play-amid-market-chaos/news-story/26491e3f09f53f5ce0c59baef54b79da]

Expect more nationalist distractions as China’s economy enters what many experts now believe will be a slow and painful decline.

Not all are likely to be so charmingly disguised — or end as uneventfully. After a few hours on the ground, the aircraft operated by Hainan Airlines and China Southern Airlines lifted off and headed home.

Regional strategists, meanwhile, worry that job losses and escalating worker protests may encourage Chinese leaders to launch new overseas adventures, confronting America more aggressively and intimidating neighbours already alarmed by what they see as Beijing’s expansionist ambitions.

Hanoi protested a flurry of recent flights into airspace it supervises, including those to the reefs on the disputed Spratly Islands, as “a serious violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty.” A US State Department spokeswoman accused China of exacerbating tensions in a critical maritime thoroughfare. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman on Monday defended the flights and said the suggestion they affected regional safety “doesn’t hold water.”

Still, China is ramping up its military capabilities even as the world’s second-largest economy stumbles. A few days before the test flights, a Defense Ministry spokesman confirmed that Beijing was building a second aircraft carrier based on its own designs. It acquired its first, a Soviet hand-me-down, from Ukraine.

That revelation followed the announcement in November that China plans to open its first overseas military facility in the East African nation of Djibouti.

Redirecting popular frustrations through muscular nationalism is a tried and tested strategy for Chinese leaders: It rescued the Communist Party from a near-death experience after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Current economic challenges aren’t as threatening, although the stock market sell-off on top of record capital flight underscores a challenge that could, over time, erode the party’s legitimacy.

Most likely, say many economists, China’s economy will undershoot its growth target for this year, expected to be 6.5%. That would leave the Chinese leadership vulnerable. President Xi Jinping has staked his rule on delivering a “rich and strong” country. If wealth no longer flows as before, he might feel more inclined to showcase power.

The next test will come this week when Taiwan elects a new president. Opinion polls predict a landslide win for Tsai Ing-wen, whose Democratic Progressive Party espouses independence for Taiwan.

Last year, Mr. Xi shook hands with Taiwan’s current leader Ma Ying-jeou in a historic encounter in Singapore that emphasised the goal of “One China,” a union of the island with the mainland. Ms. Tsai refuses to endorse that principle, leaving Mr. Xi the choice of waiting out her four-year term or applying pressure to get her to change her mind.

Mr. Xi cannot afford to look indecisive if it appears that Taiwan is slipping away — particularly if his prestige is threatened at home by a swooning economy. Some analysts think he may, if he feels cornered, consider trade sanctions such as throttling the flow of Chinese tour groups to Taiwan.

Watch out, too, for China to start air patrols over the Spratlys from its new base on Fiery Cross Reef, or to formally declare an Air Defense Identification Zone over the South China Sea to monitor foreign aircraft, just as it did over the East China Sea where it’s engaged in territorial disputes with Japan and South Korea. Either move would dramatically raise regional tensions.

Yet the jaunty style of the inaugural Spratly Island flights projects a deeper political meaning: It shows that China feels it must carefully calibrate its displays of strength, not only to avoid roiling its neighbours but because it knows that nationalist emotion at home can rebound on the regime.

History shows how anti-Japanese protests whipped up by state media on the streets of Chinese cities can quickly morph into anti-government unrest. A troubled economy that further exposes a society polarised by extremes of wealth and poverty is sure to galvanise urban malcontents if fresh demonstrations erupt.

### Econ Impact – CCP

#### A failed economic transition in China leads to instability, insecurity, and increased tensions with Taiwan Alexis Leggeri, 10-29-20, (Alexis Leggeri is a PhD candidate at the City University of Hong Kong, International and Asian Studies Department. "What Happens to the CCP If China’s Economic Growth Falters?," No Publication, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/what-happens-to-the-ccp-if-chinas-economic-growth-falters/>) -- sri

Amid growing tensions around President Xi Jinping’s international assertiveness and the COVID-19 pandemic, important changes in two key policy areas – domestic security and consumption – are slowly taking China toward a crossroads for its “Chinese Dream.” While these policy areas are often analyzed separately, they actually constitute a nexus that underpins China’s political stability – a growth-based political legitimacy backed by an expanded security apparatus. As a result, the current policy changes hold the potential to amend the dynamics of political stability in China, with consequences for its political economy and foreign policy. On consumption, the ”dual circulation” strategy was pitched by Xi in May 2020 and is likely to be part of the 2021 five-year plan, the main planning framework for the Chinese economy. The strategy aims to strike a better balance between the internal and external aspects of the Chinese economy, to the benefit of the former, partly through further policy support for domestic consumption. This is in line with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s objective to turn China into an innovative and consumption-driven economy by 2049, as its investment- and export-led growth model exhausts itself. On domestic security, Xi in the summer of 2020 launched a political campaign allegedly aimed at purging the security apparatus and ensuring its absolute loyalty, a campaign which will last until he renews his mandate in early 2022. This and the growing depth of the Social Credit System – a still fragmented AI-backed surveillance system that attributes scores to citizens based on their behavior – are key pieces in Xi’s domestic power consolidation, which is taking government control over society to a level unprecedented since Chairman Mao. Given this upward trend in terms of domestic security capacities, what would be the consequences of a failed economic transition toward a more consumption-driven economy? Would such an event necessarily lead to political change, as often claimed? China’s growth has clearly rebalanced toward consumption. Between 2010 and 2019, private consumption as a proportion of GDP rose from 34.6 to 38.8 percent. However, China’s domestic consumption has taken a downward path over the past few years. Indeed, after stagnating at about 11 percent in 2016-2017, China’s private consumption growth rate declined to 9 percent in 2019. Structurally, China’s gross domestic saving rate remains at exceptionally high levels by global standards, and constrains consumption. After a period of decrease starting in 2010, China’s gross saving rate has been stabilizing at roughly 45 percent of GDP since 2016 – by comparison, the United States’ rate was about 17.7 percent in 2019. This downward trend can be partly explained by specific factors such as the growing weight of fast-increasing household debt or the recent crackdown on money lending businesses, which has curtailed households’ access to credit. These factors notwithstanding, the current trend fundamentally reflects long-standing structural drags on consumption that have gained salience during the pandemic: social security and inequality issues. The pandemic has shed light on the weakness of China’s social safety net, which pushes the Chinese to save up a large share of their income. Indeed, despite 95 percent of its population being covered by various health care plans, China’s average out-of-pocket share of health expenditure still amounted to 35.9 percent of total health spending in 2018, as opposed to 10.6 percent in the U.S., with sizable gaps between urban and rural plans, which further disadvantage poorer rural dwellers. Likewise, in the midst of the pandemic, only 2.3 million people were eligible for unemployment benefits, whose level is set under the country’s very low minimum wage. The rest of the estimated 78 million unemployed people were forced to survive on their own means. In the absence of a strong safety net, the pandemic has strengthened another major obstacle to consumption: economic inequality. The situation of the poorer and less protected households deteriorated much more than that of the richer households. Inequalities have been historically cemented by the hukou system, a household registry that ties Chinese citizens’ access to public services and benefits to their birthplace. The system created a vast pool of “second-class” citizens who have migrated to cities for low-paid employment but are entitled to none of the rights enjoyed by urban dwellers. In response, the government has loosened the rules of the system over the past few years. However, in reality, the most attractive cities leverage the new rules to attract wealthy and educated migrants, thus excluding the bulk of rural dwellers and leaving the problem unsolved. It is clear that China’s transition toward a consumption-driven economy must involve the solving of long-standing issues. However, from China’s perspective, the difficulty is that these issues are embedded in a network of intertwined and politically sensitive matters, which complicates any solution. For instance, the ending of the hukou system would further pressure Beijing to establish an extremely expensive nationwide social safety net, given the country’s size and fast-aging population. Funding such an endeavor would require China to reshuffle its tax system and curb the downward trend of its real fiscal revenue. This would mean increasing the contribution of the income tax to the country’s revenues – 9 percent of total fiscal revenues in 2018 – which mostly rely on consumption and corporate taxes. Such a move is obviously highly politically sensitive. Beijing could also reform its financial system to complement its social safety net and enhance support to the under-financed private firms that are the main source of productivity and wage growth in China, but received only 11 percent of new loans in 2016. However, this is equally difficult. Such a reform would entail a complete revamp of the state banking system, as well as solving the long-standing issue of inefficient state-owned enterprises, which would require China to dramatically reform its methods of economic governance. China 2049 Considering these structural impediments to imperative reforms, the success of China’s economic transition is far from assured – and failure would lead the country into a period of economic stagnation like that of Japan. However, the case of Egypt shows that authoritarian regimes may survive such difficulties, as long as they have the right security apparatus. After President Jamal Abdel Nasser’s death in 1970, successive Egyptian governments gradually insulated themselves from an impoverishing population and maintained political stability via the continued increase of the country’s domestic security capacity. Egyptians only managed to overcome this insulation and have a say in politics during the 2011 Tahrir Square revolution, after four decades of steady social deterioration. In this light, it is reasonable to argue that the failure of China’s economic transition could lead to new dynamics in terms of political stability, but not to regime change. In other words, the CCP would rather rely on domestic security than growth to sustain its power. Under such circumstances, the CCP would certainly strengthen its late trend toward increased statism. Economic governance could become more politicized, as strategic competition with the U.S. is unlikely to disappear, with more decisions being made on national security grounds. Beijing’s recent steps toward the decoupling of the Chinese and American economies may be an early symptom of this longer-term securitization trend. That would certainly jeopardize the Chinese market’s process of opening, to the detriment of foreign economies. Lastly, Beijing’s less outgoing international stance, amid its broader diplomatic difficulties, may inform us of its future foreign policy. Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Xi’s flagship policy, seems to be slowly running out of steam. The number of new Chinese overseas construction contracts, an imperfect proxy for the BRI’s infrastructure activities, sharply decreased in 2018, after years of fast-paced growth. This reflects Xi’s changing global vision, which has been introduced through a number of speeches. For instance, he emphasized China’s need to refocus on its domestic development in a series of recent speeches on the domestic aspect of “dual circulation” and he called for more tech- and innovation-oriented interactions with the global economy in a speech in Shenzhen in October. In sum, Beijing is likely to become more inward-looking and engage with the world more strategically in key areas, while its foreign policy could further focus on its “core interests,” as suggested by the growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. A failed economic transition could strengthen these trends, as Beijing’s sense of insecurity would grow. Nevertheless, China has not reached its “China Dream” crossroad just yet. The recent actions toward propping up its post-pandemic consumption could contribute to pushing Beijing to undertake the reforms necessary to reach its 2049 goal.

#### An economic decline is the biggest threat to the CCP Joshua Ball, 4-10-2020, ("An Economic Downturn in China is the Greatest Threat to Chinese Domestic Security," Global Security Review, <https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-chinas-internal-stability-depend-economic-growth/>) -- sri

For decades, Western academics, policymakers, and analysts assumed that China’s embrace of capitalist economic policies would set the stage for democratic reform. Almost three decades later, however, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains firmly in power under the increasingly autocratic leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping. While the CCP-controlled government faces a range of threats from groups within its borders, the idea of a downturn in the Chinese economy remains a very legitimate threat. The Chinese government has radically modernized its economic policies over the past three decades, completely reversing their initial Marxist or Maoist aversion to providing monetary compensation for labor. These reforms are responsible for the significant growth of the Chinese middle class, which has the potential to be the most influential group in China when looked at in regards to socio-economic status. As a result, the considerably large middle class has come to perceive the CCP as being responsible for their rising levels of prosperity. China has undoubtedly experienced the effects of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis; it indeed fared much better than the majority of the world. However, China still faces many hurdles to overcome. Rising Debt and Escalating Unemployment for Chinese College Graduates It is becoming increasingly difficult in China for college graduates to find jobs, the volume of China’s exports is dropping, and tens of millions of workers are out of work. The possibility of a financial crisis in China could challenge Beijing’s ability to hold up its side of the deal with the population. Since the inception of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents,’ meant to attract private entrepreneurs to party membership, the middle and upper classes have seen the party as being responsible for their economic well-being. The government provides an environment for a healthy, regulated economy, to encourage the creation of private wealth and property, and in return has its rule legitimized by its people. Arguably, while it is individuals are responsible for the creation of personal wealth, the party made it possible. If the government or party cannot guarantee jobs to the people, there remains the little reason for the people to tolerate the strict control that the party maintains over the state. If the CCP-controlled government cannot sustain economic growth, it could be perceived by members of the growing middle class as violating the social contract that has existed between China’s citizens and the country’s ruling party elite. The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy if and when the time comes that it is unable to guarantee a healthy economy, prompting potential discontent from the middle class.

#### CCP instability causes a Taiwan war – goes global.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

However, a period of significant reform within the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions within Taiwan would not take advantage of the CCP and PLA’s distraction with their own transformation to take dramatic, perhaps militaristic, steps toward independence. For example, during Taiwan’s most recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous about her rise in support.166 The potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait could spell disaster for the entire region, as other countries and allies could be pulled into a protracted conflict between the two regions.

### Econ Impact – Global Econ

#### Global economic improvement depends heavily on China’s economic recovery

Kotok 6/22 (David Kotok co-founded Cumberland Advisors in 1973 and has been its Chief Investment Officer since inception. David’s articles and financial market commentaries have appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and other publications, “Global Soft Landing Depends Heavily On China,” Seeking Alpha, 6/22/2022, <https://seekingalpha.com/article/4519773-global-soft-landing-depends-heavily-on-china>) - MP

Russia’s war in Ukraine and Covid-related shutdowns in China have led to both slower growth prospects and higher inflation for the global economy. What was expected to be a continued strong recovery has been transformed in the second quarter to a stalling global economy. Worsening consumer and business sentiment, increased inflation, and central banks moving to tighten monetary policy, with the US Federal Reserve being the most aggressive, have increased the risk of a global recession. The Bank of England is already predicting a recession in the UK, and Germany’s GDP likely declined in the current quarter. Nevertheless, a soft landing for the global economy may still be possible, depending on the strength of an anticipated recovery in the Chinese economy along with other large Asian economies. Positive global growth still looks likely to return in the second half of this year, with real GDP growth for the year 2022 at 3% and at a similar rate next year.We have written about the central role that China plays in the global economy. It has the second largest economy, following the US, and is the world’s leading exporter, with critical supply chain connections to most economies. While there has been a lot of talk about “decoupling” from China, the reality is that the world economy remains heavily connected to the Chinese economy. When China imposed widespread lockdowns in April in pursuit of its zero-Covid policy, its economy was dealt a major blow. Output in both the industrial and service sectors turned negative in April; port activity was disrupted; and retail sales fell some 11%.In May, Covid restrictions were eased; supply disruptions were reduced; and economic policy stimulus measures were increased, with promises of more to come. The Chinese economy responded more robustly, than the market expected. Industrial production returned to positive growth, led by automobile and electric machinery production. Fixed-asset investment rebounded, led by infrastructure investment. The decline in retail sales continued but at a slower pace, which beat market expectations. China’s Covid statistics improved dramatically. The seven-day average daily case numbers have dropped to about 200, compared with some 30,000 in April. Nevertheless, mass testing is being imposed in some areas; and there have been some new, limited shutdowns. The Chinese economy probably hit bottom in April. Economic momentum appears to be picking up in June as more of the economy comes back online, the Shanghai lockdown has been lifted, and policy stimulus measures are having an increasing effect. Monetary and fiscal measures are being targeted to support small and medium-sized enterprises, real estate, manufacturing, and infrastructure financing. “Normalization” of the supervision of technology companies, following a year of regulatory crackdowns, and an outright pledge of support for the sector are welcome news to investors. Such measures to shore up domestic demand and improve export potential will be critical for maintaining the recovery in the second half and in 2023, when external demand may continue to be weak. Fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war will be a negative factor, causing a global supply shock to energy and food. China’s economy is projected to achieve an annual growth rate of about 4% this year. That would be just half the growth rate of last year but still stronger than the growth of most other economies. Growth in 2023 may average over 5%. Future Covid outbreaks will continue to be a risk to this outlook, although the government has modified its anti-Covid policies to be somewhat less disruptive.Economies in the Asia-Pacific region will benefit from a recovery in China. Particularly important will be a reduction in the disruptions in Asia’s supply chains. China has already had substantial success in its efforts to reduce logistics hurdles and otherwise support foreign trade. Chinese goods exports in US dollar terms increased 16.9% year/year in May compared with just 3.9% in April. Supply delivery times also improved in May. Stronger growth in China and fewer restrictions on activity should have a healthy effect on the Chinese demand for the exports of other Asia-Pacific economies. South Korea’s exports to China stabilized in May. The region will be affected by the Russia-Ukraine war mainly through the impact of the war on the region’s export markets, particularly those in Europe. Nevertheless, growth rates in the region’s resilient economies are likely to remain among the globe’s strongest, with this year’s growth rates for India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines all likely to be above 5%. If our expectations for a sustained recovery in China’s economy are in the ballpark, China’s stocks are likely to outperform. That has already been the case over the past three months through June 17, an otherwise dismal period for global equity markets. During this period, the Shanghai market managed a gain of 2.0% while the S&P 500 lost 17.7% and the STOXX Europe 300 lost 11.1%. At Cumberland Advisors, we currently have a positive but underweight position in Chinese equities in our International and Global Equity ETF Portfolios. That position can change any day depending on developments.

#### Chinese economic collapse causes instant value evaporation around the globe

**Gorrie 13** [James - political economist and leading financial journalist. *The China Crisis: How China's Economic Collapse Will Lead to a Global Depression,* Wiley] bjs

What ’s Really behind the Great Wall? What some see in China is not the next great superpower, but rather the next great collapse of a massively complex and brittle regime that is among the most brutal and oppressive the world has ever known. There is no crystal ball that tells us what will happen in the future, but there is known history in China, and China ’s modern history is one of great crises and spasms of social and political violence on a scale unknown anywhere else, with the possible exception of the old Soviet Union. There is, of course, the history and historical collapse of their former communist neighbor, the former Soviet Union; that in itself is not a definitive indicator, but it can certainly suggest possible outcomes. After all, command economies, wherever they are tried, all suffer from similar fundamental fl aws that have all resulted in cataclysmic disasters. But it won ’t be just one crisis that China will have to handle; it will be many, and all at the same time or in quick succession. There will defi nitely be a domino eff ect in play as the crises overlap and magnify the impacts of the others. Before too long, hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars will be lost in China—and in Chinese companies around the world.

#### Chinese economic collapse goes global

**Grandi 16** [Kedra – staff writer, “IMF warns that an economic crisis in China could cause global recession again”, International Business Times, April 6, 2016, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/imf-warns-that-economic-crisis-china-could-make-world-go-back-into-recession-1553150>] bjs

An economic crisis in China could result in a world-wide recession, warned the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was because China's financial links with the rest of the global economy was set to increase, the organisation said ahead of its spring conference in Washington next week. "It is likely that China's spillovers to global financial markets will increase considerably in the next few years", the IMF said. The warning comes at a time when there is continuing concern over the China slowdown and amid the Beijing government's efforts to shift its manufacturing dependent economy to one that is more dependent on domestic consumption. It also comes at a time when the central banks of developed nations such as the US Federal Reserve are taking a call on raising their interest rates after taking into account the economic activity in China and other emerging markets. The IMF said the impact of emerging economies on developed nations had increased to such an extent that "spillovers" now accounted for one-third of price movements across equity and foreign exchange markets of developed nations. The financial impact of China was also said to grow because of the opening up of its local bond and other markets to foreign investment. "China's financial integration with the rest of the world is expected to accelerate, and its financial influence abroad will likely catch up with its economic prowess" the IMF said. To cite a recent example, the Chinese turmoil at the start of 2016 gave the world's stock markets the worst start to a year since the financial crisis. The FTSE 100 index lost 5% or £81bn (€101.42bn, $115.49bn) in value, because of a crisis in Beijing. Last week, the Bank of England is said to have considered a Far East crash as one of the possible reasons for the next recession.

### China Hege Good

#### China heg key to regional stability—Chinese dominance in South Asia checks territorial disputes and strengthens their ties with surrounding countries.

**Singh ’22** (Naina Singh is PhD Candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Politics,National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan, China’s struggle for Hegemony in a Multiplex World-Order: The case of South Asia,” <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2022/03/11/chinas-struggle-for-hegemony-in-a-multiplex-world-order-the-case-of-south-asia/>)-lf

But, the limits and opportunities of Chinese hegemony in Asia lie in legitimately navigating the structurally, politically and culturally different sub-regions of Asia. Emphasising the existence of many ‘Asias’, this article focuses on South Asia to articulate that China’s increased economic and financial capacity in South Asia has not directly translated into creating a regional order suitable to its own security, economic and ideological interest – an essential characteristic of hegemonic ordering. China’s Bid in South Asia Analysed as China’s ‘Regionalism Policy 2.0’, arrangements such as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have put South Asian states at the centre with a different purpose. With its increased manufacturing capacity, China has increasingly fit the available role of development-finance provider in the region. Its exports have also seen a growth of 546 percent in the region since 2005 with a prominent trade imbalance in its favour. With ‘imbalanced’ trade deficits and outpouring of ‘less-conditional’ infrastructural funding, Beijing has increasingly challenged the ‘openness’ and ‘diversity’ maintained by South Asian states in their economic engagement. In case of Pakistan, China’s financial diplomacy is primarily directed towards securing shipping corridors and pipelines, ensuring Beijing’s strategic and energy requirements under China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan has experienced significant dependence as a result. Even a major economy like India faces this challenge of avoiding dependence. Under Xi Jinping’s ‘Great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ rhetoric, neighbourhood ‘connectivity’ has become an integral part of re-envisioning the norms, rules and mutual understandings of global governance within South Asian regional order. China has extended its presence by ‘brokering’ close relationships with the elite sympathisers based on development promises whereas people-to-people diplomacy still takes a back seat. South Asian political elite’s strong desire to attract investment and Beijing’s upper hand as a ‘giver’ in negotiations have had a silencing effect on debates on transparency, accountability, human rights and environment impact under nascent and weak governance institutions in the region despite South Asian states’ commitment to further promote and institutionalise democracy. China’s attempts to instrumentalise public goods ‘dominance’ to influence the security dynamics of the region have also become bolder. According to Christian Wagner, India’s self-restraint via bilateral security framework with its neighbours had helped develop a ‘regional security architecture’ in Post Cold-War South Asia. Both external powers, United States and China, till recently, have shown a rather limited interest in strategic ordering of states within the region. Their attention was either triggered by certain events or a particular state’s degree of security-engagement with them. India, however, has risked its legitimacy to be a norm enforcer in issues such as Maldives’ democratic and Nepal’s constitutional crisis. China avoided any ‘unnecessary friction’ in the region. However, it has begun to focus on strengthening elite ties in the region and utilised anxieties towards India’s norm-enforcing to make way for its strategic interests. In its drive to strengthen access to energy resources and enhance stability and development in its land-bound western provinces, South Asian littoral states have risen up in China’s strategic priorities. Since New Delhi’s firm opposition to Xi’s dream initiative, India has become an ‘adventurous’ brother in need of disciplining, in other terms, strategic rival. The dynamics of the region have become more and more complex and vulnerable with ‘renewed’ focus on Indian Ocean’s geo-strategic importance and the race to develop dual-use infrastructure in the region. In its 2019 Defense White Paper, Chinese government reassured the world that unlike ‘big power’ China will never seek hegemony, spheres of influence or form alliances, yet it is actively seeking the same in South Asia. A Yellow Brick Road? How far has this worked? Popular scholarship on hegemony has long rallied behind materially dominant states’ ability to craft their world orders but the road to hegemony has become increasingly cumbersome and trivial. China’s rise in South Asia has opened it up to politicisation and increased scrutiny at both elite and mass levels. Beijing’s intention to multiply its political, security, economic, social and cultural interactions within the region with an ‘all in one go’ approach has had a startling effect, and not always in its favour. China’s flexing of its economic muscles to take over Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, in lieu of outstanding debts, has warned other states to be mindful of the strategic implications of China’s presence. The approach of ‘caution’ and consideration of ‘national interest’ with net risk assessment has been the mantra in Bangladesh, while Pakistan, despite the significant alignment of its interests with China, is facing a suppressed internal debate and disruption in project areas of CPEC, calls to engage locals rather than bring workers from China for Chinese projects, and demands for Baloch autonomy near the Chinese-aided projects in Gwadar port. China has broken its ‘golden’ rule of not taking sides in India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and has enhanced its border incursions along India–China border to force India to adhere to China’s interests. Recurring arm-twisting and skirmishes, with increased infrastructure capability, along the border has reinvigorated the trust issues Indian strategic and political community already had with China. The rising aggressiveness under Xi’s China has pushed India to actively involve United States, Japan, European Union and Australia with the region’s security and potential development. United States and India have substantially increased soft loans and foreign aid to enhance capacity-building in the region and Japan has emerged as the most welcomed foreign-direct-investment partner. Such diversification, as highlighted by Carla P Freeman has also given the ‘smaller states in their shared neighbourhood new opportunities to operate on the regional stage as foreign policy actors with the ability to act more independently’ both from China and India. There is emerging multi-power activism in the maritime domain with positive backing for India as a more suitable partner than China. A simple point: Can states critical of India’s economic dominance even under non-interference norms in the region be really appreciative of overbearing dominance of other regional powers? South Asia has rarely been the centre of United States’ hegemonic ambitions, but Xi’s China has increasingly manipulated its ‘giver’ position in the region and has become eager to utilise force and take sides, especially in case of India’s territorial disputes with its neighbours. Its engagement is to maintain its strategic superiority on sea lines of communications. China has pushed the region to walk a tight rope between economic cooperation and strategic implications but, even being materially less capable, the region has displayed its assertiveness on certain issues and chosen to co-opt each other’s interests. Thus, where China lacks cultural legitimacy as a power, preferring large-scale economic activism has harmed its win-win narrative for Asia as a region. Sectors driving its hegemonic aspirations are constantly contested, resisted, renegotiated and reproduced in interaction with the existing norms across state/societal levels and state/non-state units. China’s material capability has not translated in South Asian states’ allegiance to its world vision. A multifaceted regional order arranged across different powers and their functional responsibilities is considered more stable. It is preferred to the one China is currently attempting to rearrange and rework to establish its hierarchical prominence.

#### Chinese global governance leadership as a first mover is key to stabilize great power relationships

Jones 16 (Bruce, Vice President and Director - Foreign Policy; Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy, Brookings Institution, 4/12/16, “China’s G-20 presidency: Where geopolitics meets global governance,” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/04/12/chinas-g-20-presidency-where-geopolitics-meets-global-governance/)

For the past several years, international affairs have been analyzed through two lenses. One lens has focused on geopolitics: in particular, the question of how great power relations are evolving at a time of redistribution in the world’s economic and now also political power. The second lens considers the framework of global governance, especially the question of whether or not the existing formal and informal institutions have the tools and the ability to manage complex global challenges. China’s presidency of the G-20 bridges the issues of global governance and great power relations. At a basic level, the G-20 will set a tone for how major powers attempt to tackle the challenges that confront us all. China’s assumption of the G-20 chairmanship in 2016 marks an important symbolic threshold. It is the first time a major non-Western power will chair the world’s premier body for international economic cooperation—not to mention one of the world’s most important geopolitical bodies, as well. China’s presidency comes at an important time in the substance of the G-20’s agenda, too, as a slowing Chinese economy is integral to the dynamics of an overall slowing global economy. As such, this event offers an opportunity to reflect on geopolitics and global governance—and the way forward. In short, what is the state of international order? HEADING DOWN A BUMPY ROAD? There is little doubt that we are at an important inflection point in international order. For the past 25 years, the international system—with its win-win economic structures—has been relatively stable. But this order is under challenge and threat, and it is eroding. We risk the rise of a lose-lose international system, encompassing a deterioration of the security relations between great powers, and a breakdown of the basic structures of international cooperation. That may be the worst-case scenario, but it is a plausible one. Countries must be vigilant about preventing this outcome. Even though the established powers and the so-called emerging powers (clearly China is an emerged power) may not hold the same views about the content of international order, all sides have a stake in pursuing intense negotiations and engaging in debate and dialogue. It is imperative that parties find a middle ground that preserves key elements of the existing order while introducing some degree of adaptation, such that this order does not collapse. A version of this kind of negotiation may occur later this year. Japan’s presidency of the G-7 will begin just ahead of China’s presidency of the G-20, putting important issues into sharp relief. As the older, Western-oriented tool for managing global issues, the G-7 still focuses on global economics but increasingly tackles cross-cutting and security issues. The G-20 is the newer, multipolar tool through which both emerged and emerging powers collaborate—but, so far, members have limited their deliberations to economic issues. The two processes together will reveal the tensions and opportunities for improvement in great power relations and in geopolitics. Of particular note is where political and security issues fall on the dockets of these two bodies. Although the G-20 did tackle the Syria crisis at its St. Petersburg meeting in 2013, political and security issues have otherwise not been part of the group’s agenda. But these topics form an important part of the landscape of great power politics and global governance, and they are issues for which we find ourselves in very difficult waters. Tensions between the West—particularly Europe—and Russia are running high, just as disputes are mounting in Northeast Asia. The question of America’s naval role in the Western Pacific and China’s claims of a nine-dash line are serious flash points in the U.S.-China relationship, and we should not pretend that they are not increasingly difficult to manage, because they clearly are. These are not part of the formal agenda of the G-20, but they should be. Although many economists may disagree with me, I believe it is shortsighted for the G-20 not to take up some of these tense security issues. The group’s argument has been to focus on economic issues, for which there are shared interests and progress can be made, which is a fair point. But history tells us that having difficult, tense issues involving a number of stakeholders leads to one of two scenarios: either these issues are managed in a credible forum, or tensions escalate and grow into conflict. There is no third option. Moreover, these are not issues that can be resolved bilaterally. They have to be settled in a multilateral forum. In 2016, Japan will take up the issue of the South China Sea in the G-7—a scenario that is far from ideal, since key stakeholders will not be present. Even so, the G-20 refuses to take up security issues, leaving countries without an inclusive forum to deal with these tense security concerns. Of course, they could be raised in the U.N. Security Council, but that is a crisis management tool. We should be building political relations and involving leaders in preventing great power conflict, all of which, by and large, does not happen at the U.N. But it could happen at the G-20. WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY A better dynamic is at work with respect to the issues of climate change and global energy policy. The Paris climate accords are counted as a major breakthrough in global governance. To understand how the outcome in Paris was achieved, we have to look again at great power relations. What really broke the logjam of stale and unproductive negotiations was the agreement struck between President Xi and President Obama. Their compact on short-lived climate pollutants transformed the global diplomacy around climate change, yielding the broader agreement in Paris. Why did the U.S.-China agreement on climate change facilitate the Paris climate accords? The United States and China did not impose a framework, nor did they insist on a particular process or stipulate a set of rules. What they did was lead. They acted first and they absorbed costs. This is the essence of the relationship between great power politics and global governance. Great power status confers a certain set of privileges, not least of which is a certain degree of autonomy. To that end, the United States has avoided multilateral rules more than other countries, and other countries may aspire to that status. But the larger point is that great power status primarily entails a responsibility to act first in resolving tough global challenges and absorbing costs. That is how great powers lead through a framework of global governance. In today’s world, where global governance will necessarily be more multipolar than in the past, we have to find new approaches to sharing the burdens of moving first and absorbing costs. That is, far and away, the most likely way to maintain a relatively stable but continuously adapting international order—one that is empowered to tackle global challenges and soothe geopolitical tensions.

### Multipolarity Good

#### Peaceful multipolarity is likely after a hegemonic decline --- changes in German and Japanese dependence indicate broader regional shift

Leonard 22 – *Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations* (Mark, 6-13-2022, "The Real End of Pax Americana," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2022-06-13/real-end-pax-americana)//KH

A DIFFERENT KIND OF ALLIANCE

The Biden administration hopes that the war in Ukraine will cement a global alliance of democracies, putting both Russia and China on the back foot. As a result, Beijing regards the conflict as a proxy war aimed in part at weakening China by convincing Asian countries of the parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan. The other side of this coin, of course, is Washington’s effort to convince Europeans that if they want to continue to benefit from U.S. support, they will need to align with the United States against China.

But as Germany and Japan become more powerful and more embedded in their respective regional security orders, they are likely to become more assertive in setting their own agendas. That is precisely what happened in the Middle East, where U.S. retrenchment has made countries less willing to follow Washington’s lead without getting something in return. Saudi Arabia, for instance, rejected U.S. requests to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to increase oil production to meet elevated demand. Instead, Riyadh worked with Moscow to keep oil prices high. Other U.S. allies in the region, including Israel and the United Arab Emirates, have been similarly resistant to U.S. demands.

Many American analysts and officials seem to think that the historic debt of U.S. allies means that they can be expected to side with the United States against China in more and more domains and at ever greater cost. Trump provided the perfect illustration of this when he threatened to withdraw from NATO while demanding that Europeans ban the Chinese technology giant Huawei from their 5G networks.

But the changes afoot in Berlin and Tokyo suggest that a different kind of relationship is on the horizon, one that is more balanced than the alliances Washington built and maintained in the postwar era. As the relative importance of U.S. defense contributions falls and the costs of alignment rise, it seems unlikely that Washington will be able to count on automatic support. Instead, the United States will have to get used to more cooperative and equitable relationships in which alignment is earned. This will create challenges and headaches initially, especially as Washington is forced to rein in its unipolar instincts. But if the new international order proves stable and helps promote U.S. interests, American taxpayers might once again start to see the country’s network of alliances as an asset rather than a drain on public resources. Not only could the burden of providing security be shared more equitably in such an order but the United States and its allies would be able to establish standards and promote liberal values that, although not solely American, would definitely be more American than Chinese. In other words, Pax Americana could give way not to chaos but to a cooperative model of shared leadership.

#### Multipolarity solves – it’s the only option in a post-pandemic world

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IN IT TOGETHER

It may be easy, and perhaps natural, for the would-be architects of the new system to organize it around Washington. But that would be a mistake. The enemies of this new order, united by their resentment of the United States, will seek to discredit it as just another effort to dominate global affairs. For this new order to be viable, it must be conceived in such a way that the charge is false.

The new order must also be decentralized to be effective; the resources and wisdom needed to solve many vexing problems are not concentrated in the United States. For instance**, on the enormous issue of defining rules for a digitized world,** Washington has been confused and passive, despite—or perhaps because of—its dominance in such commerce. It is the European Union that has led the way. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, its Digital Services Act, and its Digital Markets Act created the standards that influence most of the world, including the Americas. Decentralized leadership has also proved critical to responding to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The nucleus of the emerging pro-Ukraine coalition, for instance, is not just the United States but the entire G-7, including the European Commission. South Korea and Australia should be invited to join this coalition as well.

Yet a revised system of world order shouldn’t be limited to the United States and its traditional allies. It must be open to any countries that can and will help attain its common objectives. India should have a place at any symbolic high table, for example, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. But India’s leaders are still making their choices about their will and capacity to work on common problems. Even China should be welcome at the table. After much internal debate in the early 1990s, China’s leaders chose to play a major and often constructive role in the global commonwealth system that emerged after the end of the Cold War. In 2005, Zoellick famously urged Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder.” As late as 2017, Kurt Campbell, who now leads Asia policy for the Biden White House, thought this invitation was a wise move.

### US Hege Bad

#### American unipolarity sanctions unfettered interventionism, inflaming global conflicts and collapsing multilateral governance regimes.

Glaser, 19 — John Glaser; Director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Master of Arts in International Security at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. (3-15-2019; "The Amnesia of the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment;" *Cato Institute*; https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/amnesia-us-foreign-policy-establishment; //GrRv)

Trump is certainly hostile to what he sometimes refers to as “globalism”: multilateralism, free trade agreements, international institutions, and any international legal regime that could impose constraints on U.S. power. He is antagonistic toward allies and treaties, withdrawing the U.S. from the Paris climate agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the UN Human Rights Council. But those excoriating Trump for his disregard for rules and norms rarely mention similar, routine violations of this rules-based order by his predecessors. And while the foreign policy establishment is firm in its condemnation of Trump’s “turning away from global engagement,” as Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations put it, their harshest criticisms seem reserved for those few sporadic instances in which Trump tries to jettison lengthy and failed military deployments, as in Syria and Afghanistan, or expresses insufficient enthusiasm for permanent overseas garrisons. The pundits, practitioners, and politicians that make up the foreign policy establishment have rarely respected the non-interventionist principles at the core of the United Nations, an institution exemplifying the liberal rules-based international order that the United States helped establish following World War II. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter says “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…” According to the Charter, which American post-war planners helped write, the use of force is illegal and illegitimate unless at least one of two prerequisites are met: first, that force is used in self-defense; second, that the UN Security Council authorizes it. This prohibition against war is not some trivial aspiration. Non-intervention is the centerpiece of international law and the United Nations has repeatedly sought to underline its significance. In 1965, the General Assembly declared “No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state.” Again in 1970, it unanimously reaffirmed the illegality of “armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats.” In 1981, the General Assembly further specified that the Charter’s “principle of non-intervention and non-interference” prohibited “any … form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at another State or group of States, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of another State.” The United States is currently engaged in active military hostilities in at least seven countries, namely Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Niger. That tally doesn’t include drone strikes in Pakistan, combat operations in Kenya, Cameroon, and Central African Republic, or other interventions of unknown magnitude. The true number might be closer to 14 countries. The White House is also explicitly threatening U.S. military action to change the regime in Venezuela and against Iran for a host of spurious reasons. Not one of these cases meets the prerequisites for legal military intervention (a plausible self-defense case can be made for the war in Afghanistan, but it expired a long time ago). No other state in the international system uses force more than the U.S. has. Throughout the Cold War, the United States used military means to interfere in other countries about twice as often as did the Soviet Union. This doesn’t include interventions below the threshold of military action: from 1946 to 2000, Washington meddled in foreign elections more than 80 times (compared to 36 by the Soviet Union or Russia over the same period). Covert operations to overthrow democratically elected governments, as in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, were a staple of U.S. conduct in this period, and according to the Rand Corporation, “the number and scale of U.S. military interventions rose rapidly in the aftermath of the Cold War.” The Congressional Research Service lists more than 200 individual U.S. military interventions from 1989 to 2018, a rate that no other country even comes close to matching. It’s hard for America to act as the guarantor of a rules-based order that it consistently violates. When President Obama condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, saying international law prohibits redrawing territorial borders “at the barrel of a gun,” it was somewhat awkward: The United States did exactly that in the 1999 Kosovo war, which lacked Security Council approval, and successive administrations have similarly supported Israel as it annexes and occupies territory in violation of international law. Secretary of State John Kerry castigated Russia’s territorial grab this way: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pretext.” As it happens, that’s a rather apt description of the Bush administration’s brazenly illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003. Washington often appeals to international law to justify military action against despots who commit atrocities, as it did when it secured UN Security Council approval in 2011 to bomb Libya. But even there, when the initial use of force was authorized, the Obama administration rapidly exceeded the mandate of the resolution by pursuing what amounted to a regime-change strategy. And such appeals to humanitarianism are highly selective: U.S. military power has also been used to assist Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most regressive authoritarian regimes, commit war crimes and keep an impoverished and largely defenseless population in Yemen under siege. America’s delinquency isn’t restricted to the use of force. Though 139 other countries have done so, Washington has refused to sign on to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court. And although the United States has badgered China for violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defines maritime rights and responsibilities, the U.S. refuses to ratify the treaty itself. For all the talk of China’s unfair trade practices, the only country that receives more formal complaints about WTO violations than China is the United States—and China does a better job of complying once complaints are made. The political establishment in Washington has always accepted this unique role for the United States. We’re the policeman of the world. We enforce the rules and therefore assert the right to violate them, even as we (often violently) deny others that same prerogative. Any claim to special privileges rests to some extent on whether the international community sees it as legitimate. The problem is that America’s increasing disregard for the rules has undermined its legitimacy and that of the order itself: More than any other single nation, its actions determine the basis of international norms. As U.S. foreign policy becomes more transparently lawless, the power of international law to constrain state behavior weakens accordingly. To legitimize the Russian annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin actually cited the “Kosovo precedent.” In 2016, Chinese officials dismissed U.S. criticisms of Beijing’s human rights record by citing the “notorious…prison abuse at Guantanamo.” The United States, Chinese diplomat Fu Cong told the UN Council on Human Rights, “conducts large-scale extra-territorial eavesdropping, uses drones to attack other countries’ innocent civilians, its troops on foreign soil commit rape and murder of local people. It conducts kidnapping overseas and uses black prisons.” And when American officials lambaste Iran for backing the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad despite his use of chemical weapons, Iranian officials frequently remind the world that the United States aided Saddam Hussein while he deployed chemical weapons on a much larger scale. Our hypocrisy has always been a threat to our legitimacy, but in the past it was often managed with careful rhetoric and diplomatic maneuvers designed to conceal the discrepancy between our words and our deeds, to camouflage our violations in language that reinforced the order or appealed to higher values. Trump is distinct from his predecessors not because his foreign policy is a radical departure, but because he is carrying out similar policies without the moralistic righteousness of his predecessors . Saving the liberal order means adhering to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense or unless authorized by the Security Council. It means rolling back our global military footprint and adopting a more restrained foreign policy that at least approximates the manner in which we expect other nations to behave. It means recognizing that the United States is not exempt from the rules and norms it often punishes others for transgressing, and it means acknowledging that the foreign policy establishment has done at least as much damage to the rules-based order as has President Trump.

#### Receding US power motivates a shift to a concert strategy — solves their offense, but a reassertion of hegemony causes great-power war and erodes multilateral governance.

Pampinella, 19 — Stephen Pampinella; Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New Paltz. He is on leave from SUNY New Paltz during Spring 2019 and is conducting research on the practice of diplomacy in the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry in Quito, Ecuador; (1-23-2019; "The Internationalist Disposition and US Grand Strategy;" *Disorder of Things*; https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/01/23/the-internationalist-disposition-and-us-grand-strategy/; //GrRv)

I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism. Security and The Balance of Power A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security. Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony. Reviving Global Governance A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance. The implications for economic governance are profound: the United States would no longer exclude from consideration the notion of social democratic regulation of global capitalism and instead promote non-capitalist perspectives on the economy. Todd Tucker provides one great example of this approach when he argues that ISDS arbitration should include labor leaders and social justice advocates rather than international lawyers chosen by multinational firms which initiate legal action against sovereign states. It would also enable the United States to seriously consider Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax, Palley and Chow’s call for minimum wage floors, and a binding multilateral treaty that regulates global business activities on the basis of human rights. And finally, it would enable the drastic shift away from fossil fuels necessary to avoid climate apocalypse.In Search of a Global Public Naysayers might argue that all this degree of international cooperation sounds idealist, but all are possible in a context of declining great power competition. Once the United States recognizes the equal membership of all others in world politics on the basis of our extreme interdependencies, it can make possible what Mitzen has referred to as collective intentionality, or the emergence of a plural subject composed of several individuals who make and uphold joint commitments to each other and demand adherence as members of a global public. This kind of action is what the internationalist disposition can help us conceptualize, and even realize, through a concert strategy. If progressive internationalists want to realize their objectives, they should be willing to turn away from the US establishment and embrace a concert strategy. By prioritizing cooperation on non-state issues and resolving great power competition through equal recognition, they can realize security for their own citizens as well as others. However, IR constructivists remind us that no foreign policy can be enacted by policymakers without a legitimating national security narrative. Progressive internationalists must continue to develop a new story about the United States that rationalizes a concert strategy and renders US national identity compatible with the pluralism we find in both world politics and US domestic politics. To develop this narrative, progressive internationalists should engage radical critiques of democracy, like those offered by Chantal Mouffe, which seek maximal inclusion of others and accept difference and conflict as irreducible elements of political life. A pluralist strategic narrative can thereby serve as the basis for mutual respect of others and enable the democratization of world politics.

### Russia-China Alliance Impact

#### Russia-China cooperation causes multiple scenarios for conflict – Iran nuclearization, terrorism, instability

Douglas E. Schoen and Melik Kaylan, "The Russia-China Axis", 1-21-2015, "9 Ways China And Russia Are Partnering To Undermine The US," (Schoen is an American political analyst, Kaylan is an international journalis.) Business Insider, <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">[http://www.businessinsider.com/china-and-russia-are-partnering-on-an-unprecedented-scale-2015-1</span](http://www.businessinsider.com/china-and-russia-are-partnering-on-an-unprecedented-scale-2015-1%3c/span)> //ALB

Russia and China now cooperate and coordinate to an unprecedented degree — politically, militarily, economically — and **their cooperation**, almost without deviation, **carries anti-American and anti-Western ramifications**. Russia, China and a constellation of satellite states seek to undermine American power, dislodge America from its leading position in the world, and establish a new, anti-Western global power structure. And both Russia in Eastern and Central Europe and China throughout Asia are becoming increasingly aggressive and assertive, even hegemonic, in the absence of a systematic US response — not withstanding the Obama administration's "strategic pivot to Asia." For now, the most obvious example of American impotence is the Russian repossession of Crimea in March 2014 and the seemingly inexorable preparation for further territorial claims in Ukraine. Here as elsewhere, Russia, with the quiet but clear backing of China, has called America's — and the West's — bluff, with little consequence. In short, **there is a new Cold War in progress,** with our old adversaries back in the game, more powerful than they have been for decades, and with America more confused and tentative than it has been since the Carter years. **Those in the Russia-China Axis now operate against American and Western interests in nearly every conceivable area**. Their efforts include the following: Overseeing massive military buildups of conventional and nuclear forces, on which they often collaborate and supply each other, as well as of missile defense—on which they have signed an agreement of partnership. Conducting aggressive and often underhanded trade and economic policies — in everything from major gas and oil deals to collaboration with newly developed nations on creating alternative international financial institutions. Taking aggressive action to consolidate and expand territorial claims in their spheres of influence, often in violation of UN norms: Russia in Central Asia and its “near abroad”; China, with its belligerence toward various disputed islands in the East and South China Seas and also toward its Asian neighbors. Facilitating rogue regimes, both economically and militarily, especially in regard to nuclear weaponry. China has kept the deranged North Korean regime afloat for years with economic aid and enabled Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuits by its refusal to enforce UN sanctions. Russia has bankrolled Iran’s nuclear program and also acted as Syrian dictator Bashar Assad’s strongest ally, showering his regime with weapons systems, bases, and funding — even as Putin has played a key role in spearheading the diplomatic agreement calling for Assad to turn over his chemical weapons. Using energy resources and other raw materials as weapons in trade wars. Acting as the two leading perpetrators of cyberwarfare worldwide — activity almost entirely directed against US or Western targets. Waging a war of intelligence theft and espionage against the West — an effort that has gone on for years but was epitomized in 2013, when China temporarily sheltered, and then Russia accepted for asylum, American NSA contractor and intelligence leaker Edward Snowden. Facilitating, albeit indirectly, terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Standing together at the UN, as when the Russians vetoed — and the Chinese abstained from voting on — a Security Council resolution declaring the Crimea referendum invalid. **Indeed, Russia and China exacerbate virtually every threat or problem facing the United States today** — from terrorism to the war in Afghanistan to instability in the Western Hemisphere and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.

### AT: China Aggression

#### China is a defensive realist – Xi will never go to war with Taiwan and will only practice strategic patience

Nathan 22 – *professor at Columbia polisci, Ph.D., Harvard, MA, Harvard, BA, Harvard* (Andrew J. Nathan, 6-23-2022, "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan)//KH

Concern is growing in Taiwan, in the United States, and among U.S. allies in Asia that China is preparing to attack Taiwan in the near future. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee last year, Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned that Beijing might attempt to seize the island in the next six years. Unifying Taiwan with mainland China is a key element of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream.” And as the political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro has argued in these pages, Xi wants “unification with Taiwan to be part of his personal legacy,” suggesting that an armed invasion could come before the end of his third term as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party in 2027 and almost certainly before the end of his probable fourth term in 2032.

Putin’s war in Ukraine has intensified these concerns. Xi’s announcement just before the Russian invasion of a “no limits” partnership with Moscow, coupled with his failure to condemn Putin’s actions and the Chinese media’s endorsement of Russian propaganda, seem to signal Beijing’s support for Russia’s territorial aggression. Beijing may see a strategic opening now that U.S. political and military resources are tied up in Europe. Moreover, Chinese leaders may have interpreted the West’s response to the Russian attack as an indication that the United States will not intervene militarily to defend a country to which it is not bound by a defense treaty, especially against a nuclear-armed adversary. As David Sacks of the Council on Foreign Relations has argued, “Chinese policymakers may conclude that Russia’s nuclear arsenal effectively deterred the United States, which would be unwilling to go to war with a nuclear power over Taiwan.”

But fears of an imminent Chinese attack are misplaced. For decades, China’s policy toward Taiwan has been characterized by strategic patience, as has its approach to other territorial claims and disputes—from India to the South China Sea. Far from spurring China to jettison this approach in favor of an imminent military assault on Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will reinforce Beijing’s commitment to playing the long game. The price Moscow has paid, both militarily and in the form of international isolation, is but a fraction of what China could expect if it were to attempt to take Taiwan by force. Better to wait patiently for Taiwan’s eventual surrender, as Beijing sees it, than to strike now and risk winning the island at too high a cost—or losing it forever.

IMPENDING ATTACK?

Fear that China will attack Taiwan had been growing well before Putin invaded Ukraine. As Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow observed in a 2021 report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Taiwan is “becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that would involve the United States of America, China, and probably other major powers.” In addition to its historical and economic motives for controlling Taiwan, Beijing feels the need to prevent other powers from using the island as a base to pressure China militarily or subvert it politically. For its part, the United States has strong motives for insisting on what Washington has referred to since 1972 as the “peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue”—which, given the anti-unification sentiments of the Taiwanese people, means an open-ended and perhaps permanent state of de facto autonomy for the island. Although there is much emotion on both sides—for China, nationalism; for the United States, commitment to democracy—what makes the Taiwan issue truly nonnegotiable are the two countries’ security interests.

In 1979, when the United States broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan to normalize relations with China, Beijing had a reasonable chance of winning over Taiwan without using force. Taiwan was diplomatically isolated, militarily weak, and increasingly economically dependent on the mainland. China encouraged this dependence by establishing a host of incentives for Taiwanese enterprises to do business on the mainland, by purchasing Taiwanese exports, and by sending Chinese tourists to the island. Beijing also invested in Taiwanese media with the aim of generating favorable news coverage and held exchanges with leaders of the anti-independence Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party.

But these efforts proved insufficient to stem the tide against unification in Taiwanese public opinion and politics. According to opinion polls, the share of Taiwanese voters favoring unification fell from 28 percent in 1999 to less than two percent in 2022. An overwhelming majority favor “maintaining the status quo,” which in the language of Taiwanese politics means sustaining autonomy without formally declaring independence. Since 2016, the anti-unification Democratic Progressive Party has controlled both the presidency and the legislature, and it looks well positioned to win the next set of national elections in 2024.

Fears of an imminent Chinese attack are misplaced.

These trends have prompted China to adopt a more threatening posture toward Taiwan. Beijing has stepped up measures to isolate the island diplomatically, slowed imports and the tourist trade, trained the Chinese military to conduct the complicated joint operations necessary for a cross-strait invasion, and conducted frequent probes of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. China has also developed what the Pentagon calls “anti-access/area denial” capabilities—including long-range precision missiles, submarine-launched torpedoes, antiship ballistic missiles, cybertools, and space capabilities—designed to hold at bay a U.S. defense of Taiwan.

These moves have fed speculation that China is building up to a full-scale attack. In addition to Xi’s desire to secure his legacy, the shifting balance of power between China and the United States is often cited by U.S. analysts as a possible motivation for Xi. The scholars Michael **Beckley and** Hal **Brands**, for instance, have suggested that China may attack in the near term because it has reached the peak of its national strength—and China’s leaders know it. China is looking at a period of decline caused by a combination of unsustainable debt, rising labor costs, an aging population, declining productivity, and a critical water shortage. Meanwhile, the United States and Taiwan have recently started to readjust their military postures to counter the asymmetric threat China poses. The Biden administration is pulling Japan and South Korea together around a commitment to “stability in the Taiwan Strait,” and Western businesses are gradually moving their production sites out of China because of rising labor costs, lack of a level playing field in the Chinese market, and COVID-19 restrictions. As this reorientation gathers steam, the West’s economic incentives to avoid war with China will diminish. By this logic, Beijing has reason to strike before its adversaries are ready.

WAITING GAME

The facts on which such forecasts are based are not wrong, but they are incomplete. A fuller set of facts suggests that China is still pursuing a strategy of strategic patience when it comes to Taiwan. First, Chinese leaders—rightly or wrongly—seem confident that they can handle their own problems better than the West can handle its problems. They don’t deny the challenges that Beckley and Brands highlight, but they believe the West is in decline, hobbled by ill-managed and slow-growing economies, social divisions, and weak political leaders. However, Chinese strategists do not seem to believe that China has yet reached a favorable power balance with the West. As Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, has argued, “China’s global reach still has its limits. Despite being a major power, China also thinks of itself as a developing country—and rightly so, considering that its GDP per capita remains far behind those of advanced economies.”

Beijing can afford to wait for power in the Western Pacific to tip decisively in its favor. When Washington comes to understand that the cost of defending Taiwan is beyond its means, and Taiwanese officials realize that Washington no longer has the appetite for a clash with China, Taiwan will pragmatically negotiate an arrangement that Beijing can accept. In the meantime, China needs only to deter Taipei and Washington from attempting to lock in formal Taiwanese independence. Beijing’s shows of force are not precursors of an imminent attack, therefore, but measures intended to buy time for history to take its course.

Second, contrary to the common portrayal of China as itching for war, Beijing has demonstrated strategic patience in pursuit of its other goals. A good example is Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea, where China has built and militarized seven sand islands without triggering a war with the United States or rival territorial claimants. It did so by building only on landforms it already controlled, claiming all along that it wasn’t doing what it was doing. The rival territorial claimants were too weak to confront China, while the United States lacked a justification for doing so because it has no territorial claims where China was building. Beijing restricted access to but refrained from seizing a landform it contests with the sole U.S. treaty ally involved in these disputes—the Philippines—which in any case lacked an appetite to invoke its alliance with Washington by moving militarily to defend itself.

The conflict in Ukraine is reminding Xi that war is unpredictable and rule over a resisting population is costly.

China likewise changed the strategic status quo without triggering an armed conflict over the contested Senkaku Islands, known in China as the Diaoyu Islands, by escalating from an occasional maritime presence in Japanese waters to a permanent one, supplementing its naval forces with less confrontational coast guard, maritime militia, and fishing vessels. Beijing followed a similar playbook in the contested Ladakh region of India, where Chinese troops gradually advanced their positions and established a series of new lines of control with only one confirmed outbreak of shooting that was quickly contained.

China has invested in ostensibly civilian port projects across the Indian Ocean and beyond that could serve as foundations for future naval operations, raising some alarm but no counteraction. Beijing has also used its economic and diplomatic influence in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Oceania and its norm-setting power in international institutions to incentivize governments to align with China’s interests, again generating some alarm but no effective resistance. Such diplomatic, economic, and military “**gray zone tactics”** illustrate that China’s strategic behavior is geared toward the long term rather than the short term, moving from no presence to sustained presence in a host of arenas without generating substantial pushback, much less armed conflict (with the exception of the fighting in Ladakh). That same strategic caution has so far been evident in China’s policy toward Taiwan, where Beijing has dialed up tension and deterred a Taiwanese drive for independence without precipitating a crisis.

Finally, the lesson Xi is likely drawing from Putin’s war in Ukraine is not that territorial aggression would go unpunished militarily by the West but that it would be both difficult and costly. There is no reason to believe that Xi is surrounded, as Putin seems to be, by yes men who will tell him that a war over Taiwan can be easily won. Even if he is, however, the grinding conflict in Ukraine is reminding him that war is unpredictable and rule over a resisting population is costly. The amphibious operation China would need to undertake to seize Taiwan would be far more difficult than the land invasion Russia has carried out in Ukraine. Xi has been reforming the Chinese military’s command structure and ramping up training for such an operation, but Chinese forces remain untested in actual combat operations. Meanwhile, the chances that the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan have increased as anti-Chinese sentiment has risen in the United States and Europe—and after U.S. President Joe Biden remarked last month that defending Taiwan is “the commitment we made.”

Even if Beijing could win a war over Taiwan, it is unclear that it could win what would come next. As painful as Russia’s isolation from Western economies has been for Moscow, the postwar scenario for the Chinese economy would be even more damaging. China imports 70 percent of its oil and 31 percent of its natural gas; it is the world’s largest coal producer but still needs to import more. Although it is striving for food self-sufficiency, China is the world’s largest importer of food, especially corn, meat, seafood, and soybeans. Some of these energy and food imports come from Russia, but many come from countries that would sanction China if it invaded Taiwan. And even if they did not, China’s navy doesn’t have the global reach to defend the shipping routes across which these and many other vital commodities flow. Any war over Taiwan, even a successful one for Beijing, would deal a devastating blow to the Chinese economy, creating conditions that would threaten domestic political stability and usher in the failure, not the realization, of the Chinese dream.

FIGHTING PATIENCE WITH PATIENCE

None of this is reason for American or Taiwanese complacency. China is following the dictum of the ancient strategist Sun-tzu: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” If Beijing eventually succeeds in taking Taiwan, it will fatally undermine Washington’s credibility with its Asian—and even its European—allies, challenging Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other countries to either come to terms with China or prepare to defend themselves without American help.

The only way to defeat China’s Taiwan strategy of strategic patience is to exercise corresponding patience, continually adapting American and Taiwanese deterrence as Chinese arms and training present an ever-changing and ever-growing threat. This is a tall order for the United States at a time when its share of global GDP has declined to less than 25 percent (from 40 percent in 1960) and the U.S. Navy complains that it doesn’t have enough ships to perform all the missions it is charged with. It is an even taller order for an island that spends only 2.1 percent of its GDP on defense and that has only recently begun to move away from an unrealistic reliance on expensive advanced platforms to stave off a Chinese attack and toward a more realistic “porcupine strategy” involving mines, short-range missiles, civil defense, and guerrilla resistance. But if a prolonged standoff in the Taiwan Strait is the most likely prospect for the future, the side that that stays in the game the longest is the one that is likely to come out on top.

#### China isn’t revisionist – economic interdependence and conflict avoidance

Bader 16 – *the senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council in the Obama Administration and a former United States Ambassador to Namibia* (Jeffrey, February 2016, “How Xi Jinping Sees the World . . . and Why,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/xi\_jinping\_worldview\_bader-1.pdf)//KH

China’s rise has rightfully been drawing attention since long before Xi Jinping assumed office. But questions about whether China is a threat to the international system, a revisionist power, and a would-be regional hegemon have become much sharper in the three years since he assumed leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. How valid are such concerns?

Xi is certainly a more forceful, assertive, and ambitious leader than his predecessor. He has behind him a China with greater capacity—economic and military—than any of his predecessors.

China’s regional and global footprint is considerably larger than before, and this has made countries near and far anxious. But it would be a mistake, in my view, to view the evolution of China in the last few years primarily as the product of the vision and imagination of an aggressive leader. Most of the actions and trends that worry observers have been present for some time: the military build-up, the assertive behavior in the South and East China Sea, the growing gravitational pull of China’s economy, and the political repression and denial of basic rights to its citizens. There are questions that deserve attention about how Xi is steering China. But the larger questions about China’s direction both pre-date and will post-date Xi’s tenure.

China is likely to continue, whether under Xi or his successor, to follow a zig-zag path in its attitude toward the international system similar to the one described in this paper. It will further develop its relationship with the international system and interdependence with other countries, but at the same selectively adhere to international norms where they fit its interests and ignore or seek to change them where they do not. For example, Chinese economic success is firmly anchored in its relationship with other markets. Autarky and self-reliance are not feasible alternatives. China benefits from international rules and norms not only in the trade and investment area, but in the security realm as well. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and uncontrolled ethnic and civil strife in Central and Western Asia would be damaging to China’s interests.

#### China rise is peaceful – Militaristic interpretations of China assume the worst with no evidence.

Heer 21 (Paul Heer. Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the National Interest with 30 years as an analyst in the U.S. government, having worked as an analytic manager and member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior Analytic Service prior to becoming NIO for East Asia, a position he held from 2007 to 2015. "Should America Try to Pacify Chinese Hegemony?". 10-15-2021. Center for National Interest. [https://nationalinterest.org/feature/should-america-try-pacify-chinese-hegemony-195077. 7-1-2022](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/should-america-try-pacify-chinese-hegemony-195077.%207-1-2022).)

But what Colby overlooks—or rules out—is the possibility of a version of Chinese predominance that is similarly compatible with or even beneficial to other countries, and does not eliminate their self-determination or autonomy. Instead, he presumes that Chinese predominance in the region would inevitably and invariably be coercive and domineering with the neighbors, and both hostile to and exclusive of U.S. interests in Asia. But neither of these is a given. Colby makes three basic arguments to refute skeptics and bolster his presumptions about the nature of Chinese hegemony. First, he states that China, as regional hegemon, could “use its power to disfavor and exclude the United States from reasonably free trade and access” to Asia “in ways that would undermine America’s core purposes, shift the balance of power against the US, and ultimately open the country to direct coercion in ways that would compromise Americans’ freedom, prosperity, and even physical security.” There can be no doubt that Beijing seeks to shift the balance of power in the region against the United States, but there is little reason to believe that it seeks to exclude the United States from Asia economically, given China’s own reliance on U.S. trade. Moreover, the notion that Beijing is looking for opportunities to subject America to direct coercion or to undermine its freedom and prosperity reflects grossly inflated threat perceptions. Beijing is simply not interested in an existential struggle with the United States, which it recognizes would be counterproductive to China’s interests, and probably futile. Second, Colby acknowledges that it “may very well be true ... that Beijing does not want to create a territorial empire in Asia,” but this “misses the point from a military planning point of view.” China’s hegemonic ambitions would require it to thwart or overcome the “anti-hegemonic coalition,” so Beijing “will want to be able to conquer substantial parts of Asia.” This may be true, but it equates Beijing’s pursuit of a capability with an intention to use it aggressively and toward expansionist goals. It also presumes a coercive, hostile, and exclusive version of Chinese regional hegemony, dismissing the possibility that Beijing will calibrate its approach in an effort to avoid conflict and escalation, and in pursuit of peaceful coexistence. Third, Colby judges that China simply cannot be trusted or given the benefit of any doubt. He entertains the possibility that Beijing will not pursue “full-fledged hegemony,” or that Chinese predominance in Asia might not be that bad. “Yet to each of these arguments there is a compelling counterargument,” he replies. And although China, once established as regional hegemon, “might pursue a more open-handed approach toward the United States, it also might very well not,” per Colby. Here, Colby invokes the oft-cited 1907 memorandum by British diplomat Eyre Crowe that examined Germany’s pursuit of regional hegemony and has been credited with predicting World War I. “A state may want regional hegemony but conceal its aspirations behind lies, deceit, and distractions, as the Crowe Memorandum famously pointed out in the context of imperial Germany,” Colby observes. But Colby makes the same mistake that Crowe did when he judges that Washington cannot afford to take the risk of accepting China’s ambitions as limited or its intentions as peaceful. Crowe argued that it should make no difference in Germany’s case because England needed to prepare for the possibility of German duplicity or a later expansion of German ambitions. Similarly, Colby advocates a military strategy to prevent Chinese hegemony regardless of Beijing’s intentions or the nature of that hegemony. He observes that Beijing “has the most powerful incentive to hide the extent of its ambitions”—but this is not necessarily true if China’s ambitions are less than Colby thinks they are. More importantly, he replicates the mistake Crowe made in failing to recognize or acknowledge that England’s behavior would be a variable in shaping Germany’s subsequent behavior. Colby similarly bypasses the probability that his proposed U.S. strategy will fuel a security dilemma and prompt Beijing to harden its own strategy and resolve. Colby makes several valid assumptions about the importance of other countries to his strategy since they would make up its “anti-hegemonic coalition.” He is correct that Beijing will attempt to prevent or break up such a coalition through what he calls a “focused and sequential strategy” of using coercion and/or enticement to draw its members away from the United States. Additionally, he is correct that Washington cannot be sanguine about this. After all, some U.S. allies and partners may not fully agree with Washington on the nature or extent of the threat Chinese predominance would pose to their own freedom, prosperity, and security. They also may have doubts about the United States’ readiness and capability to protect them or prevail over China in an actual conflict. But although Colby outlines many ways to address these challenges, he does not sufficiently confront the potential implications of other countries not fully embracing his denial strategy or its premises. Many of Colby’s core assumptions and judgments appear to overlook the underlying symmetry between the approaches that the United States and China have taken to Asia. “The United States has no inherent interest in harming China, or in imposing its own hegemony over the region,” he says. “U.S. goals are limited to preventing Beijing from achieving regional hegemony.” But neither does China have an inherent interest in harming the United States. And why should the United States expect Beijing to accept Washington’s characterization of its regional ambitions more than Washington is willing to accept Beijing’s? Chinese leaders have as much reason as their American counterparts to follow Crowe’s advice of not trusting the other side’s intentions. Colby argues that “China is the power seeking to use military force to change things,” partly because some states are “fearful, jealous, ambitious, or domineering enough that they are prepared to fight to get their way.” Washington, on the other hand, seeks a “decent peace” by way of “reckoning with the unpeaceful.” But it is premature at best to judge that China is inherently unpeaceful, or eager to “use military force to change things.” Moreover, the United States is widely perceived as prepared and even inclined to fight to get its way. Indeed, Colby’s book aims at providing a strategy for doing so.

#### China is playing the long game with taiwan – aggressive moves are just posturing to keep the US out. Andrew Nathan, 6-23-2022, (Andrew Nathan is a Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan>) --sri

But fears of an imminent Chinese attack are misplaced. For decades, China’s policy toward Taiwan has been characterized by strategic patience, as has its approach to other territorial claims and disputes—from India to the South China Sea. Far from spurring China to jettison this approach in favor of an imminent military assault on Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will reinforce Beijing’s commitment to playing the long game. The price Moscow has paid, both militarily and in the form of international isolation, is but a fraction of what China could expect if it were to attempt to take Taiwan by force. Better to wait patiently for Taiwan’s eventual surrender, as Beijing sees it, than to strike now and risk winning the island at too high a cost—or losing it forever. Fear that China will attack Taiwan had been growing well before Putin invaded Ukraine. As Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow observed in a 2021 report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Taiwan is “becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that would involve the United States of America, China, and probably other major powers.” In addition to its historical and economic motives for controlling Taiwan, Beijing feels the need to prevent other powers from using the island as a base to pressure China militarily or subvert it politically. For its part, the United States has strong motives for insisting on what Washington has referred to since 1972 as the “peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue”—which, given the anti-unification sentiments of the Taiwanese people, means an open-ended and perhaps permanent state of de facto autonomy for the island. Although there is much emotion on both sides—for China, nationalism; for the United States, commitment to democracy—what makes the Taiwan issue truly nonnegotiable are the two countries’ security interests. In 1979, when the United States broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan to normalize relations with China, Beijing had a reasonable chance of winning over Taiwan without using force. Taiwan was diplomatically isolated, militarily weak, and increasingly economically dependent on the mainland. China encouraged this dependence by establishing a host of incentives for Taiwanese enterprises to do business on the mainland, by purchasing Taiwanese exports, and by sending Chinese tourists to the island. Beijing also invested in Taiwanese media with the aim of generating favorable news coverage and held exchanges with leaders of the anti-independence Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party. But these efforts proved insufficient to stem the tide against unification in Taiwanese public opinion and politics. According to opinion polls, the share of Taiwanese voters favoring unification fell from 28 percent in 1999 to less than two percent in 2022. An overwhelming majority favor “maintaining the status quo,” which in the language of Taiwanese politics means sustaining autonomy without formally declaring independence. Since 2016, the anti-unification Democratic Progressive Party has controlled both the presidency and the legislature, and it looks well positioned to win the next set of national elections in 2024. Fears of an imminent Chinese attack are misplaced. These trends have prompted China to adopt a more threatening posture toward Taiwan. Beijing has stepped up measures to isolate the island diplomatically, slowed imports and the tourist trade, trained the Chinese military to conduct the complicated joint operations necessary for a cross-strait invasion, and conducted frequent probes of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. China has also developed what the Pentagon calls “anti-access/area denial” capabilities—including long-range precision missiles, submarine-launched torpedoes, antiship ballistic missiles, cybertools, and space capabilities—designed to hold at bay a U.S. defense of Taiwan. These moves have fed speculation that China is building up to a full-scale attack. In addition to Xi’s desire to secure his legacy, the shifting balance of power between China and the United States is often cited by U.S. analysts as a possible motivation for Xi. The scholars Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, for instance, have suggested that China may attack in the near term because it has reached the peak of its national strength—and China’s leaders know it. China is looking at a period of decline caused by a combination of unsustainable debt, rising labor costs, an aging population, declining productivity, and a critical water shortage. Meanwhile, the United States and Taiwan have recently started to readjust their military postures to counter the asymmetric threat China poses. The Biden administration is pulling Japan and South Korea together around a commitment to “stability in the Taiwan Strait,” and Western businesses are gradually moving their production sites out of China because of rising labor costs, lack of a level playing field in the Chinese market, and COVID-19 restrictions. As this reorientation gathers steam, the West’s economic incentives to avoid war with China will diminish. By this logic, Beijing has reason to strike before its adversaries are ready. The facts on which such forecasts are based are not wrong, but they are incomplete. A fuller set of facts suggests that China is still pursuing a strategy of strategic patience when it comes to Taiwan. First, Chinese leaders—rightly or wrongly—seem confident that they can handle their own problems better than the West can handle its problems. They don’t deny the challenges that Beckley and Brands highlight, but they believe the West is in decline, hobbled by ill-managed and slow-growing economies, social divisions, and weak political leaders. However, Chinese strategists do not seem to believe that China has yet reached a favorable power balance with the West. As Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, has argued, “China’s global reach still has its limits. Despite being a major power, China also thinks of itself as a developing country—and rightly so, considering that its GDP per capita remains far behind those of advanced economies.” Beijing can afford to wait for power in the Western Pacific to tip decisively in its favor. When Washington comes to understand that the cost of defending Taiwan is beyond its means, and Taiwanese officials realize that Washington no longer has the appetite for a clash with China, Taiwan will pragmatically negotiate an arrangement that Beijing can accept. In the meantime, China needs only to deter Taipei and Washington from attempting to lock in formal Taiwanese independence. Beijing’s shows of force are not precursors of an imminent attack, therefore, but measures intended to buy time for history to take its course. Second, contrary to the common portrayal of China as itching for war, Beijing has demonstrated strategic patience in pursuit of its other goals. 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China likewise changed the strategic status quo without triggering an armed conflict over the contested Senkaku Islands, known in China as the Diaoyu Islands, by escalating from an occasional maritime presence in Japanese waters to a permanent one, supplementing its naval forces with less confrontational coast guard, maritime militia, and fishing vessels. Beijing followed a similar playbook in the contested Ladakh region of India, where Chinese troops gradually advanced their positions and established a series of new lines of control with only one confirmed outbreak of shooting that was quickly contained. China has invested in ostensibly civilian port projects across the Indian Ocean and beyond that could serve as foundations for future naval operations, raising some alarm but no counteraction. 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Finally, the lesson Xi is likely drawing from Putin’s war in Ukraine is not that territorial aggression would go unpunished militarily by the West but that it would be both difficult and costly. There is no reason to believe that Xi is surrounded, as Putin seems to be, by yes men who will tell him that a war over Taiwan can be easily won. Even if he is, however, the grinding conflict in Ukraine is reminding him that war is unpredictable and rule over a resisting population is costly. The amphibious operation China would need to undertake to seize Taiwan would be far more difficult than the land invasion Russia has carried out in Ukraine. Xi has been reforming the Chinese military’s command structure and ramping up training for such an operation, but Chinese forces remain untested in actual combat operations. Meanwhile, the chances that the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan have increased as anti-Chinese sentiment has risen in the United States and Europe—and after U.S. President Joe Biden remarked last month that defending Taiwan is “the commitment we made.” Even if Beijing could win a war over Taiwan, it is unclear that it could win what would come next. As painful as Russia’s isolation from Western economies has been for Moscow, the postwar scenario for the Chinese economy would be even more damaging. China imports 70 percent of its oil and 31 percent of its natural gas; it is the world’s largest coal producer but still needs to import more. Although it is striving for food self-sufficiency, China is the world’s largest importer of food, especially corn, meat, seafood, and soybeans. Some of these energy and food imports come from Russia, but many come from countries that would sanction China if it invaded Taiwan. And even if they did not, China’s navy doesn’t have the global reach to defend the shipping routes across which these and many other vital commodities flow. Any war over Taiwan, even a successful one for Beijing, would deal a devastating blow to the Chinese economy, creating conditions that would threaten domestic political stability and usher in the failure, not the realization, of the Chinese dream.

AT:

### AT: Transition Wars

#### Empirics and growing normal powers ensure hegemony decline will be peaceful! Indicts Kagan specifically!

Leonard 22 – *Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations* (Mark, 6-13-2022, "The Real End of Pax Americana," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2022-06-13/real-end-pax-americana)//KH

Greater German and Japanese assertiveness is likely to go hand in hand with U.S. retrenchment (and a shrinking of Washington’s relative economic and military might) over the long haul, a trend that is unlikely to change with the war in Ukraine. The United States will be forced to concentrate its limited resources on the challenges posed by China. Analysts such as Robert Kagan have argued that Pax Americana could give way to global chaos. That is definitely possible. But it is **not what has happened** in much of the Middle East, where the United States was most engaged for the last two decades and where it is now pulling back most dramatically. Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations have described how there was an initial surge in regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia and in military conflicts that drew in outside powers, such as Russia and Turkey. But then many of these **conflicts slowed down,** and more locally driven reordering processes began, exemplified by the August 2021 Baghdad conference that brought key regional actors into dialogue with one another.

In Europe, U.S. retrenchment could yield greater sovereignty once Europeans finally realize that the war in Ukraine will not stop Washington’s long-term pivot to Asia. One reason that Europeans have failed to develop a common foreign policy is their lack of trust in one another. But Moscow’s aggression has brought Europeans together, convincing countries that previously favored engagement with Russia, such as Germany and Italy, to embrace a policy of containment. If this convergence holds, one could see a real European strategic alignment, backed eventually by a European armaments industry and even conceivably by a more common European nuclear deterrent (or at least a willingness by France to share its deterrent). In the long term, Europe could forge a common framework to manage relations with other powers, such as Russia and Turkey, including through deterrence, selective decoupling to minimize tensions, and some form of dialogue to prevent escalation. Instead of continuing to expand the EU and NATO, Europe might opt for smaller, more flexible multilateral arrangements involving some of the most important players, much like the Quad in Asia. In short, the European order might become more Asian.

At the same time, Asia is likely to become more European. The United States will maintain its shift in focus to the Indo-Pacific, but its economic and military weight will shrink compared with China’s. As a result, Tokyo and other regional powers will probably strengthen their ties with the United States yet continue to diversify beyond their traditional alliances with Washington. As Michishita put it: “What we are trying to do is to invite more friends into the Japan-U.S. alliance.” Already a new Asian order is emerging that includes ties with the United States and closer cooperation among powers such as Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. Jimbo says Asian countries won’t form a NATO-like alliance but rather increase cooperation in areas such as intelligence, maritime security, and law enforcement. In trade and commerce, a certain level of regional integration has already occurred **without Washington’s participation** through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—which took shape after the United States walked away from its predecessor—and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

In terms of security, a more balanced division of labor could emerge. Europeans will have to take more direct responsibility for security in eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. In Asia, regional powers will have to invest more in their own capabilities to balance Chinese influence in the region. Elbridge Colby, who served as a U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Trump administration, put it this way in an interview with Nikkei Asia: “The United States is 5,000 miles away from Japan and Taiwan, so we need Japan to do more.” And as the European and Indo-Pacific theaters become more connected—not least through the Sino-Russian rapprochement—it is even possible that European and Asian powers will support one another. Japan and South Korea, for instance, might ask Europeans to reciprocate their support for sanctions on Russia. The result would be more complex regional orders in which the United States still plays an important role but no longer calls the shots.

### AT: Border Wars Turn

#### Status quo agreements fail – there has been no discussion of the implementation of confidence building measures

Lo 9 [Bobo Lo - Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs - Director of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Centre for European Reform, Axis of Convenience - Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics. New York, NY, US: Brookings Institution Press, 2009, site.ebrary.com/lib/wfu/reader.action?docID=10338432, DOA: 7/15/16]

In recent years Moscow and Beijing have worked hard to minimize tensions over the Chinese presence in the RFE. The Communist leadership has cooperated whenever the Russian government has sought to tighten visa procedures and regulate shuttle trade. Beijing has reiterated on many occasions that it holds no irredentist ambitions, and it has responded with restraint to intemperate accusations from Russian regional and federal politicians. For its part the Kremlin has consistently rejected the notion of a “China threat,” whether in general terms or in the specific context of the RFE. It has given its blessing to the growth of interregional ties and canvassed the possibility of Chinese participation in energy and infrastructural projects in the Far East. It has also managed to bring the regions on-message and contain the worst of their Sinophobia. The presence of Ishaev, a once vociferous critic of China, at the signing of the final border agreement in Beijing in October 2004 highlights the extent to which the Russian side is now singing the same tune— at least in public. 83 Such apparent unanimity is in stark contrast to the open discord that prevailed under Yeltsin. Goodwill on both sides has led to a clear improvement in the dialogue on RFE issues, which has become much more constructive. Crucially there has been substantive progress to back up the fine sentiments. In addition to demarcation of the border, “illegal migration” is less of an issue than at any time since the opening-up of the RFE; interregional trade is growing; and political contacts between provincial administrations on both sides of the border are more frequent and cordial than ever before. It would seem that things could hardly be better. Paradoxically, however, this is part of the problem. The largely positive state of relations in the RFE relies disproportionately on the “suspension of disbelief ” discussed in the previous chapter. It is as if Moscow and Beijing have agreed not to delve too closely into the underlying contradictions for fear of awakening the monster. This softly-softly approach fosters an atmosphere in which both sides can talk through issues. But it also risks sliding into self-deception and complacency. For Moscow, in particular, benign interaction may obscure the importance of finding lasting solutions to unresolved problems. Thus far there is little sign of the Kremlin implementing the measures needed to make the RFE a viable political and economic entity within the Russian Federation. Instead, the government has adopted a band-aid approach, marked by declarations of intent as impractical as they are vocal. Whether through lack of interest, a failure of comprehension, or absence of political courage, it has not managed to address the region’s problems. State investment in economic and social infrastructure remains inadequate. 84 Putin’s centralizing political reforms have not significantly reduced corruption and misgovernment by local administrations. 85 Moscow shows little understanding of the different economic conditions across the RFE. 86 There has been no progress in regularizing the importation of Chinese labor for projects in construction, the timber industry, and agriculture. And the federal government continues to play games over the development of transnational energy and infrastructural projects. An uncertain future The continuing expansion of Sino-Russian partnership ensures, for the time being, a relatively favorable environment in which to resolve these problems. But time and opportunity are not unlimited. While talk of a crisis is premature, the present state of affairs in the RFE cannot continue indefinitely. 87 A number of variables could change the situation for the worse. The first is a rise in the overall number of Chinese migrant workers and a corresponding diminution of work opportunities within China. Although Beijing is taking steps to alleviate this problem, the pace of domestic modernization will ratchet up employment pressures for the next decade and perhaps longer. 88 Most workers will continue to gravitate toward China’s cities, while others will find employment in various Asian countries, Europe, and America. However, while Russia will avoid the worst of the overflow, an increase in the number of Chinese in the RFE is possible. This would exacerbate tensions between the newcomers and the local Russian population. The second variable is macroeconomic. The bilateral relationship has benefited from high growth rates in Russia and China. These have not only driven the expansion of trade, but also instilled a new confidence. This begs the question, however, of what might happen in the event of an economic slowdown or worse in either or both countries, with knock-on effects for political and social stability. One potential outcome, already witnessed in the Russia-Japan relationship, is the emergence of an antagonistic nationalism. This could manifest itself in several ways: trade disputes, resource competition in Central Asia, great-power rivalry across the globe. The most plausible theatre of trouble, however, is the RFE, because it is here where the Russian and Chinese sit in direct proximity and where many issues are outstanding. Third, the rise of nationalism could, in time, see a revival of Chinese claims on parts of the RFE. It was not so long ago that Mao called for these lands to be returned to China. This coincided with the Sino-Soviet freeze and the build-up to the 1969 clashes, and highlighted the extent to which the prominence of such questions rises and falls according to the overall state of the relationship. A serious downturn, whether in the RFE or elsewhere, might dilute previous commitments. With its attention overwhelmingly focused on internal modernization and Taiwan reunification, Beijing has no interest in resurrecting the territorial issue for the foreseeable future. But there may come a time when the Chinese leadership feels either confident or desperate enough to reassess the situation on its northern frontier. Today’s academic discussions about the “lost one-and-a-half million square kilometers” could become tomorrow’s policy debates. Even if successive Chinese leaders remain true to their promise not to raise territorial claims, the Russians may not believe them. A number of Russian commentators are asking what happens after Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. There is genuine concern that the RFE could be back on the table some time in the next fifteen to twenty years and that, when the time comes, Moscow will be unable to withstand Chinese pressure. 89 Suspicion of Beijing’s intentions will always remain, no matter how often and how vigorously it reaffirms its present position. To skeptics the only way of guaranteeing Russia’s territorial integrity is to “trust in capabilities, not intentions”—an attitude that history shows has the potential to generate serious misunderstandings. Other commentators, including several leading Sinologists, posit a scenario whereby the Communist Party loses control of the modernization process and the ensuing chaos sees “millions” of Chinese fleeing across the border. In that event, the territorial question would resurface by force of circumstances. 90 The widening demographic imbalance, and Russia’s larger population crisis, is the final variable. The danger is not so much the decline in the number of working-age Russians, but rather its impact on Russian self-perceptions and views of the outside world. In particular, it could heighten such traditional instincts as the “besieged fortress” mentality and fear of strategic encirclement. In such an atmosphere, even a modest increase in the Chinese presence in Russia’s eastern provinces could undermine the larger bilateral relationship.

# Aff Answers

## Uniqueness Answers

### China Losing

#### China’s authoritarian ascendence will cause its downfall – the US will outcompete

Kroenig ‘20 (Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, and the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China,” The Atlantic, 4/3/2020, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/why-china-ill-equipped-great-power-rivalry/609364/)-> MP

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the [United States built](https://www.amazon.com/Present-Creation-Years-State-Department/dp/0393304124) the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt [recently wrote](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/opinion/sunday/china-economy-trade.html) in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many [economists predict](https://www.newsweek.com/worlds-largest-economy-2030-will-be-china-followed-india-us-pushed-third-1286525) that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and [some have suggested](http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2043235,00.html) that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao [aligned with the Soviet Union in 1950](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.shtml) only to nearly [fight a nuclear war](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/index2.html) with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and [“hiding its capabilities and biding its time”](https://www.ft.com/content/05cd86a6-b552-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399) abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. [According to the Asia Society](https://aspi.gistapp.com/winter-2020/page/overview), he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, [taking contested territory](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/world/asia/south-china-seas-photos.html) from neighbors in the South China Sea and [conducting military exercises](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html) with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The [2017 U.S. National Security Strategy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf) declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000 [years of history](https://camphorpress.com/5000-years-of-history/)” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the [protests this year in Hong Kong](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695) and Xinjiang—the CCP [spends more on domestic security](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-spends-more-on-domestic-security-as-xis-powers-grow-1520358522) than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. [Shadi Hamid: China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/china-trolling-world-and-avoiding-blame/608332/) Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including [North Macedonia this week](https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/04/02/world/europe/02reuters-nato-northmacedonia.html). The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of [lauding autocratic China’s firm response](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/asia/coronavirus-china-united-states.html) in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually [misrepresented](https://time.com/5813628/china-coronavirus-statistics-wuhan/) the numbers of COVID-19 infections and [deaths](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-27/stacks-of-urns-in-wuhan-prompt-new-questions-of-virus-s-toll) in China, and European nations have [rejected](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52092395) and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits. The great political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli considered a similar line of thinking in the 16th century, about whether republics or dictators charted a more stable course. He wrote, “I, therefore, disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable [and] changeable … The prince … unchecked by laws, will be more … unstable, and imprudent than a populace.” The U.S. political system certainly has problems. But democracy is the best machine ever invented for generating enormous power, wealth, and prestige on the international stage.

### China Econ Declining

**China’s economy declining – markets plummeting, rising risk of recession, and GDP decline**

**He ‘22** {Laura He is a reporter and digital producer for CNN Business, 5-5-2022, CNN, "China's economy is going backwards ", https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/05/economy/china-economy-services-decline-covid-intl-hnk/index.html]//PJ

China's gigantic services sector just contracted at the second sharpest pace on record as Covid lockdowns hit businesses hard. The Caixin purchasing managers' index, a closely-watched indicator for assessing the state of the economy, plummeted to 36.2 in April from 42 in March, according to a survey released by IHS Markit on Thursday. A reading below 50 indicates contraction, while anything above that gauge shows expansion. The services sector accounts for more than half of the nation's GDP and over 40% of its employment. And with survey data showing China's manufacturing sector also shrinking last month, the world's second biggest economy went backwards in April. While conditions might improve this month as Covid infections rates ease and officials try to limit the damage to the economy, large parts of Beijing have just been placed under tighter restrictions and some economists are now forecasting that Chinese GDP will decline in the second quarter. The nation's capital has effectively shut down its largest district, Chaoyang, suspending transportation within it and encouraging 3.5 million residents to work from home as part of its latest effort to curb Covid-19 cases, local authorities announced Wednesday. The nearly 6-point decline in services activity in April was second only to the collapse in February 2020, when China's economy came to a near standstill as it battled to contain the initial coronavirus outbreak that started from Wuhan. In that month, the Caixin services PMI dived to 26.5 from 51.8 in January. Businesses in the world's second largest economy were already grappling with rising energy and raw material costs, when Covid lockdowns hamstrung their operations further. It has also become harder for firms to pass the higher prices to consumers, because of the impact Covid restrictions have having on customer demand. That has translated to even lower employment. "Some companies, affected by the drop in orders, laid off workers to lower costs," said Wang Zhe, senior economist for Caixin Insight Group. The measure for employment in the services sector has been under 50 for four consecutive months, the survey showed. The data came just hours after China reported a steep drop in tourist spending for the Labor Day national holiday. Tourist spending was only 64.7 billion yuan ($9.8 billion) over the five-day holiday, down 43% from the same period last year, according to a statement by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism late Wednesday. People made 160 million domestic tourist trips during the holiday, down 30% from a year earlier. The data again highlights how China's zero-Covid policy has taken a heavy toll on its economy. On Saturday, PMI surveys from the government indicated that both factory and non-manufacturing activities slumped in April to their worst levels since February 2020. "Recent mobility trends suggest that China's growth momentum deteriorated significantly in April," analysts from Fitch Ratings wrote on Tuesday. They expect GDP to contract in the second quarter, before output recovers in the second half. Nomura analysts also warned last month of a rising risk of "recession" in the second quarter, as lockdowns, a shrinking property sector, and slowing exports hit the economy hard. As the highly transmissible Omicron variant spreads quickly in China, the country is battling its worst outbreak in more than two years. So far, at least 27 Chinese cities are under full or partial lockdown, which could be impacting up to 185 million residents across the country, according to CNN's latest calculation. That includes Shanghai — the nation's leading financial center and a major manufacturing and shipping hub. The city has been under a lockdown since March 28. Although authorities started to lift some restrictions last month, more than 8 million residents are still banned from leaving their residential compounds. The Chinese government still adheres to its stringent zero-Covid policy more than two years after the initial outbreak — at a time when the rest of the world is learning to live with Covid. The policy involves mandatory mass testing and strict lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. But economic costs are rising. Many economists have downgraded their China GDP growth targets for this year, citing risks from the zero-Covid policy. Last month, the International Monetary Fund lowered its China growth forecast to 4.4%, well below the government's official target of about 5.5%.

#### China is in a recession – econ collapse is inevitable

He 22 (Laura He is a reporter and digital producer for CNN Business, based in Hong Kong. She covers news about Asian business and markets, with a focus on China, “China’s economy is going backwards,” CNN Business, 5/5/2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/05/economy/china-economy-services-decline-covid-intl-hnk/index.html>) - MP

China’s gigantic services sector just contracted at the second sharpest pace on record as Covid lockdowns hit businesses hard. The Caixin purchasing managers' index, a closely-watched indicator for assessing the state of the economy, plummeted to 36.2 in April from 42 in March, according to a survey released by IHS Markit on Thursday. A reading below 50 indicates contraction, while anything above that gauge shows expansion. The services sector accounts for more than half of the nation's GDP and over 40% of its employment. And with survey data showing China's manufacturing sector also shrinking last month, the world's second biggest economy went backwards in April. While conditions might improve this month as Covid infections rates ease and officials try to limit the damage to the economy, large parts of Beijing have just been placed under tighter restrictions and some economists are now forecasting that Chinese GDP will decline in the second quarter. The nation's capital has effectively shut down its largest district, Chaoyang, suspending transportation within it and encouraging 3.5 million residents to work from home as part of its latest effort to curb Covid-19 cases, local authorities announced Wednesday. The nearly 6-point decline in services activity in April was second only to the collapse in February 2020, when China's economy came to a near standstill as it battled to contain the initial coronavirus outbreak that started from Wuhan. In that month, the Caixin services PMI dived to 26.5 from 51.8 in January. Businesses in the world's second largest economy were already grappling with rising energy and raw material costs, when Covid lockdowns hamstrung their operations further. It has also become harder for firms to pass the higher prices to consumers, because of the impact Covid restrictions have having on customer demand. That has translated to even lower employment. "Some companies, affected by the drop in orders, laid off workers to lower costs," said Wang Zhe, senior economist for Caixin Insight Group. The measure for employment in the services sector has been under 50 for four consecutive months, the survey showed. The data came just hours after China reported a steep drop in tourist spending for the Labor Day national holiday. Tourist spending was only 64.7 billion yuan ($9.8 billion) over the five-day holiday, down 43% from the same period last year, according to a statement by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism late Wednesday. People made 160 million domestic tourist trips during the holiday, down 30% from a year earlier. The data again highlights how China's zero-Covid policy has taken a heavy toll on its economy. On Saturday, PMI surveys from the government indicated that both factory and non-manufacturing activities slumped in April to their worst levels since February 2020. "Recent mobility trends suggest that China's growth momentum deteriorated significantly in April," analysts from Fitch Ratings wrote on Tuesday. They expect GDP to contract in the second quarter, before output recovers in the second half. Nomura analysts also warned last month of a rising risk of "recession" in the second quarter, as lockdowns, a shrinking property sector, and slowing exports hit the economy hard. As the highly transmissible Omicron variant spreads quickly in China, the country is battling its worst outbreak in more than two years. So far, at least 27 Chinese cities are under full or partial lockdown, which could be impacting up to 185 million residents across the country, according to CNN's latest calculation. That includes Shanghai — the nation's leading financial center and a major manufacturing and shipping hub. The city has been under a lockdown since March 28. Although authorities started to lift some restrictions last month, more than 8 million residents are still banned from leaving their residential compounds. The Chinese government still adheres to its stringent zero-Covid policy more than two years after the initial outbreak — at a time when the rest of the world is learning to live with Covid. The policy involves mandatory mass testing and strict lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. But economic costs are rising. Many economists have downgraded their China GDP growth targets for this year, citing risks from the zero-Covid policy. Last month, the International Monetary Fund lowered its China growth forecast to 4.4%, well below the government's official target of about 5.5%. In recent days, Chinese leaders have repeatedly tried to reassure the public about fixing the economy. President Xi Jinping last week called for an infrastructure spending spree to promote growth. And the Communist Party's Politburo on Friday promised "specific measures" to support the internet economy.

#### Chinese economy collapse is coming – Ukraine conflict and lockdowns causes economic downturn.

Chen 22 (Yawen Chen is in Beijing, crunching economic data, interviewing high-level officials, and travelling to far-flung provinces to visit factory floors and talk to local shopkeepers, “China is at risk of self-inflicted recession,” Reuters, 4/12/2022, <https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/china-is-risk-self-inflicted-recession-2022-04-13/>) - MP

China’s stubborn battle to eradicate Omicron is raising the risk of a serious economic crisis. Nearly one-third of the population is under some sort of lockdown, with shops shut and factories struggling. Policy easing looks unavoidable, but with benchmark yields dropping below U.S. Treasury bonds, so does capital flight. The outbreak in Shanghai, where asymptomatic cases are running at around 25,000 a day despite two weeks of rigorous lockdown, is prompting other regions to impose draconian measures pre-emptively. At least 373 million people in cities contributing to 40% of China’s GDP have been affected, a Nomura survey showed. Key indicators are already reflecting the shock. Domestic sales of passenger cars fell over 10% in March, per official data; an index tracking freight traffic in China dropped by about 25% during the first week of April. China contained the initial outbreak in 2020 quickly and resumed production, allowing its manufacturing sector to tap export markets to revive growth after a single quarter of contraction. Omicron is far more infectious, yet Beijing aims to reproduce that result. Officials appear to be realising that won’t be easy. With the war in Ukraine pushing up commodities costs, and demand for Chinese exports cooling as inflation spikes in key overseas markets, premier Li Keqiang this week warned of “unexpected changes” in the external and domestic environment that would require more urgent, aggressive measures. Fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending will be hard to implement during lockdowns, which leaves monetary policy. Cutting interest rates and reserve ratios, however, is tricky given the increasingly hawkish U.S. Federal Reserve. Yields on China's 10-year government bonds fell below U.S. Treasury yields for the first time in 12 years on Monday; local inflation rates are still lower but rising quickly. If sharp currency depreciation ensues, Beijing might face a repeat of the capital outflows it struggled to contain in 2015. There are already signs foreign investors are evacuating. For private businesses, uncertainty as to when lockdowns will end, and whether they will resume soon after, will deter investment and job creation regardless of the cost of credit. Consumers rushing to hoard food before they get sealed inside their flats are unlikely to spend on other goods. The longer Beijing digs its heels on zero Covid, the closer a recession will get. - At a forum held with local government officials on April 11, Premier Li Keqiang said the government must be vigilant against “unexpected changes” in the international and domestic environment that are putting downward pressure on the Chinese economy. Li urged officials to speed implementation of policy measures announced earlier in the year, ranging from tax cuts and special-purpose government bond issuance to ensuring stable energy supply. - Yields on China's 10-year government bonds fell below U.S. Treasury yields for the first time in 12 years on April 11, Reuters reported. - Chinese banks extended 3.1 trillion yuan ($490 billion) in new yuan loans in March, up sharply from February and exceeding analyst expectations, data released by the People's Bank of China on April 11 showed.

**China’ economy in freefall – mismanagement, COVID, and external factors make it damage beyond repair**

**Singleton ‘22** [Craig Singleton is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat., 6-13-2022, Foreign Policy, "China's Crisis of Confidence", https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/13/china-xi-jinping-economy-downturn-slowdown-decline-geopolitics-competition-united-states/#:~:text=China's%20economy%2C%20long%20in%20decline,prolonged%20era%20of%20slow%20growth.]//PJ

What if the new era of great-power competition was over before it had even begun? Many of today’s fears about a multigeneration conflict with Beijing rest on linear extrapolations of yesteryear’s data, harkening back to a time when China appeared on track to supplant the United States as the world’s largest economy. Yet more and more signs point to a China that is fully unprepared for the competition with the United States it once sought. China’s economy, long in decline, is now in freefall—thanks to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s mismanagement. Case in point: This year, the U.S. economy is forecast to grow faster than China’s for the first time since 1976, with strong indications that China has entered a prolonged era of slow growth. More surprising is that Xi, in an attempt to stabilize China’s finances, has largely abandoned his ambitious plans to overhaul China’s growth model, choosing instead to double down on the very economic policies that got China into today’s economic bind in the first place. Put differently, Xi blinked. Xi’s reversal speaks volumes. It suggests he lacks confidence in his own plan to transform China’s unsustainable economic model into one that can deliver on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) promise of “high quality” growth. More important is that China’s fizzling economic miracle may soon undercut the CCP’s ability to wage a sustained struggle for geostrategic dominance. This raises a tantalizing question: What if, instead of being a competitor, China cannot actually afford to compete at all? Xi is often said to have tapped into Chinese resentment over its colonial-era humiliations to kick-start its modern-day competition with the United States. But the decision to jettison China’s policy of hiding its capabilities and biding its time began much earlier. Indeed, for decades before Xi’s ascent into power, CCP elites made clear this dictum would be discarded as soon as the international balance of power shifted in China’s favor. When Washington looked to be terminally weakened by the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese officials made their move, betting that overseas investments and economic coercion were the keys to outcompeting the West. They were mostly right. China’s economic clout, beyond any other consideration, still serves as the foundation for the country’s vast influence. The gravitational pull of China’s market, along with Beijing’s ability to influence economic conditions and shape political perceptions in other countries, enabled China to bind itself to the world. The fruits of China’s economic expansion also underwrote its power projection, covering the costs of the Belt and Road Initiative, military modernization, and expanding multilateral commitments. China’s GDP growth paid domestic dividends for the CCP too, empowering a model of state capitalism that broke down the barriers between the private sector and government institutions to mobilize the former in service of the latter. Nevertheless, China’s meteoric rise, fueled by annual GDP growth above 6 percent, appears over. Yes, China’s economy has been cooling for years, plagued by systematic deficiencies like chronic overinvestment, massive debt loads, and a shrinking workforce, which has put enormous stresses on China’s finances. But these systematic trends have been exacerbated, perhaps irreversibly, by China’s disastrous pandemic response, where the lack of an effective domestic vaccine and the CCP’s unwillingness to approve and purchase Western ones have made rolling lockdowns a permanent way of life. So far, the CCP’s containment measures have resulted in plummeting industrial output, surging unemployment, capital flight, and a sinking currency. Efforts to stabilize the Chinese economy will be further strained by a deteriorating external environment, with the World Bank warning of 1970s-style stagflation and reduced global demand for Chinese exports—until now, the engine of China’s growth. The economy remains severely dependent on vast supplies of imported fuel, grain, and other commodities whose prices have massively surged. Western technology transfer restrictions are also taking their toll. Another challenge is growing frustration in China’s largest markets—the United States and the European Union—over Xi’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Already, large multinational companies like Apple are shifting supply chains to Southeast Asia and other regions perceived as more stable while expatriates are abandoning the country and newly minted college graduates flee in droves. Indeed, China’s brain drain has begun. So far, Xi has offered few new ideas for remedying China’s crisis, even as his subordinates warn about the need to “act decisively” to avoid financial ruin. Xi’s big bet consists of an “all-out” infrastructure push to boost the economy—the same approach that fueled China’s current debt bubble, massive industrial overcapacity, and the creation of entire ghost cities of half-finished apartments. But such investments are unlikely to stimulate China’s economy, not least because they are focused on propping up the least productive parts of China’s economy, including the state sector. Making matters worse, Xi has offered little relief for Chinese consumers, the linchpin in his effort to drum up domestic consumption, decrease inequality, and reduce the economy’s reliance on exports and unproductive investments. Consumers were integral to China’s pandemic rebound in 2021 but now face growing fears about job security and sustained income losses from never-ending lockdowns. At the same time, one by one, Xi’s signature economic initiatives have disappeared from the front pages of China’s state-owned newspapers. That includes Xi’s push for “common prosperity,” which ostensibly aimed to reduce extreme inequality by giving ordinary Chinese a greater share of the nation’s wealth. Plans to introduce a property tax to slow down China’s notorious real estate bubble—where the elite have amassed vast fortunes—have also been shelved. Chinese regulators have also signaled an end to Xi’s crackdown on China’s tech giants, whose growing influence has long been viewed as a growing threat to the CCP’s power. Nevertheless, foreign investors, who lost billions of dollars on Chinese tech stocks tanked by Xi’s policies, remain wary. With many Western banks warning that the regulatory risks of investing in China now outweigh the potential benefits, these investors may not come to Beijing’s rescue either. Mere months before Xi’s coronation to a third term as party secretary, CCP officials whose jobs it is to worry about economic growth, like Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, are now openly pitted against Xi and those more concerned with regime security and party control, such as Chinese Vice Premiers Han Zheng and Hu Chunhua. While Xi projects calm and warns citizens not to question his zero-COVID policies, Li refuses to endorse them and instead speaks of China’s “complicated and grave” situation. This fractured policy environment, where ideological and technocratic factions battle for influence, is eerily reminiscent of late Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s era. Just as it did then, today’s intraparty clash will produce winners and losers. For now, the latter group includes Xi, who will probably be forced to make key personnel concessions during this fall’s 20th National Party Congress to secure the support needed to guarantee a third term. For the remainder of 2022, China’s worsening domestic challenges will remain the party’s highest priority, and addressing them will take up an increasing share of China’s economic resources. The upshot is that U.S.-China tensions will likely remain subdued, at least for the short-to-medium term. China’s state-owned enterprises, provincial and local governments, private companies, and citizens will be forced to compete for a piece of a pie that is no longer growing. More difficult to predict, however, is how China’s fight for resources and power will affect the country’s various domestic stakeholders. For the first time in a while, China’s state-owned enterprises, provincial and local governments, private companies, and citizens will be forced to compete for a piece of a pie that is no longer growing. As a result, funding trade-offs will be necessary, including those considered inconceivable when China’s annual growth hovers around 10 percent. That will include cuts to current and planned investments in China’s power projection capabilities, both civilian and military. Outbound Chinese development loans, a key tool for Beijing to expand relations across Asia and Africa, have already dropped 96 percent in recent years, from $75 billion in 2016 to approximately $4 billion during the pandemic. The overall average value of Belt and Road Initiative-related projects, averaging $255 billion annually between 2010 and 2019, also cratered to less than $81 billion in 2020. Although these figures may recover slightly, Chinese policymakers will be hard pressed to justify such expenditures as China’s economy falters. Similar trade-offs will also be necessary for certain aspects of China’s defense spending. In a contested resource environment, tensions will almost certainly emerge between China’s army, navy, and domestic security apparatus. The same goes for civil-military relations because local officials are often expected to provide the military with the materiel and support required for training and large-scale exercises. Overtime, China’s economic slowdown could also lead to civil unrest, which could force the military to become more involved in maintaining domestic security at the expense of its broader modernization. Potential economic constraints could also impede plans to fully fund newly announced ventures, such as China’s space force. Over the long term, China could be forced to choose among certain core missions, such as monitoring China’s coast, building up its South China Sea outposts, maintaining its air defense identification zone, and even protecting its unruly borders. Either way, China’s military will be forced to do more with less. In the end though, China’s sustained economic cooldown and Xi’s crisis of confidence will result in the very outcome he, the CCP, and Chinese nationalists feared most: broad recognition that China may be incapable of competing with the United States at all.

### China Hates NATO

#### China already hates NATO action

McCarthy 22[Simone McCarthy. China Writer for CNN Digital Worldwide, Previously South China Post, received Awards at WAN-IFRA, contributor to SupChina. "Analysis: Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy". 6-30-2022. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html. 7-2-2022.]-cg

As leaders of major Western democracies and their allies met in two back-to-back summits this week in Europe, their focus was clear: keeping pressure on Russia as its brutal assault on Ukraine enters its fifth month. But another country was also pulled into the spotlight in those meetings: China. And Beijing is not happy about it. For the first time, China was included in NATO's "Strategic Concept," adopted at the bloc's summit in Madrid on Wednesday. The document, last updated in 2010, lays out the security challenges facing the alliance while outlining a course of action, and now says China's ambitions and "coercive policies" challenge the allies' interests, security and values. The new language has prompted China to accuse NATO of being a "Cold War remnant." "The Strategic Concept claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world," China's Mission to the EU said in a statement Wednesday. "We urge NATO to stop provoking confrontation by drawing ideological lines, abandon the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game approach, and stop spreading disinformation and provocative statements against China. Since NATO positions China as a "systemic challenge," we have to pay close attention and respond in a coordinated way," it said. Earlier this week, the Group of Seven (G7) major democratic economies included tough language on China in their own communique, released days after launching an infrastructure investment plan to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. European leaders have grown increasingly wary of China in recent years and those views have hardened over the past few months as Beijing has repeatedly refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and bolstered its ties with the Kremlin. "We see a deepening strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. And China's growing assertiveness and its coercive policies have consequences for the security of Allies and our partners," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at a news conference Wednesday. "China is not our adversary. But we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents," he said. Differences still exist between countries in the bloc on how to treat China, observers say. Some NATO members want to ensure the focus remains squarely on Russia, while the United States -- by far the block's most powerful member -- has pegged China as the "most serious long-term challenge to the international order." But the developments this week, which show China to be higher on these bodies' agendas than ever before, signal an increasing alignment between the US and its partners. They also mark a significant setback for Beijing, which has tried to drive a wedge between the American and European stances on China, observers say. "The combination of the kind of language used by the G7 and (China's formal inclusion) in NATO strategic documents is indeed a blow for (China), and something that they would have hoped and wished to be able to prevent," said Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow in the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States. "It's an exceptionally strong period in terms of transatlantic cooperation and that translates for China in ways that they're very concerned about," he said. China's concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. "China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a 'systemic challenge'?" ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. "We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China," he said, adding that NATO should "stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe." But that rhetoric -- blaming NATO for "disruption" in Europe -- is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia's actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China "very quickly and very clearly lined itself up -- at least in words, not so much in deeds -- with Russia," while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging "democracies versus autocracies" narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. "In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift," Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China's economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation's relations with Taiwan. That miscalculation was on show in a terse summit between China and European Union leaders in April, where China focused on talking points around deepening their relations and economic cooperation, while EU officials were bent on pushing China to work with it toward brokering peace in Ukraine. China has claimed neutrality and that it supports peace, but has made no concrete steps in that direction. Rising concerns about China from the G7 -- made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the US -- were reflected in the bloc's joint communique, released Tuesday after a summit in German Bavaria. The document, which mentioned China around a dozen times -- versus four references in the G7 leaders' statement a year earlier -- touched on areas of cooperation, but focused on calling on China to improve its human rights record and abide by international rules. And in a mark of how Russia has shaped the bloc's view on China, the group called on Beijing to "press" Moscow to comply with United Nations resolutions and stop its military aggression. The statement followed what Washington called the "formal launch" on Sunday of a $600 billion G7 infrastructure investment initiative, first announced last year. The drive, which the EU said would "demonstrate the power of development finance when it reflects democratic values," was an apparent bid to counter China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative, which critics say Beijing has used to build its global influence. At NATO, the newly adopted strategy document says China "employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up." It also points to a "deepening strategic partnership" between Russia and China and says their "mutually reinforcing attempts" to undercut the rules-based international order "run counter" to NATO values. The language, which also saw Russia move from a "strategic partner" in the 2010 document to "the most significant and direct threat" in the current iteration, is a clear bolstering of NATO's stance. That's significant not least of all because in recent years, as NATO statements began to reference China, some members and observers raised concerns that taking too firm a stance risked turning China into an enemy. Others have seen China as outside the region's key security interests. Following a NATO meeting last June, in which leaders characterized China as a security challenge, French President Emmanuel Macron downplayed the move with a quip that "China is not in the North Atlantic." Some of those concerns still exist, and inside the bloc there remain differences in views on how to handle China, observers say. Within Europe, such debates even extend to the emerging "autocracies versus democracies" narrative being promoted by the US, according to Pierre Haroche, a research fellow in European security at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris). "Do you want to solidify the 'dragon-bear monster' to show that there is a clear ideological 'Cold War' between democracies and autocracies, because that's convenient in terms of the narrative? Or is it (a better) strategy to say that the two (China and Russia) are very different actors ... who might even, in the future, oppose one another?" said Haroche, summarizing the argument. But even as differences may exist between member states, it's clear that NATO is thinking bigger at this year's summit, with the historic inclusion of leaders from New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. The move was met with ire in China, where officials have long argued that NATO was seeking to expand its presence into the Indo-Pacific, which Beijing views as its own neighborhood. "The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean - this should be the general consensus in the Asia-Pacific region," a Tuesday editorial from the Communist Party-affiliated nationalist tabloid Global Times said. But observers have characterized this not so much as an expansion of NATO into the Indo-Pacific, but rather a bid to strengthen relations between, in the NATO secretariat's words, "like-minded countries." Those democracies across the Pacific, like their counterparts in Europe, may now be seeing the threats they face as more connected, according to The German Marshall Fund's Small. "There is much more of a sense emerging from all of this, conditioned by the China challenge, by the Russia challenge, that the democratic allies have to be more effectively coordinated," he said.

### China Hege Decline Now

#### China in decline – US must maintain force and hege to contain aggressive and violent policies of China.

Brands ‘22 (Hal Brands. Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. "The Dangers of China's Decline as a Great Power". April 14, 2022. Foreign Policy. https://archive.ph/1Rt7v. 7-1-2022.)-cg

Decline is a tricky concept. The term makes us think of a country that is falling like a rock—one whose power and capabilities are dropping across the board. But a country can be in relative decline vis-à-vis a fast-growing adversary even if its own power is still increasing. It can be surging forward in some areas, such as military might, even as its underlying economic strength starts to wither. And decline doesn’t always lead a country to scale back its objectives—the sense of urgency it creates can cause ambitious powers to grab what they can before the clock runs out. Xi Jinping’s China is about to give the world an education in the nuances of decline. Since the onset of its economic reforms in the 1970s, China has long defied predictions that it would soon stumble or collapse. Its spectacular growth challenged prevailing views about the sources of national success in the modern world. In some ways, China is still soaring: Its military power grows more formidable every year. When Xi declares that “the East is rising and the West is declining,” he gives voice to this sense that China is a country on the make. Yet military power is often a lagging indicator of a country’s trajectory: It takes time to turn money into military muscle, and massive buildups often persist even after a country’s economic fortunes begin to flag. And today, for reasons including demographic disaster and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, China is facing the end of the stunning economic growth that made it possible for Xi to assert that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” was at hand. The China of the 2020s will be a country whose coercive capabilities are more intimidating than ever as its economic dynamism fades. That could be the worst possible combination for the world. Any country that rises as impressively as China is bound to make fools of some prophets of decline along the way. In recent decades, Beijing has repeatedly confounded those who predicted it was about to hit the wall. In the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s death, some Western observers were skeptical that China—a country that U.S. diplomat George Kennan once called a “vast poorhouse”—could put together the policies necessary for sustained growth. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it was common to wonder whether the resulting political crackdown would stifle the country’s prosperity. Through the early 2000s, social scientists and U.S. officials predicted that China could be rich or autocratic—but not both. A few prominent analysts made careers for themselves by heralding China’s collapse. It hasn’t happened—yet. From 1978 to the onset of the global financial crisis three decades later, China’s constant-dollar GDP grew by a factor of 17, without the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) losing control. That growth enabled the decades-long military buildup and sprawling economic influence that made China a force to be feared on the global stage. As Tufts University’s Michael Beckley and I argue in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict With China, this economic miracle required good luck and good policy. China seemed to have hit the demographic jackpot in the 1980s and 1990s; the unlikely combination of warfare and famine in the 1930s and 1940s, a regime-sponsored baby boom after the CCP took power, and then the institution of the one-child policy in 1980 left the country with a huge working-age population unencumbered by lots of young or old dependents. China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and other resources. And it had the fortuitous timing to start its reforms as globalization went into overdrive, making it easier to integrate the country into complex supply chains and thereby make China the workshop of the world. Good policies were also crucial. Mao’s one-man rule and economic illiteracy had condemned China to serial, self-created disasters. Once he died, Deng Xiaoping and his successors moved toward a “socialist market economy.” They opened China to trade and investment, overhauled the tax and regulatory systems, shrank bloated state-owned enterprises, and encouraged private business. Accompanying political reforms limited the power of China’s rulers and enlarged the space for nonideological competence within the regime. The CCP relaxed its grip enough to permit economic spontaneity—and reaped the benefits in the form of prosperity that reinforced its political control. China’s ascendance shook the world intellectually as well as geopolitically: It undermined post-Cold War Western beliefs that prosperity would lead inevitably to political liberalization, that democracies produced higher rates of growth than autocracies, and that tyranny was incompatible with sound economic management. As China became a global heavyweight, a new orthodoxy solidified—that a hegemonic transition was approaching as Beijing surpassed the United States. One dissenter was the political scientist David Shambaugh. In 2015, Shambaugh argued that China was suffering from a deep internal malaise and that Xi’s increasingly repressive rule was a sign of insecurity, not confidence. “[F]or all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut,” he wrote, China’s economy “is stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit.” Shambaugh struck a discordant note at a time when Beijing was tightening its control of the South China Sea and spreading its influence across multiple continents. He also happened to be right. Not least of the oddities surrounding contemporary China is that much of the world deemed its ascent inevitable just as its prospects started to dim. This may sound absurd, given all the hype surrounding China’s rise. After all, that country is supposedly destined, as the Harvard University political scientist Graham Allison (channeling legendary Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) has written, to become “the biggest player in the history of the world.” It’s true that China does boast many apparent advantages. It has an enormous domestic market and is the leading trade partner of roughly 130 countries around the world. It is making concerted investments in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and other critical technologies. If the United States doesn’t up its game, a national commission chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned in 2021, China could become the premier “AI superpower.” But look closer, and China’s trajectory starts to seem more tenuous. For one thing, many of China’s technological achievements are narrower and less impressive than they first appear. For example, Beijing has made great strides in AI applications focused on surveillance (no surprise there), but the United States still leads significantly across the wider expanse of AI subfields and uses. Despite vast state subsidies, China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. is years behind in the creation of cutting-edge semiconductors that make up the foundation of advanced economies in the information age. Just this year, Peking University published a candid assessment—which the CCP then predictably censored—of China’s progress in science and technology. The verdict was that China is “following [the United States] in most fields, running side by side in a few, and leading in very few.” And while China’s other strengths are not illusory, neither can they hide a reality that Beckley and I discussed last year: The magic that made China’s economic miracle is unmistakably fizzling. The country’s resource abundance is old news: Overuse devastated much of China’s arable land; industrialization and pollution left the country with severe water scarcity. More damaging still, China’s abundance of human resources is also a thing of the past. The one-child policy was a devil’s bargain that is now causing demographic implosion. China’s total population is set to peak by 2028 (or perhaps as soon as this year, by some estimates) and then plummet by as much as half by century’s end. Its working population crested in 2015; it will fall by 70 million between 2020 and 2035 and even faster after that. China will soon combine an enormous geriatric population with a rapidly shrinking workforce. It will experience one of the worst peacetime demographic crunches on record, a formula for stagnation at best and catastrophic economic contraction at worst. Making matters worse, the era of enlightened economic policy is over. The reform agenda has been stalled for more than a decade because further liberalization—necessary to make the leap to a more innovative, knowledge-based economy—would threaten the privileges of entrenched elites. If anything, Xi has thrown the country into reverse. Politically, he is taking China into neototalitarianism through pervasive repression and indoctrination. And economically, his policies have a decidedly retrograde feel. Xi’s agenda has featured a preference for state-owned enterprises at the expense of the more vibrant private sector; the imposition of severe, politically motivated restrictions on wide swaths of the economy; attacks on the autonomy of relatively technocratic institutions such as the central bank; and the empowerment of political minders in companies of nearly all sizes. China’s leaders may talk about the need to transition to a high-tech, services-based economy, but Xi’s policies are stifling the competence, creativity, and spontaneity necessary to make that shift. It all constitutes a “great leap backward”—a reversion to pre-Deng-era policies that condemned China to stagnation. There is also the question of what Xi’s consolidation of power means for the country’s long-term resilience. As the political theorist Francis Fukuyama has written, for nearly 40 years after Mao’s death China avoided the “bad emperor” problem—the worst pathologies that accompany authoritarian rule—by imposing term limits on its rulers and making them more accountable to other CCP elites. Yet Xi has systematically disassembled this system by purging rivals, sidelining potential successors, and entrenching himself in power. By doing so, he is enabling China to move faster and more decisively. But he is also leaving the country vulnerable to impulsive or unwise decision-making—a perpetual problem of one-man rule—and creating the potential for terrible instability when his reign finally ends. Xi’s centralization of authority, while seemingly impressive, is setting the country up for a fall. Finally, it doesn’t help that a more assertive China is now facing more international resistance. Trade barriers against Chinese companies and products proliferated in the decade after the global financial crisis. Washington has waged a technological cold war against Huawei, seeking to deprive that Chinese firm of high-end semiconductors and keep it out of the world’s 5G networks. Dozens of countries are more carefully scrutinizing their economic, financial, and technological ties with Beijing; the Japanese government is offering to pay companies to reduce their China exposure. China is still central to the global economy, but the days when the United States and other powerful countries eagerly abetted its ascent are over. Indeed, Xi’s effort to cultivate the domestic market is an implicit admission that China, which rose on the strength of an export-focused economy, now confronts a very different world. China’s predicament has been thrown into relief, ironically, by COVID-19. Early on, the pandemic seemed to herald an epochal global shift. Prominent U.S. analysts saw it as a “Suez moment,” the terminal crisis of the U.S. empire. Xi touted his regime’s success in containing COVID-19 at home (albeit after allowing it to escape to the world) as an advertisement for Chinese authoritarianism. Two years later, it’s clear that COVID-19 was a turning point but not in the way that Xi hoped. The pandemic hypercharged global anti-China sentiment, after Beijing concealed the initial outbreak and then exploited the resulting chaos to bully nations from Australia to Germany and the United Kingdom. It thereby encouraged a host of efforts—through multilateral institutions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, AUKUS, and the G-7, as well as the United States’ bilateral alliances in the Pacific—to counter Chinese power. “A Cold War mentality” had reemerged, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry complained, as the United States and its friends pursued “anti-China encirclement.” COVID-19 also confirmed how patchy China’s rise had been: The country’s biotechnology sector couldn’t produce anything like the revolutionary vaccines that democratic innovation economies in the United States and Europe churned out. Even China’s heavy-handed success in containing COVID-19 at home became a trap: The combination of “zero-COVID” policies, low levels of natural immunity, and vaccines that proved weak or worthless against highly contagious variants condemned the country to recurring lockdowns of major cities, with all the accompanying disruptions. Even before COVID-19, in fact, China’s economic vital signs were worrying. The government claimed a growth rate of 6 percent, but Chinese insiders and academic research indicate that the true number is considerably lower—and even that growth is inflated by the relentless injection of capital into a less and less efficient economy. As a result, overall debt grew eightfold between 2008 and the end of 2020, reaching 335 percent of GDP. In other countries, this combination of slumping productivity and growing debt usually presages sharp crises that turn into lasting economic quagmires. Xi’s Chinese dream involves catching up to the United States. In reality, his country is slowing down. China is not, however, slowing down in all areas at once. This isn’t unusual: The Soviet Union hit the apex of its military power in the 1980s, when its economy was in a death spiral. In the early 20th century, Britain ruled a global empire at a time when its economic supremacy had already slipped away. Today, China is stagnating economically, but its drive for world power is accelerating. Chinese leaders and propaganda organs now openly tout the country’s designs: In the coming decades, the official state news agency Xinhua proclaimed, China will “re-ascend to the top of the world.” Beijing is creating new international organizations and co-opting others. Its marquee projects, namely the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road, aim to project economic and political influence across Eurasia and beyond. China also fashions itself as an ideological role model for other countries: Its style of governance, Xi has said, offers a “new option for other countries and nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” Most notably, China is building and wielding the tools of geopolitical coercion. Countries such as Australia, Lithuania, Norway, and South Korea have felt China’s economic bite after they opposed its policies or criticized its internal practices. Chinese military spending—having already grown tenfold in real terms between 1990 and 2016—continues to rise, funding a dramatic expansion of the capabilities needed to conquer Taiwan, overawe Beijing’s neighbors, and perhaps even take on the United States in the Western Pacific. The statistics are simply astounding: Beijing put as many ships to sea from 2014 to 2018 as were in the navies of Britain, Germany, India, Spain, and Taiwan combined. And having long avoided a nuclear arms race with Washington, Beijing is now sprinting forward and could be the United States’ nuclear peer by the 2030s. Threats to use force against enemies have also become ubiquitous: Anyone who obstructs China’s plans, Xi warned in 2021, will “have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel.” It is sometimes hard to believe that such a country is running out of gas. But perhaps China’s strategic urgency is increasing because its economic outlook has turned grim. China’s “hide and bide” strategy—the approach it followed for a generation under Deng and after—was one of patient confidence. If time was on a rising Beijing’s side, then it made sense to gradually build the country’s power and delay confrontation with the United States. Today, China’s strategic mindset is darker and more insistent. In many areas, Xi acknowledges, “the West is strong, and the East is weak.” China must race to make itself “invincible” so that “nobody can beat us or choke us to death.” What the United States will face in this decade, then, is a China whose ability to batter its enemies and challenge the global order is growing, even as leaner economic times loom ahead. This China is unlikely to be benign or peaceful. History has seen many once ascendant countries lash out violently rather than accept a disappointing future as a second-tier power. This fear is what led Germany to take the risks that helped ignite World War I. It prompted Japan to undertake the expansionist rampage that helped bring on World War II. Xi has grand ambitions, from capturing Taiwan to establishing China’s primacy in Asia and, eventually, the world. If he loses faith that the patient accumulation of economic power will bring Beijing these rewards, he may become more inclined to take risks and use China’s coercive tools to secure them instead. This means that the task of dealing with China could prove quite ticklish in the years ahead. The United States can’t simply rest easy, confident that a peaking China will fade away. Instead, it will have to rapidly firm up its defenses in places where an impatient Beijing might lunge for advantage, such as the Western Pacific. The United States and its allies will have to join forces to prevent China from weaponizing its still considerable economic and technological leverage to fracture the anti-Beijing coalitions now taking shape. And they will have to ensure, through multilateral control measures as well as investments in their own capabilities, that the democratic world maintains its edge in semiconductors and other critical technologies that will shape the future balance of economic and military power. Yet Washington and its friends will also have to do all this while keeping channels of communication open and not unnecessarily provoking an anxious China that may lash out as its predicament worsens. After all, power and pessimism can make a deadly mix. The hardest sort of China to handle may be one that is strong and weak at the same time.

### Russia-China Already Allied

#### Russia China alliance growing based on opposition to democracies, specifically US, may also embolden autocratic governments

Champion 22[Marc Champion. Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal, an editor at the Financial Times, the editor-in-chief of the Moscow Times and a correspondent for the Independent in Washington, the Balkans and Moscow. "Why Closer Ties Between Russia and China Have Democracies Worried". 6-14-2022. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-14/why-increasing-russia-china-ties-worry-democracies-quicktake. 7-2-2022.]-cg

Rivals for centuries, China and Russia now have a partnership that has “no limits,” Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin said in early February. The energy, military and political ties nurtured over the past decade between the world’s two most powerful authoritarian states — both of which aim to upend at least parts of the US-dominated, post-Cold War order — have aroused growing concern among democratic leaders from Washington to Tokyo. Just weeks after the joint statement, when Russia invaded Ukraine, China refused to condemn the move. Still, the support Beijing has shown its ally since has been anything but boundless. The rapprochement was driven by a common alienation from America that deepened after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and became increasingly overt after the 2008 financial crisis, which originated in the US. Both states concluded that the meltdown would undercut faith globally in the US economic and political model. They increased ties cautiously until 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula triggered sanctions and a definitive break between Russia and the wider West. That forced Moscow to look for new partners and especially new markets for its energy exports. China was a good fit, proving a massive and fast-growing buyer of Russian commodities and weapons. The two states also share a deep hostility toward US alliances in what they consider their own rightful spheres of influence. For Russia, that’s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe; for China, it’s Washington’s network of bilateral defense treaties in the Indo-Pacific region. Though short of a formal, treaty-based alliance, the partnership between China and Russia has been enhanced by a strong personal bond between Putin and Xi. Products of tough childhoods, both men have evinced a determination to crush dissent at home and restore their nations to greatness, ending their perceived humiliation by the US and Europe. They have met more than 30 times, making dumplings together in Tianjin and pancakes in Vladivostok. In 2019, Xi called Putin his “best friend.” In a joint statement in February, they spelled out their shared contempt for Western ideas of democracy. They defined democracy without reference to elections, independent courts or free media and said it was about economic development, with all models for public political participation equally valid. In the 1800s, Russia was among European powers that imposed so-called unequal treaties on China’s Qing dynasty, including one ceding the territory where the Russian city Vladivostok sits today. Relations improved dramatically for a short period after Mao Zedong led China’s Communist Party to power in 1949, finding a natural ally in Josef Stalin. But Mao opposed the political reforms known as de-Stalinization that followed the Soviet leader’s 1953 death and, in 1961, he split from Moscow. In 1969, the two countries fought a brief border war over disputed territories and, in 1972, China did the unthinkable by turning toward the US. It wasn’t until the mid-1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev took charge in the Kremlin, that relations began to thaw again. Since 2014, Russia has sold China some of its most advanced weapons systems, including $5 billion worth of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and SU-35 attack jets. Within two months of Crimea’s annexation, Russia’s Gazprom PJSC signed a deal it said was worth about $400 billion to supply China with natural gas through a pipeline called the Power of Siberia. A second pipeline deal has been struck since. In addition, the two countries have increasingly coordinated their positions at the United Nations Security Council, where both wield vetoes. The growing cooperation between China and Russia has led some policy makers in the US to fear that the country could be forced to fight wars on two fronts, for example if Russia were to threaten an American ally in Europe to distract the US during a confrontation with China over Taiwan. US Senator Jim Inhofe argued last year that, adjusted for purchasing power parity, the two nations combined spend more on defense than the US. There’s a wider concern that the combination of economic, military and political muscle the two can muster is emboldening other world leaders with autocratic tendencies, undermining confidence in democracy as a political system, and threatening the version of the rules-based international order promoted by the US and its allies since the end of the Cold War. China avoided criticizing the invasion, blamed the US and NATO for the conflict, and bought Russian oil that was being shunned by some other countries, indirectly funding Moscow’s war machine. But Xi proved reluctant to unequivocally back the war or help Russia cushion the financial impact of US and European Union sanctions. With a gross domestic product almost eight times the size of Russia’s, China has substantially more at stake in a global economy that’s still dominated by the US and other developed democracies.

#### Chinese Russian relations have been great since 2014 – invasion of Crimea and decline of the west

Taylor and Shullman 22 (Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program, Center for New American Security and David O. Shullman is a Senior Director of the Global China Hub, Atlantic Council. “Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine,” 6-22-22, https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine)ZK

Previous Russian aggression in Ukraine has been a catalyst for deepening Russia-China relations. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 significantly accelerated the slow warming of the relationship that started in the waning days of the Cold War. Convinced that it had no real economic opportunities in the West, the Kremlin turned to China for help in offsetting Western pressure. At that time, China’s initial support for Moscow was tepid. Beijing was vaguely critical of the West for supposedly causing the crisis, and it never verbally supported Russian annexation, abstained on key UN resolutions, and allowed Chinese firms to abide by U.S. and European sanctions. China also took advantage of Russia’s increased economic dependence to drive a hard bargain on key energy deals. Yet Beijing eventually leaned into its partnership with Russia. While Moscow’s need to diversify away from the West energized relations, Beijing also came around to recognize the utility in building a stronger relationship with the Kremlin. In particular, the China-Russia partnership crystallized around a fundamentally similar view of the United States as a primary strategic threat. Both Xi and Putin view U.S. support for democracies in their regions—and for those fighting repression and authoritarianism inside China and Russia—as an effort to extend influence and ultimately overthrow their regimes. The leaders also view the U.S. alliance network—including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Quad grouping in the Indo-Pacific—as a direct challenge to their security and to their regimes. In the wake of 2014, these views hardened, especially as both countries’ relations with the United States grew more adversarial. Moreover, Xi and Putin have noted the increasing challenges facing Western democracies and have grown more confident that the United States and the West are in decline. They therefore view the time as ripe to challenge the U.S.-dominated global order and alliance network and hasten Washington’s retrenchment from their respective peripheries. Both also expect the United States to do everything in its power to hold onto its superpower status, particularly in the face of China’s rise, including coercing its allies to take actions against their own interests. Russia and China’s deepening alignment since 2014, along with the complementarity of their needs and capabilities, has fueled growing ties across all dimensions of their partnership. In the economic sphere, for example, China’s share of Russia’s external trade doubled from 10 to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021. Their partnership deepened most notably in the defense domain and in their common crusade against democracy and the universality of human rights. Arms sales and technical cooperation have grown, as have the frequency, scope, and complexity of their joint military exercises. In the democracy domain, Moscow and Beijing together are popularizing authoritarian governance, exporting their best practices, watering down human rights norms, backing each other up in multilateral forums, creating norms around cyber and internet sovereignty, and bolstering illiberal leaders. Despite these developments since 2014, China is once again treading carefully in the aftermath of Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine. China has abstained from voting on key UN resolutions, and Chinese firms are tentative about maintaining operations with Russia, given their desire to avoid secondary sanctions. The key difference, reflecting the much deeper starting point of their relationship going into this crisis, has been China’s far stronger rhetorical support for Russia. Senior Chinese officials not only indicated support for the Kremlin’s “reasonable security concerns” about potential NATO expansion as a justification for its initial actions but have since doubled down on pledges to deepen ties with Russia, parroting Russian talking points about its actions in Ukraine and the culpability of the United States and NATO for the conflict’s endurance. To signal their enduring close partnership, Russia and China flew joint patrols near Japanese and South Korean air defense zones in May 2022 during President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia designed to rally America’s U.S. Indo-Pacific allies.

#### Iran, Russia, and China are teaming up and holding drills—regional tensions growing with the U.S

RFE/LE ’22 (RFE/RL journalists report the news in 27 languages in 23 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established

-- **“**Iran, Russia, China Hold Joint Naval Drill Amid Growing Ties” --January 21, 2022

--<https://www.rferl.org/a/31663080.html)//Mari_narasauce>

Iran, Russia, and China are holding their third joint naval drill in the northern Indian Ocean, amid speculation that the three countries are teaming up in the face of growing regional tensions with the United States. Russian vessels, together with the Chinese and Iranian navies, performed "joint tactical maneuvering and practiced artillery fire at a naval target as well as search-and-rescue missions at sea," the Russian Defense Ministry said on January 21, adding that the sides also "practiced inspection and liberation of a ship that was supposedly captured by pirates." Eleven Iranian vessels were joined by three Russian ships and two Chinese vessels, Iranian Rear Admiral Mostafa Tajoldini earlier told state TV. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are also participating in the exercises, with smaller ships and helicopters. Since coming to office in June 2021, Iran's hard-line President Ebrahim Raisi has pursued a policy to deepen ties with both Moscow and Beijing. Russia, Iran, and China are subject to Western sanctions imposed over various issues, including Russia’s threats on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, human rights abuses in China, and Iran’s nuclear program. “Improving bilateral relations between Tehran and Moscow will enhance security for the region and the international arena,” Raisi said upon [returning from a visit](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-iran-putin-raisi/31662000.html) to Russia on January 21, according to the government news agency IRNA. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian paid a visit to China last week during which it was announced that Beijing and Tehran have launched a 25-year cooperation deal aimed at bolstering economic and political ties. In September, Iran’s bid to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was approved by the seven current members of the security body led by Beijing and Moscow. The country will formally join the grouping after the technical and legal process concludes, which is expected to take up to two years.

## Link Answers

Kind of already spotting them the link because of aff advantage claims.

### No AI Link

#### US-China AI competition is not zero-sum – collaboration with clear goals solves.

Sullivan 21 (Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan is an Army pilot by trade, who lived and studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar. He was one of just five Army officers selected that year. Ryan has taken his experience in and knowledge of China and combined that with graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence. “US China AI Competition Factors,” 10/04/21 <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D>, p9)ZK

The U.S. and China remain the two nations best positioned to benefit from the increasing adoption of AI across society. Competition over AI is not zero-sum, in that both nations will derive value from AI growth, but the benefits are not shared equally. China’s substantial advantages in data and the size of its market lead experts to predict that China will account for nearly half of the estimated $15.7 trillion that AI will add to the global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, and almost double the expected growth in North America.23 AI’s economic benefits are undeniable, but AI competition with China goes beyond GDP growth and centers on the global diffusion of Chinese values, norms, and standards for AI utilization. That environment is very much undecided, as the international community struggles with challenges over data privacy, the role of AI-empowered multinational companies, and critical choke points in supply chains that impact the AI industry and threaten national security interests. This paper seeks to recognize that collaboration occurs between the U.S. and China and identifies efforts to address security concerns, collaborations, and even cooperation in areas of trans-national challenges that benefit all of humankind. The deteriorating bilateral relationships and mistrust likely prohibit bilateral cooperation in many areas. However, in working with like-minded nations with shared values, the U.S. can promote multilateral collaboration and cooperation opportunities for AI. Such engagements should not exclude China by design. However, the criteria for engagement must clarify that the values shared by democratic nations will help address the ethical concerns over AI and the adoption of technical standards. The current political environment and U.S. actions taken against universities and companies with ties to the PLA leave very little room for military-to-military (mil-to-mil) collaboration on AI, nor did research for this paper discover any indications from Chinese sources of a desire for mil-to-mil engagements. Nevertheless, in focusing on our allies and promoting interoperability, the Department of Defense (DoD) entities must remain aware that collaboration opportunities might arise in various areas of responsibility (AOR) and prepare appropriate guidance and safeguards for units based on current policies.

### Russia Alliance Turn

#### The more Russia loses (the aff), the more China will support them. Worst case, everything is balanced.

Blanchette 22 (Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will back him,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2022 at 4:09 p.m. EDT, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/24/xi-jinping-putin-china-russia-sanctions/>) - MP

China has tried to have it both ways since Russia invaded Ukraine a month ago. It abstained from key votes at the United Nations criticizing Russia’s actions, avoided directly labeling President Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine an “invasion,” amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly laid blame for the war at the feet of the United States and NATO. At the same time, Beijing has also largely complied with sanctions against Russia, made repeated, if vague, calls for a negotiated settlement to the hostilities and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. But make no mistake: The worse it goes for Russia in Ukraine, the more China will step up its support for the Putin regime. Beijing’s uneven diplomatic strategy may seem to stem from a desire to achieve multiple, often conflicting aims, most notably to forestall a deterioration in relations with Europe. Not all objectives are weighted equally, however, and as the war enters a more protracted and destructive phase, China’s primary goal is coming into focus: to ensure that Russia retains its status as Beijing’s key strategic partner, even if this necessitates paying serious economic and diplomatic costs. Beijing will see the prospect of a Russian defeat as a direct threat to its own territorial security and ability to compete head-to-head in the geopolitical rivalry with the United States — and China simply can’t allow that to happen. To see why Beijing has a direct stake in the war’s outcome, it’s critical to understand how its relationship with Russia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how China views the global security environment evolving over the next three to five years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia have experienced significant friction and mutual mistrust. The nadir of the relationship came in 1969, when the two communist powers nearly engaged in a nuclear war. Since 1989, however, Beijing and Moscow have systematically addressed the major points of contention in their relationship, including any lingering territorial disputes. In 2001, the countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, cooperation has expanded to include joint military exercises, efforts to reform global governance and technology sharing. For example, the two countries continue to develop a satellite navigation system to rival the United States’ GPS, and in January, Russia and China, along with Iran, held a series of naval drills in the Indian Ocean. This growing symbiosis was formalized on Feb. 4 in a joint statement issued during Putin’s visit to Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics (Xi’s meeting with Putin then was his first with a world leader since February 2020, when he appeared with the Mongolian prime minister in Beijing). Stretching more than 5,000 words, the joint statement encapsulated a shared worldview between two authoritarian powers and two autocratic leaders. The global order is undergoing “momentous changes,” the statement read, which include a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” and “global challenges and threats growing from day to day.” But perhaps more important, the joint statement articulated a shared grievance that the United States and its allies threaten Chinese and Russian interests and global aspirations. NATO, the document states, promotes an “ideologized cold war approach,” while the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” endangers the “peace and stability in the region.” Before Russia had even invaded Ukraine, then, Beijing had come to see Moscow as a critical security and strategic partner in the growing power rivalry with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. More to the point, Russia is China’s only real military and strategic partner. Although tensions exist in the bilateral relationship, not least because of the growing economic gap between their economies, the broader geopolitical chessboard draws Moscow and Beijing together. What’s more, Putin and Xi have a close relationship — they’ve met in person or virtually nearly 40 times in the decade that Xi has been in power. Time is running out for China The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly thrown Beijing off balance, and Chinese officials certainly didn’t want Putin to invade in the first place, but the basic math underlying this strategic partnership with Moscow has not changed. Indeed, the war has only consolidated Beijing’s central logic for supporting Russia, given the recent demonstration of Western diplomatic unity, the overwhelming power of U.S.-led sanctions and the reinvigoration of NATO. The former editor of the Chinese nationalist Global Times newspaper, Hu Xijin, argued in recent commentary that “if the U.S. pursues extreme strategic coercion against China, with Russia as a partner, China will not fear a U.S. energy blockade, our food supplies will be more secure, as will [our supplies] of many other raw materials.” In a speech last weekend, China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng drew a straight line between NATO in Europe and China’s own security concerns, warning that just as Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were a direct consequence of NATO expansion, any actions by NATO in the Asia-Pacific region would provoke similar consequences, and thus, the “crisis in Ukraine is a stern warning.” Beyond the substantive reasons underlying China’s support for Russia, there is also Beijing’s unwillingness to be seen as submitting to the U.S. demand that it back away from Moscow. As one Chinese Russia expert at the Shanghai International Studies University observed, “If China goes along with the U.S. against Russia, it will not only greatly strengthen the anti-Russian camp, but will also be a huge boost to the U.S. ‘leadership.’ ” The key question now is just how far Beijing will go to support Moscow. While Xi would like to maintain good relations with Europe and avoid a further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship, the fate of Putin and the Russian state directly implicates China’s core security interests. Not only would the prospect of a beaten and broken Russia activate China’s fears of instability along their shared 2,500-mile border, but it would also create uncertainty about the future leadership and geopolitical orientation of the Russian government. If Putin were eventually to fall from power, would his successor remain aligned with Beijing? So the more anxious Beijing becomes about the war and Putin’s personal position in power, the more likely it is to step up support by providing direct economic assistance, mitigating the impact of sanctions and even supplying military equipment. Clearly, China’s preference is to avoid secondary sanctions in response to any support — access to the international market and the U.S. dollar remains critical for China’s economy and its continued rise. But Beijing could pursue means of support that are difficult to track, such as facilitating Russia’s access to U.S. dollars via offshore accounts, or by directing state-owned enterprises and even private companies to increase their purchases of non-sanctioned Russian goods and services. If China does decide to supply Russia with military assistance, it would likely seek to avoid equipment and hardware that would flagrantly violate international law and sanctions or be easily traceable, and instead provide spare parts, ammunition or certain dual-use items that aren’t yet sanctioned. But critically, the decision to provide aid to Russia would be driven primarily by Beijing’s assessment of how Russia is faring in the war, rather than a desire to avoid paying economic or diplomatic costs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing is watching the conflict unfold without growing more nervous by the day: Russia has failed to achieve any of its major military or political objectives. In just the past week, the Russian military has escalated its offensive to include a wider number of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, and President Biden is also now warning of “clear signs” that Putin is considering using chemical weapons. Domestically, Putin has begun to purge his inner circle, arresting some within the security services and senior officials in the national guard. Beijing will see this as a sign that Putin’s grip is weakening, and as the sanctions continue to decimate Russia’s economy, anxiety in China is only likely to grow. Succession plans protect nations. Putin and Xi just threw theirs out. Some analysts suggest that China may well see Russia’s recent weakening in the wake of sanctions as a net positive, as it shifts the balance of power in the relationship in Beijing’s favor. A tangible benefit of such a shift would be Beijing’s ability to demand more favorable terms in buying Russian energy. While it’s true that Beijing leveraged Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to gain better terms in several large energy deals, the security environment for China in 2022 is far more contentious than it was in 2014, and Moscow’s true value is its ideological orientation and military capabilities as much as its energy stores. Xi does not want a weak Russia for a security and strategic partner. If Beijing turns toward and not away from Moscow as the war grinds on and the extent of human suffering increases, the basic trajectory of China’s relations with the West will undergo a profound shift toward open rivalry. It would be comforting to think that the prospect of such a disastrous turn would be enough to dissuade the Chinese leadership from traveling down this path. Unfortunately, though, Beijing’s geopolitical outlook for the next decade — much like Washington’s — includes conflict and friction as defining features.

## Growth Impact Answers

### Growth Resilient

#### Chinese growth is resilient – reforms ensure that small dips won’t stick

Liu 16 – (Chinese ambassador to the UK, “The Chinese economy is still full of power”, 2/27/16, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12175115/The-Chinese-economy-is-still-full-of-power.html)//EO

A glass is filled halfway with water. Pessimists would say it’s half empty, while optimists would say it’s half full. The same is true when it comes to the Chinese economy. Quite a few pessimists have been forecasting doom and gloom since the beginning of the year. However, they have failed to see the country’s resilience and the new driving forces that have emerged. In fact, [the recent moderation in China’s growth is the anticipated result of reform measures and regulation](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/02/26/ftse-100-extends-gains-and-china-rebounds-as-finance-ministers-g/). This is therefore the “new normal”: we are seeing slower yet better quality growth helped along by proactive and deeper reforms. Of course, China’s growth rate could easily have exceeded 7 per cent if the energy- and- pollution-intensive industries had been given free rein, or if massive stimulus measures had been applied. China, however, chose not to opt for this kind of unsustainable growth – because it would come with a huge cost and would sacrifice the long-term development of China and the world. Instead, China has chosen to focus on the following five key areas: addressing excess capacity, downsizing property inventories, expanding effective supply, helping enterprises reduce cost and guarding against financial risks. This approach, like losing weight, won’t be without its discomforts or pain. But just as perseverance will see one through a diet – to less fat, stronger muscles and a healthier body – so it is with the Chinese economy. Despite the moderation in growth, the fundamentals of the Chinese economy remain strong. While the stock and foreign exchange markets have their own patterns, the key is to look at the bigger picture. It is true that the 6.9 per cent growth in 2015 was the lowest for China in 25 years. But this was achieved by an economy that is 10 trillion dollars in size. The actual increment is equivalent to the yearly GDP of a medium-sized country and it is larger than the amount generated by double-digit growth years ago. In other words, against the background of the sluggish world economy, China remains one of the fastest-growing major economies – and it contributes over one quarter of global growth. Consumption now accounts for two thirds of China’s growth and the service sector now makes up more than half of GDP. China’s solid material foundation, abundant human resources and vast market potential will continue to provide a sound basis and condition for sustained economic growth. The gap between the eastern and western regions, and between the urban and rural areas, indicates ample spaces and untapped potentials for further development. Moreover, the ongoing process of new industrialisation, IT application, urbanisation and agricultural modernisation is generating strong driving forces for growth. China’s fiscal deficit and government debt is also secure and much lower than that of the US, Europe and Japan, leaving enough room for further positive regulation. Going forward, five new engines will drive forward China’s economy. The first engine is the 13th Five Year Plan. With its five key development concepts – innovation, balanced growth, a green economy, opening up and inclusive development – this Plan will map out the way for China to get over the “middle-income trap” and join the high-income economies. The second engine is supply-side reform. Rather than being a copy of Reaganomics or Thatcherism, China’s supply-side reform is a response to the economic “new normal” in China. Its core mechanism is to replace ineffective and low-end supply with effective and high-end supply, which will increase competitiveness. The third engine is open development. China will continue to improve its domestic business environment in terms of legal, international and business-friendly practices. The fourth engine is China’s active involvement in global economic governance and in providing public goods. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, officially inaugurated last month, is just one example of this. The fifth engine is innovation-driven development. China will optimise the allocation of key resources in order to stimulate innovation, to create new demands and new supply, and to give rise to new businesses. Since the financial crisis, China has made an outstanding contribution to global growth. It is widely recognised as the world’s economic powerhouse and has fulfilled its responsibility as a key global player. Make no mistake: that engine is still full of power and will continue to bring opportunities and benefits to the world. “Although Zhou was an ancient state, it had a reform mission.” This line from a 3000-year-old Chinese work, the Classic of Poetry, best portrays the country’s commitment to reform. Today, reform and innovation remain the source of confidence and strength for China. There is every reason to look to a world-embracing China for steady progress and for a promising economic future.

### AT: Diversionary War

#### No diversionary wars --- social instability is too dangerous

Levi and Economy, 16 - both Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations \*PhD, David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the CFR \*\*PhD, C.V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Elizabeth, “Economic and Geopolitical Fallout From China's Slowing Growth” February 25, 2016, Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, *Council on Foreign Relations*]

...But Beijing Is Unlikely to Wage War if the Economy Crashes

By the same token, analysts should probably discard the notion that a crash of the domestic economy would provoke a Chinese military adventure abroad in order to distract Chinese people from upheaval at home. This “wag the dog” scenario may gain currency with screenplay writers and conspiracy buffs, but it is not borne out by history. Although it is true that strife-torn countries often get embroiled in external wars, it is rarely because their leaders set out to generate a diversionary activity for their restive populace.

Indeed, most workshop participants argued that if China were beset by an acute internal crisis, the Communist Party would almost certainly refocus its energy and resources inward. The leadership and its security apparatus, including components of the military, would have their hands full protecting against social instability, tamping down the activities of Uighur and Tibetan separatists, and maintaining the cohesiveness of the party itself. To launch a foreign war in an atmosphere of domestic public grievance would be particularly dangerous for Beijing. If China sustained a defeat at the hands of the Japanese or U.S. navy, the leadership would compound its reputation for economic mismanagement with one for military ineptitude—a potentially lethal cocktail for the ruling party.

### AT: CCP Collapse

#### Growth or decline doesn’t matter --- it’s how the regime frames the issue, which proves it’s resilient

Zeng, 16 – PhD in Politics and IR, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and Lecturer in Politics and IR at Royal Holloway, University of London [Jinghan, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Oct 29, 2015 Palgrave Macmillan *Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific*, Academia]

As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, there is no empirical evidence to prove that the CCP’s legitimacy solely relies on economic success. Arguably, there are two major problems in the relevant literature: the exclusion of ideological factors and the narrow focus of government performance. The major problem with the socioeconomic performance approach lies in its exclusion of ideological factors, which leads to many problematic arguments and predictions. The performance legitimacy approach implies a problematic relationship between economy and politics (White, 1986). The argument – that legitimacy of the CCP primarily relies on economic performance – implies that economic crisis or the slowdown of economic growth would lead to some kinds of legitimacy crises or major disasters in China. This is also explicitly warned by many who argue that economic deterioration will unavoidably lead to political crisis (Krugman, 2013; Zhao, 2009). This kind of argument implies that economic factors are the independent or dominant variables, while political factors are subordinate or dependent variables. It is flawed to contend that the regime is helpless in an economic crisis. This book endorses White’s assertion (1986) on the primacy of politics – that proper political actions can fill the deficit in legitimacy created by economic difficulties. As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, legitimacy directly comes from neither economic crisis nor economic growth per se (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). Ideological factors will transform economic performance into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance, and regime legitimacy is based on “those perceptions” rather than on economic performance per se. As such, an economic crisis is not a direct threat to a regime – its impacts on political legitimacy depend on people’s perceptions of the crisis and the regime; thus, how the government frames this crisis is crucial (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). In other words, how political actors use ideological factors to frame people’s perceptions of the crisis (i.e., discourse) is key to deciding the impact of the crisis on legitimacy. Proper political actions and effective crisis management will contribute to minimize legitimacy loss or even sometimes enhance legitimacy. As discussed below, there is much room to manipulate people’s dependency on the government and on its irreplaceable role during a crisis. This is especially true in China, where people’s dependency on the government is more obvious because of historical traditions (Tong, 2011). The CCP has abundant experience and the capability to market its authoritarian rule through information control and powerful propaganda campaigns. In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the Chinese government actually won, rather than lost, legitimacy credits. The regime strategically manipulated this crisis as an opportunity to achieve its political purposes including the promotion of Scientific Outlook of Development (Holbig, 2011). The Chinese media highlighted China’s good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically in contrast with the disaster that this crisis caused in other countries, and the official media also made efforts to project international recognition onto China’s crisis management. By using those propaganda strategies, the CCP successfully transformed its performance during this crisis into positive perceptions, thus legitimacy (Holbig, 2011).

#### No internal link --- the economy is not directly reflected in legitimacy --- ideology outweighs

Zeng, 16 – PhD in Politics and IR, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and Lecturer in Politics and IR at Royal Holloway, University of London [Jinghan, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Oct 29, 2015 Palgrave Macmillan *Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific*, Academia]

Economic performance is the most frequently mentioned element of performance legitimacy. The conventional wisdom of Western scholar- ship holds that economic achievement is a principal (if not the sole) pillar of legitimacy in contemporary China (Krugman, 2013; Laliberté and Lanteigne, 2008b; Perry, 2008; Shambaugh, 2001; Wang, 2005a; Wang, 2005b; Zhao, 2009; Yang and Zhao, 2014). In a major textbook on Chinese politics, Tony Saich (2004: 347) argues that “[CCP] legitimacy is currently based on the capacity to deliver the economic goods.” Economic performance is absolutely important. However, empirical studies show that while economic performance matters, there is no strong evidence to prove that it is the sole, let alone the principal, pillar of legitimacy (Chu, 2013; Lewis-Beck, et al., 2013; Munro, et al., 2013; Yang and Tang, 2013). In addition, if economic prosperity leads to high levels of popular support for the government, why do not other coun- tries that enjoy economic prosperity – such as India and Brazil – also have high levels of support, as China does (Tang, et al., 2013)? Based on a 2010 national survey in China, Dickson (2013) finds a negative rela- tionship between economic development and popular support. In addition to economic performance, social stability is another essen- tial element of government performance, and it has also been widely accepted as a fundamental pillar of the CCP’s legitimacy (Breslin, 2009; Dickson, 2011; Laliberté and Lanteigne, 2008b; Shue, 2004; Sandby- Thomas, 2011). Shue (2004), for example, argues that the CCP “stakes” its legitimacy on its ability to maintain social stability. Needless to say, social stability and economic growth are interdependent. Without a stable social order, the economy cannot grow rapidly; conversely the welfare materials delivered by economic growth might help to enhance social stability. This interdependence suggests that the rules of modern states are based on different combinations of legitimacy sources rather than on any one pillar. Legitimacy by nature has many dimensions, and its sources are often interrelated. Ideology in particular plays a crucial role in influ- encing other sources of legitimacy. Arguably, a fatal weakness of the performance legitimacy approach is its insufficient attention to ideo- logical factors. As mentioned, the mainstream approach overempha- sizes economic growth, and many assume that market reform has also rendered ideology obsolete. This misguided view has underestimated the role of ideology in contemporary China. Legitimacy generated from government performance is not directly through government performance per se but from citizens’ subjective perceptions of this performance. Ideological factors play a crucial role in shaping those perceptions. Thus, economic performance – crisis or growth – is not directly reflected in legitimacy (Gilley and Holbig, 2010); the performance will be framed by ideological factors and transformed by conductive ways into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance. If economic performance became the sole legitimacy pillar in China, then economic deterioration would unavoidably lead to political crisis. However, the financial crisis of 2008 enhanced rather than weakened the CCP’s rule (Holbig, 2011). By using the Chinese media to highlight the good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically and the disaster this crisis caused in other countries, the CCP managed to manipulate this debacle as an opportunity to gain legitimacy and achieve its political purposes – such as marketing its then-official ideology, the “Scientific Outlook of Development” (Holbig, 2011).

### Growth Bad – Aggression

#### Slowing China’s economy is essential — growth emboldens China to dominate Asia, increasing the likelihood of war

Mearsheimer 16 — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, interviewed by Peter Navarro, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Merage School of Business at the University of California-Irvine, holds a Ph.D. in Economics and a Masters of Public Administration from Harvard University, 2016 (“Mearsheimer on Strangling China & the Inevitability of War,” *Huffington Post*, March 10th, Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling\_b\_9417476.html, Accessed 8-22-16)

\*Author Initials added for Clarity

JJM: My argument, in a nutshell, is that if China continues to grow economically over the next 30 years, much the way it has over the past 30 years, that it will translate that wealth into military might. And it will try to dominate Asia, the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. And my argument is that this makes good strategic sense for China. Of course, the United States will not allow that to happen if it can. And the United States will, therefore, form a balancing coalition in Asia, which will include most of China’s neighbors and the United States. And they will work overtime to try to contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia. This will lead to a very intense security competition between the United States and China’s neighbors on one hand, and China on the other hand. And there will be an ever-present danger of war. PN: Of course from this observation rises the imperative if not to strangle China’s economy then to certainly slow it down. JJM: There’s no question that preventive war makes no sense at all, but a much more attractive strategy would be to do whatever we could to slow down China’s economic growth. Because if it doesn’t grow economically, it can’t turn that wealth into military might and become a potential hegemon in Asia. I mean, what really makes China so scary today is the fact that it has so many people and it’s also becoming an incredibly wealthy country. Our great fear is that China will turn into a giant Hong Kong. And if it has a per capita GNP that’s anywhere near Hong Kong’s GNP, it will be one formidable military power. So the question is, Can you prevent it from becoming a giant Hong Kong?

### Growth Bad – Japan

#### Chinese economic decline prevents Sino-Japan war and cements US leadership

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Similarly, China’s economic slowdown could offer Japan an occasion to gain leverage in the Sino-Japanese relationship, creating the possibility to tamp down tensions in the East China Sea and stabilize bilateral ties that remain a fragile, but critically important, component of the regional security landscape. Perhaps most significantly, a Chinese economic slowdown affords the United States an opportunity to buttress its political, economic, and military position in the Asia-Pacific, and assuage worries that the United States lacks sufficient strategic vision and political commitment to the region. The outcome relies on how Washington plays its hand, but the result could be the strengthening of a rules-based, U.S.-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region for years to come.

#### A Chinese-Japan war is only an incident away and goes nuclear

Kazianis 2016 - Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest as well as a Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Potomac Foundation  
Harry, "Get Ready, America: Are China and Japan Destined for War?," Jan 22, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-america-are-china-japan-destined-war-14991?page=2

While your Twitter and Facebook feed these days might be filled with stories about Iran, North Korea and ISIS, as well as the South China Sea, 2016 could be the year of a deadly clash between China and Japan—and the stakes could not be any higher for the United States. A recent article in Foreign Policy sets the stage for such a clash—and shows how America could get sucked in. After a relatively peaceful year—if such a thing exists in the East China Sea—Beijing and Tokyo are once again warning each other to back off claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With the rhetoric heading up, Foreign Policy reporters Dan De Luce and Keith Johnson headed over to the Rand Corporation for a war game that pitted China vs. Japan and eventually the United States. In the simulation, Tokyo’s treaty ally pledged to defend the island nation, including the disputed islands, from attack. The scenario for the wargame was frighteningly realistic to say the least: “A group of renegade Japanese ultranationalists wade ashore on a barren islet they call Uotsuri-shima. It’s the largest of a cluster of uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks known as the Senkakus, or the Diaoyu in Chinese, the unlikely locus of a long-running territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing. The activists plant the Japanese flag, declaring that the islands are inalienable Japanese territory; their YouTube video threatens the Chinese navy with destruction if it dares to seize the islands. “Caught off guard, Tokyo is slow to respond, but eventually disowns the ultranationalists and their stunt. By then, though, China has condemned the move as a hostile act and has dispatched armed coast guard and naval vessels to the relatively shallow waters around the Senkakus. Chinese marines arrest the 14 activists and vow to bring them back to China for prosecution. “The next day, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is dispatched to the area, accompanied by a squadron of Japanese F-15 fighters. China maintains its naval ships around the islands and insists that it will not withdraw from the area. As the two militaries appear headed on a collision course, Tokyo informs Washington that it is finally invoking the mutual defense treaty the two nations have had since 1951. Now the White House has a decision to make.” While it is well worth your time to read all the twists and turns, here is the ultimate of spoilers: “The United States sends humanitarian aid and disaster-response teams to Japan to bolster its homeland defense and dispatches the carrier at a safe distance in flight range of the Senkakus. It also launches targeted, precision strikes on a handful of Chinese missile sites on the coast, clearly explaining to Chinese leadership the limited nature of the measures.” And into hell we descend: “U.S. missiles rain down on the Chinese homeland; Japanese commercial freighters explode on the high seas; China’s shiny new navy is quickly shrinking under relentless undersea attacks. In reprisal, Chinese forces obliterate Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and take a potshot with a carrier-killer missile at the George Washington, damaging it and forcing it out of the area. The casualty toll is appalling on all sides, with thousands dead.” Feel a sense of déjà vu, National Interest readers? It seems good minds think alike, as I explored a very similar scenario back in June of 2014: “Picture it: It's March 1, 2015. Tokyo and Beijing are headed towards what was once the unthinkable. “Over the last several months China has instituted daily non-naval maritime patrols around the hotly disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Beijing is even sending fully-fledged naval assets within the islands' 12 mile exclusion zone while its aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, exercised only 50 miles away from the islands back in February — truly the end of Beijing's small-stick diplomatic strategy. “But on 1 March the plot thickens. Two Chinese SU-27 fighters come within 25 feet of a Japanese P-3 Orion surveillance plane just 10 miles west of the Senkakus (sound familiar?). The Japanese pilot gets nervous. A slight tweak at the controls and the Japanese plane collides with one of the Chinese fighters. Both aircraft crash into the ocean, with no survivors. "Naturally each side blames the other. Beijing accuses the Japanese pilots of violating Chinese sovereign airspace and violating its Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. Japan claims the Chinese pilots acted recklessly, flying so close. The media in both countries fan the flames of nationalism. Just 72 hours later, a group of twenty Chinese nationals land on one of the disputed islands under the cover of darkness. Rumors swirl that Beijing knew of the voyage but did nothing to stop it. A Japanese naval task force carrying a small detachment of soldiers is dispatched. Their goal: remove the only residents of the disputed five-island chain. “Beijing threatens force if its citizens are harmed. As Japanese naval forces come within 20 miles of the islands a Chinese J-10 fighter jet buzzes the task force. On its second pass it comes dangerously close to a Japanese destroyer. In a perceived act of self-defense, the destroyer shoots down the aircraft. “Hours later, as Japanese forces begin operations to remove the Chinese nationals from the Senkakus, Beijing fires a warning shot, a DF-21D or “carrier-killer” missile which hits the ocean just 10 miles away from the Japanese task force. Undeterred, Japanese forces press ahead. Domestic pressure on Chinese leaders becomes intense. They feel they have no choice but to escalate, launching a massive saturation strike with ballistic and cruise missiles against the Japanese task force. Three vessels are hit with heavy loss of life. Global media coverage of the burning hulks and bodies in the water reaches a fever pitch. Prime Minister Abe urgently phones President Obama formally requesting America's help under the terms of the US-Japan alliance — a 3am call no president would ever wish to receive. War in Asia seems imminent.” So what to make of all this crazy block quoting? Simple: a conflict in Asia—which would make problems like ISIS seem like mere child's play—is only an incident away. And make no mistake about it, such a conflict, considering that the United States and China are armed with nuclear weapons, would be a frightening affair. Food for thought as we contemplate other pressing national security challenges—for if Asia was ever to be engulfed in the flames of great power war only bad things would result, with millions of lives in the balance.

### Growth Bad – BioD

#### Chinese growth causes massive species extinction in China—extinction

Nagle 9 [John Copeland, prof at Notre Dame Law School, “The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law,” Spring, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law 203]

China offers the best and the worst of biodiversity protection. China is a vast, varied nation that hosts an incredible range of ecosystems and species. "China's biodiversity ranks eighth in the world and first in the northern hemisphere." n67 Over 100,000 species of animals and nearly 33,000 plant species exist in 460 different types of ecosystems. Those ecosystems include forests, grasslands, deserts, wetlands, seas and coastal areas, and agricultural ecosystems. China hosts 212 different types of bamboo forests alone. China also has an unusual number of ancient and relic species because of its protection from historic geologic events such as the movement of glaciers. Most famously, it is the only home of the giant panda, the symbol of many efforts to protect biodiversity throughout the world today. Such species and ecosystem diversity is complemented by an unsurpassed collection of genetic diversity. "The richness of China's cultivated plants and domestic animals are incomparable in the world. Not only did many plants and animals on which human survival depend originate in China, but it also retains large numbers of their wild prototypes and relatives." n68 A 2005 report estimated that China's biodiversity is valued at nearly five hundred billion dollars. n69 China is also the home for more than 1.25 billion people. The rapid economic growth that China has experienced since 1980 strains the nation's ability to preserve ecosystems, species, and genetic resources. But the biodiversity of China has encountered countless threats for thousands of years, including the cultivation of more and more land for agriculture and the consequences of numerous wars. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to 1960, [\*216] Mao Zedong targeted the "Four Pests": rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes. The attack on sparrows enlisted schoolchildren to knock down nests and to beat gongs so that the sparrows could not find a place to rest. Only after sparrows were virtually eliminated throughout China did the country's leaders recognize the value of the birds in controlling insects. China faces many of the same threats as biodiversity in other countries, with the notable addition of the country's notorious air pollution. Habitat loss is the biggest threat to biodiversity in China. As in many other countries, rapid economic development and continued population growth exert relentless pressure on previously undeveloped areas that offered habitat to a diversity of wildlife and plants. The overgrazing of rangelands, erosion, and the adverse effects of tourism and mining further compromise the condition of ecosystems and species throughout China.

## Hege Impact Answers

### AI Link

#### Chinese AI decks U.S. heg—superior UAVs and unrestricted exports threaten U.S. AI leadership.

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The Final Report released by the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence in 2021 describes China as a “competitor,” if not a leader, to the United States in terms of AI development. A basic understanding of the US-China AI competition is established in the report: “. . . we must win the AI competition that is intensifying strategic competition with China. China’s plans, resources, and progress should concern all Americans. It is an AI peer in many areas and an AI leader in some applications. We take seriously China’s ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s AI leader within a decade.”5 The report also foresees China’s determination to surpass the United States in AI leadership with its talent and technological development. This section demonstrates the area of China’s AI development and applications. Before digging into the military aspects, the reason China has been devoted into AI should be explained. In 2015, China issued the document Made in China 2025 and two years later in 2017, China released the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. These two documents proved that China’s central government officially confirmed the importance of developing AI technologies. The primary purpose of China’s AI development is for domestic use. First, advanced technologies are the major driving force for the economic and commercial development in China. To maintain its rapid growth, China encourages high technologies research and development, including AI, thus many private firms and research institutions have entered this field. Second, AI has been adopted domestically to improve the overall well-being, for example, payment using facial recognition, online AI-driven medical diagnosis, and security cameras that are designed to enhance safety. China's determination of developing AI technologies is not supported only by documents but also practice. The Ministry of National Defense has established research institutions—the Artificial Intelligence Research Centre and the Unmanned Systems Research Centre—to focus on AI and unmanned systems research and development. The key military think tank, the Academy of Military Science (AMS), has also updated its doctrine to cope with the AI technological development: “The revamped AMS is tasked with driving defense innovation and ensuring that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) warfighting theory and doctrine fully capitalize on disruptive technologies like AI and autonomous systems.”6 In addition to the government-backed official organizations, a number of private institutions have also invested considerable sums of money to conduct related research. The central government of China uses the term “intelligentized” warfare to refer to the innovations in military technologies.7 Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy analyzed more than 300 AI-related equipment contracts of the PLA regarding the adoption of AI technologies, and the result of their research shows that around 2 percent of PLA contracts are related to AI in the half year from April to November 2020. The research also predicted that China would continue to invest in AI technologies and may create vulnerabilities for the United States. Moreover, to quickly transfer technologies from the private sector to the public, China also launched a national strategy, the military-civil fusion, to create a favorable research and development environment.8 Among all the AI technologies, China places the top priority on unmanned combat systems and equipment along with other advanced military innovations.9 Unmanned technology has been profoundly changing the face of warfare, and unmanned equipment is one of the first options for future combat equipment. Since President Xi Jinping took office, he has emphasized the importance of unmanned systems on various occasions. For example, in 2017, when Xi Jinping visited the training of unmanned operations, he said to the sergeant that “UAVs are important combat forces for the modern battlefield. You must carry out your duties well and cultivate good personnel.”10 Another example was in 2020, when Xi met students at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Aviation University, he declared, “Drones are profoundly changing war scenarios. It is necessary to strengthen drone combat research, education and training, and accelerate the training of drone pilots and commanders.”11 The capacities of unmanned combat systems include effectively reducing casualties, achieving accurate reconnaissance, striking, resupplying, configuring flexible activities, and significantly improving combat effectiveness—to list only a few of many such advantages. With the development of unmanned technology, human warfare places more and more value upon information, which AI and unmanned systems excel at procuring. China’s development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) began in the late 1950s.12 In 1959, it had basically figured out the law of self-pilot takeoff and landing of two types of aircraft, namely the An-2 and IL-28. In the mid to late 1960s, China had been investing in the development of UAVs and formed a series of target aircraft such as the Changkong-1 radio-controlled target UAV, the DR-5 high-altitude photo reconnaissance aircraft, and the D4 small remote-controlled aircraft. Moreover, in August 1958, the first unmanned aircraft developed by Northwestern Polytechnic University flew successfully, and in 1984, the university established the UAV Research Institute with the approval of the former Ministry of Aviation Industry. In the1970s, China developed ChangHong high-altitude high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, T-6 general-purpose unmanned aircraft, Z-5 series unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, ASN series unmanned aircraft, and so forth. Dozens of these target and reconnaissance UAVs have been mass-produced and deployed alongside troops. The emergence of a large number of Chinese military UAVs began in 2006, when a number of military UAV designs appeared publicly in the limelight, such as the “Xianglong” high-altitude high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, whose body design is very similar to the US “Global Hawk” high-altitude long-endurance reconnaissance UAV; the “Skyhawk-3” unmanned helicopter that can hover, take off, and land vertically; and the “Dark Sword” UAV shaped like a US-made stealth bomber, which can burst into the enemy’s airspace with its stealth and high-speed performance and conduct suppressive attacks on the enemy’s air defense forces.13 The PLA is equipped with at least four types of medium and large UAVs, namely the EA-03 Xianglong, the Attack 1 (Wing Dragon 1), the JWP02 (ASN-206), and the BZK-005 UAV. EA-03 Xianglong is China’s most advanced high-altitude long-endurance unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in service. With a status similar to that of the US RQ4 global-use UAV, it is mainly adopted for high-altitude strategic surveillance reconnaissance. The aircraft has an overall length of 14.33 meters, a wingspan of 24.86 meters, a normal takeoff weight of 6,800 kilograms, a mission load of 600 kilograms and an effective flight range of 7,000 kilometers. It can conduct continuous aerial surveillance for 10 hours at an altitude of 18,000 meters from 2,000 kilometers away. The front and rear wings are connected in a diamond shape, which greatly strengthens the stiffness of the wings with a certain stealth capability.14 During the standoff in DongLang in the in last year between China and India, three Xianglong aircraft had appeared at Shigatse airport, and this confirmed that troops have been equipped with the aircraft. The Attack-1, improved from Chengfei Institute's Yilong-1 (sometimes call the Wing Loong), was unveiled at the 2014 Zhuhai Airshow and was the first active PLA inspection and fighter UAV that was made public at the airshow. Its shape is similar to that of the US UAV MQ-9, while its size is similar to that of the MQ-1 Predator. It has a maximum takeoff weight of 1.2 tons, a length of 9 meters, a wingspan of 14 meters, a payload of 200 kilograms, a maximum lift of 5,300 meters and a range of 4,000 kilometers. The latest Yilong-2 has a major improvement in both size and performance, with a length of 11 meters, a wingspan of 20.5 meters, a maximum flight altitude of 9,000 meters, a maximum speed of 370 kilometers per hour, a maximum takeoff weight of 4.2 tons, and an external hang-up capacity of 480 kilograms. It is equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) as well as laser-guided missiles and GPS-guided bombs and is able to perform continuous missions for 20 hours. To date, there has been no news that the Yilong-2 has been put into service.15 The JWP02 UAV (ASN-206) was developed by the Xi’an Aisheng Group of Northwestern Polytechnic University and won the first prize of the National Science and Technology Progress Award in 1996. It is rumored that it had received technical support from Israel. The aircraft applies solid rockets in assisting flight, zero-length launch, parachute landing and recovery, and can be used multiple times. It has a maximum takeoff weight of 222 kilograms, mission equipment weight of 50 kilograms, practical lift of 6,000 meters, range of 150 kilometers, and endurance of four to eight hours. The aircraft, which was developed earlier than Attack-1 UAV, currently serves as the mainstay of China's tactical unmanned reconnaissance aircraft along with the Attack-1 UAV.16 BZK-005 UAV has certain stealth capability and is a medium and high-altitude long-range unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. It has a maximum lift of 8,000 meters, an endurance of 40 hours, a maximum takeoff weight of 1.25 tons and a maximum carrying weight of 150 kilograms. Early models are equipped with photoelectric pods, while the latest models are equipped with SAR and other electronic reconnaissance equipment. The media reported that the aircraft has been on a patrol flight mission in the East China Sea. The TYW1 Skyhawk UAV, which was developed on the basis of the BZK-005, rolled off the production line on November 14, 2017. It is reported that the maximum takeoff weight of the TYW-1 has increased to 1.5 tons, with a maximum bomb load of 300 kilograms.17 UAVs play three important roles in military applications, the first of which is reconnaissance and surveillance.18 UAVs can penetrate hundreds of kilometers or more behind enemy lines and are configured at high, medium, and low altitudes. They can provide important reference for strategic decision-making and battle command in large-scale military operations through scanning reconnaissance and close-in reconnaissance to obtain highly accurate intelligence information. The latter is very suitable for PLA military, divisional, and brigade-level forces of the PLA Marine Corps to conduct battlefield reconnaissance surveillance, target search and location, as well as battle results assessment. UAVs can also work with satellites and skywave over-the-horizon radar to search and track enemy maritime targets and transmit back target information in real time. In this way, military UAVs can become an important part of the “kill chain” in antiaircraft-carrier warfare. The second is electronic jamming.19 Electronic-jamming UAVs can fly over the enemy, emitting electromagnetic waves through their airborne equipment and the application of interference foil, and so forth to implement interference on the enemy’s air defense radar, fire control radar, early warning systems, and other electronic equipment to cover China's aircraft defense and ground attack. The third role is firepower destruction. In addition to antiradiation UAVs that can destruct the enemy’s radar and other electromagnetic equipment, attack UAVs, inspection and fighter UAVs, and so forth can also carry out effective firepower destruction against the enemy. Acquisition of UAV technologies has enhanced China’s confidence to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks to protect claimed territory. In the early 2010s, China for the first time sent a UAV to the Diaoyu Dao/ Senkaku Island disputed area.20 It was able to easily avoid the detection of Japanese ground radar, which surprised the Japanese coast guard. It was only a short and tactical victory that the Chinese UAVs exploited the loopholes in Japan's air defense system and reached the Diaoyu Islands for cruising with an ultra-low-altitude blind spot; it did not change the strategic pattern of the Japanese side’s effective control over the Diaoyu Islands. The most common unmanned aircraft to cruise the Diaoyu Islands is the BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance aircraft—equipped with a rear-propelled engine, a dual-tail brace structure and an under-nose photoelectric/infrared detection device—first unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2006 and capable of flying continuously for 40 hours at an altitude of 26,000 feet.21 The BZK-005’s primary detection system is an electro-optical pod under the nose, which is equipped with a forward-looking infrared detection system, CCD cameras, and a laser range/target designation system. Wave-transparent materials are applied in the BZK-005 UAV; thus, it can be determined that it has a satellite communication system that can transmit information to the rear over radio range, which also indicates that the BZK-005 should have an activity radius of more than 1,000 kilometers. The application of the BZK-005 UAV has effectively enhanced the capability of China's naval maritime integrated surveillance system. At present, the quantity and quality of China's naval maritime surveillance aircraft are insufficient, and the application of the BZK-005 can improve the capability and coverage of China's naval target detection and indication system, especially for accurate detection and identification of targets in the middle and near sea, which helps China to comprehensively grasp the real-time situation in the relevant sea areas and provides support for relevant decision making. For nearly a decade since China sent the BZK-005 to the Diaoyu Island area without alerting Japan, Japan has been cooperating with the United States to equip itself by importing UAVs. Early this year, Japanese media reported that the United States and Japan are currently discussing a military deployment against China. According to the report, the United States and Japan plan to deploy MQ-9 UAVs near Kagoshima, a move designed to “respond to China's” regular military operations.22 UAVs are characterized by high speed and high altitude. The MQ-9 made its first flight in 2014 after improvements were made, and then it was used by the US military. It is understood that the UAV deployed in Kagoshima is a reconnaissance type and it is also the first time the United States deployed this high-altitude type of UAV in Japan. With the US pivots in Asia, tensions between the two giants, namely China and the United States, have been inevitable. Located in the southwestern tip of Japan, Kagoshima has a very special geographical location in that, if the United States deploys the MQ-9 UAV on the island, it will obtain the information about the activities of the Chinese naval fleet. In other words, the MQ-9 UAV is the US “eye” planted in the vicinity of China for receiving information. In addition, the specific location of the US deployment of the MQ-9 UAV is also thought-provoking, for the reason that to the further south of Kagoshima, there are the Okinawa Islands, followed by the Miyako Strait waters. This area is the “treasure land” that is of great military importance. When the United States and Japan intervenes in the Taiwan Strait conflict, should it occur, the Miyako Strait waters are the shortest cut they must go through. Obviously, China is also aware of this problem. Therefore, China should pay close attention to the Miyako Strait when the cross-strait unification attack commences, if this is the only way. In this context, the US UAVs deployed in Kagoshima are the main means of reconnaissance for the United States and Japan. The UAVs must not only watch out for the moves of the Chinese side, but also conduct reconnaissance of Chinese defense networks. UAVs are not only used in the East China Sea area, but also the South China Sea area. Even in the border conflicts between China and India, UAVs were also applied. Despite that there has not been any offensive action taken by UAVs in the mentioned areas, one cannot deny the potential there. Considering the unstable situation in the Indo-Pacific, states either focus on AI technologies research, including UAVs, or import arms and technologies from others. It is still unknown that whether the applications of AI technology will eventually arouse an arm race. Concerns The advanced AI technologies that are applied in the military field can exert great impact on deterrence and warfare in the future. Meanwhile, China’s rapid development of AI technologies and applications in its military are cause for increasing concern by the United States. Despite the success of China’s AI in commercial areas, no clear evidence has indicated that China’s military has plans to apply AI in any lethal systems. In the short term, weaknesses still exist despite China’s preexisting foundation on AI commercial applications. Allen points out that China has disadvantages in top talents and technical standards, as well as in software frameworks and platforms.23 For example, the case of restrictions on ZTE and Huawei clearly reveals that China heavily depends on imports of critical products, which means that China still has a long way to go until it becomes fully independent in vital sectors, such as semiconductors. AI technology itself is not offensive, but it is likely to play an irreplaceable directorial role in warfare if it is applied to automating weapons, especially nuclear weapons. To avoid unwanted jeopardy to any nations, the top priority is to ensure human intervention is involved in AI that are applied in security-related areas. AI actually lowers the threshold of offensive military actions because of the limited casualty risk. States, including China and the United States, should cooperate on preventing the abuse of AI. According to the China Global Television Network, China is the first nation that has submitted the position paper to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons for regulating the application of AI technologies in military field in December 2021.24 In other words, as with the control of nuclear weapons, norms and regulations are needed to limit the use of AI armaments. The United States is concerned about the global proliferation of unmanned systems and other AI weapons since China lacks export restrictions. China’s purposes of exporting unmanned arms, such as UAVs, include but are not limited to protecting overseas Chinese and investment security, establishing and consolidating diplomatic relations, and creating commercial profits.25 The United States is concerned about the unrestricted export for not only security reasons, but also economic ones. To prevent China from occupying the international market of unmanned systems, previous president Donald Trump reinterpreted the Missile Technology Control Regime to boost the export of UAVs. The Biden administration is willing to continue Trump’s policy, which made the export more flexible.26 Therefore, if both superpowers obtain unmanned technologies and export the arms mainly for commercial purpose, it is unnecessary for the United States to raise high concern. Future As for the future development of China’s AI technology applications in the military area: First, high-altitude long-endurance will be a primary focus of UAV development. Previous UAVs have a small carrying capacity, inadequate power supply, and little endurance, which may result in a small area of reconnaissance, failure to continuously obtain information for a long time, and even “blind spots” in intelligence, thus it is difficult for them to adapt to the needs of future warfare.

### Growth Link

#### Slowing Chinese economic growth is vital to preserving US hegemony

Mearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

There is a small possibility China will eventually become so powerful that the United States will not be able to contain it and prevent it from dominating Asia, even if the American military remains forward deployed in that region. China might someday have far more latent power than any of the four potential hegemons the United States confronted in the twentieth century. In terms of both population size and wealth—the building blocks of military power—neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union came close to matching the United States. Given that China now has more than four times as many people as the United States and is projected to have more than three times as many in 2050, Beijing would enjoy a significant advantage in latent power if it had a per capita GNI (gross national income) equivalent to that of either Hong Kong or South Korea. All that latent power would allow China to gain a decisive military advantage over its principal rivals in Asia, especially when you consider that China would be operating in its backyard, while the Unites States would be operating more than 6,000 miles from California. In that circumstance, it is difficult to see how the United States could prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon. Moreover, China would probably be the more formidable superpower in the ensuing global competition with the United States. But even if China’s GNI does not rise to those levels, and it ends up with not quite as much latent power as the United States, it would still be in a good position to make a run at hegemony in Asia. All of this tells us the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead. That outcome might not be good for American prosperity, much less for global prosperity, but it would be good for American security, which is what matters most.

### Impact – Laundry List

#### Primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.

#### A receding US deterrent is a catalyst for great-power conflict — decline causes transition wars and miscalculation.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 7: Rediscovering Tragedy; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

Moreover, if discussions of “international order” can quickly take on an abstract quality, the consequences of collapse—the lives lost or ruptured, the prosperity destroyed, the moral depravities committed—can be frighteningly concrete. Thucydides had it right when he described what happens in such a vacuum of security and morality: “Death thus raged in every shape … there was no length to which violence did not go.”3 This is all indisputably ~~depressing~~, but it should not be the least bit surprising. If it were possible to construct an international system that was truly universal in its appeal; if it were possible to freeze global power relationships at that moment of creation; if it were possible for states to put aside the very human ambitions, emotions, and fears that drive their behavior: then, perhaps, the world could permanently escape the competitive impulses that make international orders impermanent and their demise so traumatic. But none of this has ever been possible. International orders, even the most inclusive ones, create winners and losers because they benefit states unequally. The power balances that underpin a given system shift over time, encouraging new tests of strength. And although the human desire for peace and prosperity is strong, countries also remain motivated by ideological passion, greed, and insecurity. The most successful orders can mitigate the effects of these dynamics; they can suppress the sources of conflict and upheaval. But they cannot eliminate them entirely. This point is essential in considering the trajectory of the post-1945 order. It is tempting for individuals in nearly every geopolitical era to believe that their world is somehow different—that it is immune to the dangers of conflict and collapse. It is alluring to think that progress can be self-sustaining, and that liberal principles can triumph even if liberal actors are no longer preeminent. To do so, however, is to fall prey to the same ahistorical mindset that so predictably precedes the fall. Yes, the American order is exceptional in the level of stability, prosperity, and liberal dominance it has provided, and in the level of consent it has generated from countries around the world. Yet it is not so exceptional as to be exempt from the dangers of decline and decay. As the Greeks surely would have realized, in fact, it is precisely when one succumbs to the illusion that tragedy is impossible that tragedy becomes all the more likely. II This leads to a second component of a tragic sensibility—an appreciation that tragedy is once again stalking global affairs. The U.S.-led system is undoubtedly strong and resilient in many respects, as shown by the simple fact that it has survived as long as it has. Yet what endured in the past is not destined to endure in the future, and today the structure is groaning as the stresses mount. Long-standing principles such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation are being undermined from Eastern Europe to the South China Sea. International predators like North Korea and radical jihadist groups are using creative, asymmetric strategies to cause geopolitical disruption out of all proportion to their material power. The democratic wave has receded amid the growing prevalence and power of authoritarianism. Revisionist autocracies are reshaping regional environments in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, and waging sophisticated assaults against the political systems and geopolitical positions of their competitors. These countries are building privileged spheres of influence in critical areas of the globe; they are casting ever longer shadows, both strategic and ideological, across the international landscape. Meanwhile, the countries with the most to lose should the current system crack are too often divided and demoralized; their strategic torpor and distraction are creating vacuums that the revisionists are all too happy to fill. The protectors of the post-1945 order seem stuck in neutral, or even reverse, as the attackers push forward. This has historically been a dangerous combination. Faced with this daunting panorama, some analysts will take refuge in the hope that these challenges will simply exhaust themselves, or that revisionist powers will be satiated once their regional ambitions are fulfilled. Yet most systems tend toward more, rather than less, entropy over time, meaning that more, rather than less, energy is required to stabilize them. And revisionist powers rarely reach some natural point at which their aspirations subside; those aspirations often grow with each success.4 Today, the dissatisfied dictatorships, especially Russia and China, see themselves as being locked in a form of geopolitical conflict with the United States; they are already using force and other types of coercion to chip away at the American order. Should they succeed in claiming regional primacy and reestablishing a spheres-of-influence world, the result would be not to dampen but to inflame international conflict. Competition among the great powers would intensify as hostile spheres rub up against one another; the security of the global commons—the foundation of international prosperity—would be threatened by escalating geopolitical rivalry. The prospects for self-determination and liberalism would fade as small states fall under the sway of stronger, authoritarian neighbors. And crucially, as Daniel Twining notes, regional dominance could serve as a “springboard for global contestation”—for the renewed clashes for systemic dominance that Americans thought they had left behind with the end of the Cold War.5 It is impossible to predict precisely when the pressures on the existing order might become unbearable, or to know how close we are to that critical inflection point at which the dangers metastasize and the pace of decay dramatically accelerates. One can only speculate what the terminal crisis of the system will look like if and when it occurs. What is clear is that the telltale signs of erosion are already ubiquitous and the trend-lines are running in the wrong direction. The first step toward recovery is admitting you have a problem. Having a tragic sensibility requires seeing the world for what it is and where it is going, especially when the outlook is ominous. III If the international order is under strain, however, it does not follow that its collapse is unavoidable. Here a third aspect of a tragic sensibility is vital: the ability to reject complacency without falling into fatalism. Nietzsche defined tragic pleasure as the “reaffirmation of the will to live in the face of death.”6 It was just such a rejection of fatalism—of the belief that the next great global crackup was inevitable—that motivated U.S. policymakers to create the post-1945 order and sustain it through the crises that followed. Today, it is true enough that the grandest aspirations of the post–Cold War era are unlikely to be fulfilled anytime soon. Given the instability and revisionism roiling the international environment, it is simply beyond America’s power—if it was ever possible in the first place—to create a truly global order in which liberal values are universal, geopolitical competition has ceased, and authoritarian rivals have been fully pacified and converted into “responsible stakeholders.” Yet the existing international order, incomplete and threatened as it is, still constitutes a remarkable historical achievement. The creation of a global balance of power that favors the democracies, the prevention of unchecked aggression and intimidation by predatory powers, and the promotion of a prosperous and an integrated world in which liberal values have achieved great prevalence are all triumphs worth preserving. A more reasonable goal, then, would be to defend this existing order against the depredations of those attacking it, and America undoubtedly has the power for this essential undertaking.

### AT: China Leadership Good

#### Letting China surpass the US ensures geopolitical chaos and great-power war.

Glickman, 18 — Gabriel Glickman is a nonresident associate fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. (2-12-2018; "Back to the Future: The Potential of Great-Power Conflict;" *National Interest*; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/back-the-future-the-potential-great-power-conflict-24464; //GrRv)

What does the DOD mean by “order?” In the field of international relations, the terms “revisionist state” and “status-quo state” are used to describe, respectively, countries that seek to change the current international system and those that uphold it. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the international system has been defined by American hegemony and the spread of Western liberal democracy rather than its challengers—notably, fascism and socialism. This is commonly referred to as the liberal world order.

Under that world order, the United States is the most powerful country in the world. It often intervenes in international conflicts at a high cost, thus keeping dissatisfied nations from overturning the system. The NDS, however, refers to a recent shift in the current world order with an observation that, “We are facing global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order.”

The basis for that observation is the argument that the United States under the Obama administration took a brief, but arguably consequential, step back from the job of world-order maintenance. As proof of this, foreign-policy pundits often refer to Obama’s favorite quote (which he got from Martin Luther King Jr., who in turn got it from a nineteenth-century clergyman named Theodore Parker): “[T]he arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” The implication of this quote is that history is ultimately on the side of good rather than evil (e.g., dictatorships), and therefore the United States needn’t concern itself with great power competition or world order strategy. Critics point out that the president’s faith in that sentiment was put to poor use, however, because it led him to apologize for American power and to enact a more restrained foreign policy that in turn allowed revisionist states like Russia, China and Iran to flourish at the expense of their respective regions’ security. As Charles Krauthammer harshly wrote in the final months of the administration: “The consequent withdrawal of American power … has yielded nothing but geopolitical chaos and immense human suffering. (See Syria.).”

And that's not exactly a partisan argument either. In addition to conservative critics like Krauthammer, left-leaning foreign policy scholars, like Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institute, also have been critical of the results of the Obama administration's well-intentioned foreign policy.

The NDS promises to reverse the “arc of history” approach to security policy with a three-tiered approach that prioritizes the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, then “rogue regimes” like Iran and North Korea, and finally “nonstate actors” such as ISIS.

Of course, this new approach may alleviate serious concerns about the NSS—including my own—that the United States government no longer cares about global security. But policy will only follow well-written sentiment if President Trump himself can accept that America is the glue holding together an entire world order.

With China now poised to reclaim its previous spot in world history as a global hegemon, the proverbial clock is turning back. And that appears to be the reason why the DOD is serious about America being in the business of world order maintenance. As stated in the NDS: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”

Indeed, China already has a strong economy. It represents almost 15 percent of the global GDP to America’s roughly 24 percent. But, to put that in a slightly different perspective, China has grown astronomically in the last decade to overtake Japan as the second largest global economy. Thus, there is a real possibility that in the near future (likely decades) it may be able to surpass even the United States and then harness its capital to develop superior military technology. At that point, China would be capable of overthrowing the current international system.

The world has not seen global conflict the likes of World War I and II since the United States became the dominant power. Nor, for that matter, has it seen a recurrence of the great power conflicts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As the new defense strategy implies, take U.S. hegemony out of that equation and great powers may clash once again to the detriment of a cherished world order.

### AT: Multipolarity

#### Multipolarity fails—it generates violent fill in and risks nuclear war

Kagan 19—(Robert Kagan, Senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World”, Alfred A. Knopf)//ND

At the root of such thinking is the belief that there is an escape from power or that it is possible to wield power without error and without failure. Americans, blessed by their favorable geography and wealth, still believe they have a choice between engaging the world and letting the world fend for itself. There has been no shortage of realists, idealists, progressives, and conservatives telling them that substantially disengaging from our alliances and overseas commitments is possible and cost-free. But the real choice we face is not between the good and the bad but between the bad and the worse. It is between maintaining the liberal world order, with all the moral and material costs that entails, or letting it collapse and courting the catastrophes that must inevitably follow. What is likely to follow is a return to the multipolar power struggles that brought so much devastation to the world before the United States redirected the course of history. That is where the deep ruts lead, back to the state of the world prior to 1945. Only this time, the powers competing and clashing will be armed with nuclear weapons. It is ironic that some of those who spent the Cold War warning that America’s hawkish foreign policies would result in nuclear holocaust do not seem “democracies would result in nuclear holocaust do not seem to fear nuclear war in the competitive multipolar world that may be our future. We have yet to test the question of whether nations with nuclear weapons can go to war, because so far the United States and the liberal world order have prevented such wars. But if history is any guide, to count on the horror of new weaponry alone to maintain the peace is a most risky bet. Had you cast that bet before the two world wars, you would have lost. These days some experts tell us it was the existence of nuclear weapons that prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from coming to blows, but few at the time had any confidence that nuclear weapons were a guarantor of peace. Throughout much of the Cold War there were those who simply assumed that the world was heading inevitably toward Armageddon. They were wrong that it would come as a result of American Cold War policies, but in the long run they may still prove right.

### China Revisionist

#### China is revisionist – territorial expansion, 5-year plans, and anti-democratic innovation on all fronts

Beckley 22 – *Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University* (Michael, March/April 2022, "Enemies of My Enemy," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy)//KH

ENTER THE DRAGON There has never been any doubt about what China wants, because Chinese leaders have declared the same objectives for decades: to keep the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, reabsorb Taiwan, control the East China and South China Seas, and return China to its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia and the most powerful country in the world. For most of the past four decades, the country took a relatively patient and peaceful approach to achieving these aims. Focused on economic growth and fearful of being shunned by the international community, China adopted a “peaceful rise” strategy, relying primarily on economic clout to advance its interests and generally following a maxim of the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping: “Hide your strength, bide your time.” In recent years, however, China has expanded aggressively on multiple fronts. “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy has replaced friendship diplomacy. Perceived slights from foreigners, no matter how small, are met with North Korean–style condemnation. A combative attitude has seeped into every part of China’s foreign policy, and it is confronting many countries with their gravest threat in generations. This threat is most apparent in maritime East Asia, where China is moving aggressively to cement its vast territorial claims. Beijing is churning out warships faster than any country has since World War II, and it has flooded Asian sea-lanes with Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels. It has strung military outposts across the South China Sea and dramatically increased its use of ship ramming and aerial interceptions to shove neighbors out of disputed areas. In the Taiwan Strait, Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than 50 combat aircraft, prowl the sea almost daily and simulate attacks on Taiwanese and U.S. targets. Chinese officials have told Western analysts that calls for an invasion of Taiwan are proliferating within the CCP. Pentagon officials worry that such an assault could be imminent. China has gone on the economic offensive, too. Its latest five-year plan calls for dominating what Chinese officials call “chokepoints”—goods and services that other countries can’t live without—and then using that dominance, plus the lure of China’s domestic market, to browbeat countries into concessions. Toward that end, China has become the dominant dispenser of overseas loans, loading up more than 150 countries with over $1 trillion of debt. It has massively subsidized strategic industries to gain a monopoly on hundreds of vital products, and it has installed the hardware for digital networks in dozens of countries. Armed with economic leverage, it has used coercion against more than a dozen countries over the last few years. In many cases, the punishment has been disproportionate to the supposed crime—for example, slapping tariffs on many of Australia’s exports after that country requested an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19. China has also become a potent antidemocratic force, selling advanced tools of tyranny around the world. By combining surveillance cameras with social media monitoring, artificial intelligence, biometrics, and speech and facial recognition technologies, the Chinese government has pioneered a system that allows dictators to watch citizens constantly and punish them instantly by blocking their access to finance, education, employment, telecommunications, or travel. The apparatus is a despot’s dream, and Chinese companies are already selling and operating aspects of it in more than 80 countries.

#### Western encirclement, aging populations, and attempted expansion prove China is a volatile revisionist power on the verge of lash-out

Beckley and Brands 21– *\*Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University; \*\*resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies*. (\*Michael and \*\*Hal, January 1, 2021, “Into the Danger Zone - Coming Crisis in US-China Relations," American Enterprise Institute, Targeted News Service, ProQuest via UMich Libraries, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27632?seq=1)//KH

Red Flags Most debate on America's China policy focuses on the dangers of a rising and confident China.3 But the United States actually faces a more complex and volatile threat: an already powerful but increasingly insecure China beset by internal problems and a brewing international backlash. China already has the money and muscle to challenge the United States in key areas. Thanks to decades of rapid growth, China boasts the world's largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity), manufacturing output, trade surplus, financial reserves, navy by number of ships, and conventional missile force. Chinese nationals lead four of the 15 United Nations specialized agencies.4 Chinese investments and loans span the globe, and Beijing is pushing for primacy in key technologies such as 5G telecommunications and artificial intelligence (AI).5 Add in that the American-led world order has experienced four years of geopolitical disarray under President Donald Trump and that much of the world has suffered through many months of a crippling COVID-19 pandemic, and it is hardly surprising that Beijing is testing the status quo everywhere from the South China Sea to the border with China. But China's geopolitical window of opportunity may be closing as fast as it opened. Since 2007, China's annual economic growth rate has dropped by more than half, and productivity has declined by nearly 10 percent, meaning that China is spending more to produce less.6 Meanwhile, debt has ballooned eightfold and is on pace to total 335 percent of gross domestic product by the end of 2020.7 No country has racked up so much debt so fast in peacetime. China has little hope of reversing these trends, because it is about to suffer the worst aging crisis in history. Over the next 30 years, China will lose 200 million working-age adults and gain 300 million senior citizens./8 Any country that has aged, accu-mulated debt, or lost productivity at anything close to China's current pace has lost at least one decade to near-zero economic growth. And as economic growth falls, the dangers of social and political unrest rise./9 China's leaders are well aware of these trends./10 President Xi Jinping has given multiple internal speeches warning party members of the potential for a Soviet-style collapse./11 China's gov-ernment has outlawed negative economic news, and Chinese elites are moving their money and children out of the country en masse./12 Meanwhile, China faces a rising wave of foreign hostility. According to leaked Chinese government reports and independent Western analyses, nega-tive views of China have soared to highs not seen since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989./13 This surge of anti-China sentiment is a response to Beijing's internal repression and external assertiveness, and it is now manifesting in ways that threaten to crush China's geopolitical ambitions. Nearly a dozen countries have suspended or canceled their participation in Belt and Road Initiative projects./14 Another 16 countries, including eight of the world's 10 largest economies, have banned or severely restricted use of Huawei products in their 5G networks./15 India has been turning hard against China, since a clash between the two countries killed 20 soldiers in June. Japan has ramped up military spending, turned amphibious ships into aircraft carriers, and strung missile launchers along the Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan, where a record number of citizens now identify solely as Taiwanese, not Chinese./16 The European Union has labeled China a "systemic rival," and Europe's three great powers--France, Germany, and the United Kingdom--are sending naval patrols to counter Beijing's expansion in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean./17 These intensifying headwinds will make China a less competitive long-term rival to the United States but a more explosive **near-term threat**. Simply put, it is hard to see how a country facing so many severe challenges can ultimately outpace America and its many allies. Yet whereas a rising China could afford to shelve disputes and deescalate crises--confident that its wealth, power, and status were growing and that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) legitimacy was secure--a slowing and increasingly encircled China will be eager to score geopolitical wins while it still can. There is no mystery about what China's ambitions are, because the CCP has enshrined them in national law: to make the Chinese nation whole again; reunite Taiwan with the mainland; control the East and South China Seas, thereby turning the western Pacific into a Chinese lake; and restore China's status as a great power. The looming danger is that China will act more aggressively to achieve them as its future prospects dim. History Rhymes If China goes down this ugly path, it wouldn't be the first great power to do so. We tend to think that rising revisionists pose the greatest danger to the existing order. "It was the rise of Athens and the **fear that this inspired in Sparta** that made war inevitable," Thucydides wrote. But historically, the most desperate dashes have often come from dissatisfied powers that had been on the ascent but grew worried that their time was running short./18 World War I is the classic example. The growing German challenge to the United Kingdom provided the strategic background to that conflict. Yet in the foreground in the run-up to 1914 were nagging German fears of decline. The growth of Russian military power and strategic mobility was menacing the eastern flank. New French conscription laws were changing the balance in the west. A tightening Franco-Russian-British entente was leaving Germany surrounded. If Berlin did not act quickly, its military strategy--based on fighting a two-front war--would collapse, its dreams of world power and geopolitical greatness would vanish, and the internal strains caused by intensifying political clashes might become unmanageable. This was a principal reason Berlin acted so recklessly during the July crisis--by issuing its "blank check" to Austria-Hungary and then enacting its plan for a rapid, two-front war--despite the obvious peril, as Chief of General Staff Helmut von Moltke acknowledged, of a continental war that might "annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come."/19 The same decision-making dynamics were present in other cases. Imperial Japan made its fatal gamble in 1941, after the US oil embargo and naval rearma-ment made it clear that Tokyo's window to dominate the Asia-Pacific was closing fast./20 In the 1970s, Soviet global expansion peaked as Moscow's military buildup matured and the slowing of the Soviet economy created an impetus to lock in geopolitical gains sooner than later. Even the United States once fit this pattern. The flurry of American expansion and the buildup of US naval power in the 1890s came after an economic slump that exacerbated internal tensions and amid a global upsurge of imperial aggran-dizement that left some US strategists concerned that Washington would be left behind by emerging European mega-empires. In some of these instances, it was economic dis-tress following a long period of growth that stoked anxious aggression. In others, it was the onset of strategic encirclement, often self-provoked, by rival powers. In all cases, an upsurge in a revisionist state's power gave it the means to challenge the status quo, but an apparent downturn in its future prospects gave it the motive to do so boldly, even violently. Given that China is currently facing both a grim economic forecast and tightening strategic encirclement, the next few years may prove partic-ularly turbulent./21

## Russia Alliance Impact Answers

### Impossible

#### China will never create a full alliance with Russia because it needs US markets to sustain growth

Brækhus and Øverland 07 — Kyrre Elvenes Brækhus and Indra Øverland, Brækhus is a Mandarin Language Scholar at Tsinghua University, Beijing, Øverland is Director of the Energy Program at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway, 2007 (“A Match Made in Heaven? Strategic Convergence between China and Russia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, May 2007, Available Online at <http://old.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2007/Braekhus_Overland.pdf>, Accessed 07-05-2016, SP)

Institutionalization of the Beijing–Moscow relationship remains low, but a pattern of regular consultation between top leaders has evolved. Russia and China also meet annually for bilateral military and technical co-operation talks, and have continued to develop the Shanghai Cooperation Organization founded in 2001. China–Russia strategic convergence is a discernible trend which will gain further momentum. However, strategic convergence should not be confused with an alliance, and China and Russia are not perfect strategic partners. Developments inside China and Russia are crucial to how the relationship develops. Key questions are whether political stability will prevail and whether rapid growth can be sustained. Trenin argues that a Sino–Russian alliance could occur only as a result of “exceptionally short-sighted and foolish policies on China and Russia are not pro-Western, but neither are they definitively anti-Western. Western policymakers who are worried about the implications of Sino–Russian strategic convergence would do well to pursue a policy of engaging both Moscow and Beijing, and put pressure on Tokyo to resolve the dispute over the Kurile Islands. Paradoxically, if an alliance, or something resembling an alliance, were to be formed this could lead to a breakdown of the relationship in the medium to long term. China and Russia both command sufficient resources and sophistication to be significant global powers in their own right, and they certainly consider themselves as such. China was unwilling to subordinate itself to Russia for more than a brief period after the Communists came to power in 1949, and Russia would refuse to subordinate itself to China. The most likely scenario is Sino–Russo strategic convergence based on a relationship of mutual self-interest. The evidence presented in this article indicates that trade and investment between China and Russia are set to continue to grow rapidly, particularly in the energy sector, further enhancing the significance of the relationship. While Beijing and Moscow have common interests in placing restraints on the power of the United States, the creation of a full-fledged anti-Western alliance is unlikely to prove viable in the short term. Russia and especially China are both dependent on open access to Western markets to sustain growth.

### Inevitable

#### China will support Russia regardless of how the Ukraine conflict develops

Blanchette 22(Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will back him,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2022 at 4:09 p.m. EDT, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/24/xi-jinping-putin-china-russia-sanctions/>) - MP

China has tried to have it both ways since Russia invaded Ukraine a month ago. It abstained from key votes at the United Nations criticizing Russia’s actions, avoided directly labeling President Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine an “invasion,” amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly laid blame for the war at the feet of the United States and NATO. At the same time, Beijing has also largely complied with sanctions against Russia, made repeated, if vague, calls for a negotiated settlement to the hostilities and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. But make no mistake: The worse it goes for Russia in Ukraine, the more China will step up its support for the Putin regime. Beijing’s uneven diplomatic strategy may seem to stem from a desire to achieve multiple, often conflicting aims, most notably to forestall a deterioration in relations with Europe. Not all objectives are weighted equally, however, and as the war enters a more protracted and destructive phase, China’s primary goal is coming into focus: to ensure that Russia retains its status as Beijing’s key strategic partner, even if this necessitates paying serious economic and diplomatic costs. Beijing will see the prospect of a Russian defeat as a direct threat to its own territorial security and ability to compete head-to-head in the geopolitical rivalry with the United States — and China simply can’t allow that to happen. To see why Beijing has a direct stake in the war’s outcome, it’s critical to understand how its relationship with Russia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how China views the global security environment evolving over the next three to five years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia have experienced significant friction and mutual mistrust. The nadir of the relationship came in 1969, when the two communist powers nearly engaged in a nuclear war. Since 1989, however, Beijing and Moscow have systematically addressed the major points of contention in their relationship, including any lingering territorial disputes. In 2001, the countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, cooperation has expanded to include joint military exercises, efforts to reform global governance and technology sharing. For example, the two countries continue to develop a satellite navigation system to rival the United States’ GPS, and in January, Russia and China, along with Iran, held a series of naval drills in the Indian Ocean. This growing symbiosis was formalized on Feb. 4 in a joint statement issued during Putin’s visit to Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics (Xi’s meeting with Putin then was his first with a world leader since February 2020, when he appeared with the Mongolian prime minister in Beijing). Stretching more than 5,000 words, the joint statement encapsulated a shared worldview between two authoritarian powers and two autocratic leaders. The global order is undergoing “momentous changes,” the statement read, which include a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” and “global challenges and threats growing from day to day.” But perhaps more important, the joint statement articulated a shared grievance that the United States and its allies threaten Chinese and Russian interests and global aspirations. NATO, the document states, promotes an “ideologized cold war approach,” while the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” endangers the “peace and stability in the region.” Before Russia had even invaded Ukraine, then, Beijing had come to see Moscow as a critical security and strategic partner in the growing power rivalry with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. More to the point, Russia is China’s only real military and strategic partner. Although tensions exist in the bilateral relationship, not least because of the growing economic gap between their economies, the broader geopolitical chessboard draws Moscow and Beijing together. What’s more, Putin and Xi have a close relationship — they’ve met in person or virtually nearly 40 times in the decade that Xi has been in power. Time is running out for China The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly thrown Beijing off balance, and Chinese officials certainly didn’t want Putin to invade in the first place, but the basic math underlying this strategic partnership with Moscow has not changed. Indeed, the war has only consolidated Beijing’s central logic for supporting Russia, given the recent demonstration of Western diplomatic unity, the overwhelming power of U.S.-led sanctions and the reinvigoration of NATO. The former editor of the Chinese nationalist Global Times newspaper, Hu Xijin, argued in recent commentary that “if the U.S. pursues extreme strategic coercion against China, with Russia as a partner, China will not fear a U.S. energy blockade, our food supplies will be more secure, as will [our supplies] of many other raw materials.” In a speech last weekend, China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng drew a straight line between NATO in Europe and China’s own security concerns, warning that just as Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were a direct consequence of NATO expansion, any actions by NATO in the Asia-Pacific region would provoke similar consequences, and thus, the “crisis in Ukraine is a stern warning.” Beyond the substantive reasons underlying China’s support for Russia, there is also Beijing’s unwillingness to be seen as submitting to the U.S. demand that it back away from Moscow. As one Chinese Russia expert at the Shanghai International Studies University observed, “If China goes along with the U.S. against Russia, it will not only greatly strengthen the anti-Russian camp, but will also be a huge boost to the U.S. ‘leadership.’ ” The key question now is just how far Beijing will go to support Moscow. While Xi would like to maintain good relations with Europe and avoid a further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship, the fate of Putin and the Russian state directly implicates China’s core security interests. Not only would the prospect of a beaten and broken Russia activate China’s fears of instability along their shared 2,500-mile border, but it would also create uncertainty about the future leadership and geopolitical orientation of the Russian government. If Putin were eventually to fall from power, would his successor remain aligned with Beijing? So the more anxious Beijing becomes about the war and Putin’s personal position in power, the more likely it is to step up support by providing direct economic assistance, mitigating the impact of sanctions and even supplying military equipment. Clearly, China’s preference is to avoid secondary sanctions in response to any support — access to the international market and the U.S. dollar remains critical for China’s economy and its continued rise. But Beijing could pursue means of support that are difficult to track, such as facilitating Russia’s access to U.S. dollars via offshore accounts, or by directing state-owned enterprises and even private companies to increase their purchases of non-sanctioned Russian goods and services. If China does decide to supply Russia with military assistance, it would likely seek to avoid equipment and hardware that would flagrantly violate international law and sanctions or be easily traceable, and instead provide spare parts, ammunition or certain dual-use items that aren’t yet sanctioned. But critically, the decision to provide aid to Russia would be driven primarily by Beijing’s assessment of how Russia is faring in the war, rather than a desire to avoid paying economic or diplomatic costs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing is watching the conflict unfold without growing more nervous by the day: Russia has failed to achieve any of its major military or political objectives. In just the past week, the Russian military has escalated its offensive to include a wider number of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, and President Biden is also now warning of “clear signs” that Putin is considering using chemical weapons. Domestically, Putin has begun to purge his inner circle, arresting some within the security services and senior officials in the national guard. Beijing will see this as a sign that Putin’s grip is weakening, and as the sanctions continue to decimate Russia’s economy, anxiety in China is only likely to grow. Succession plans protect nations. Putin and Xi just threw theirs out. Some analysts suggest that China may well see Russia’s recent weakening in the wake of sanctions as a net positive, as it shifts the balance of power in the relationship in Beijing’s favor. A tangible benefit of such a shift would be Beijing’s ability to demand more favorable terms in buying Russian energy. While it’s true that Beijing leveraged Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to gain better terms in several large energy deals, the security environment for China in 2022 is far more contentious than it was in 2014, and Moscow’s true value is its ideological orientation and military capabilities as much as its energy stores. Xi does not want a weak Russia for a security and strategic partner. If Beijing turns toward and not away from Moscow as the war grinds on and the extent of human suffering increases, the basic trajectory of China’s relations with the West will undergo a profound shift toward open rivalry. It would be comforting to think that the prospect of such a disastrous turn would be enough to dissuade the Chinese leadership from traveling down this path. Unfortunately, though, Beijing’s geopolitical outlook for the next decade — much like Washington’s — includes conflict and friction as defining features.

### Russia-China Good Turn

#### Russia-Chinese alliance key to prevent border conflicts – without dialogue, the tensions would mirror the sino-soviet border wars

Crossley 2/27 [Pamela Kyle Crossley - Collis Professor of History, Dartmouth College, "Are China and Russia Forging a New Ideological Bloc?", https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-china-and-russia-forging-new-ideological-bloc, DOA: 6/25/16]

Ambassador Wu's reference to the absurdity of an "ideological bloc" is interesting, and in the sense of “ideology” as sometimes used in policy circles the prospect does seem absurd. But there has been some convergence of strategic conceptualization between the sequence of governments based in Beijing and in Moscow since at least 1689, when they began their own history of diplomatic exchange, and since that time they have successfully negotiated the maintenance of their nearly 3,000 miles of shared borders. It has not been simple or uniformly peaceful, and the idea that two enormous countries sharing centuries of successfully resolved tensions between their ancestral empires without emerging with some common ideas about trade regulation and taxation, environmental management, migration controls and maintenance of security is not entirely credible. Those could amount to an ideology of a positive sort, as contrasted to mere suspicion of and opposition to the United States, a sort of negative ideology. There are clearly grounds for alliance between Russia and China based on stable shared perspectives and interests rather than only a shared opponent. The question of China’s dense population accumulation on one side of the border and Russia’s expanses of lightly inhabited and under-developed territory on the other presents as many possibilities for cooperation as for conflict. The same is true for the faltering of the regime in North Korea, the problems of resource exploitation and transport in Central Asia, the management of sea and air dominance of the western Pacific, the development of programs for exploitation of space and the moon, and financial and commercial initiatives in Europe, among other issues. Russia and China have every reason to explore mutually-disciplined expansion on all fronts at the expense, if possible, of the United States and Japan, and history suggests that the rewards are great enough that both parties will have reason to accept such a program. The possibility of disenchantment on either side will always be present. Each can cite grievances against the other if needed, from the First United Front to the Korean War to the Sino-Soviet split to border disputes. The greatest danger may come not from the complexities of their roles in the wider world but from the relative stabilities of their governments. Slippage by either would raise the question of support from the other, or exploitation of a crisis to in order to sponsor a new and perhaps dependent —or at least obliged— new regime. Their pasts, in other words, look a bit more solid than their futures. Where they seek friendship they could find betrayal. But their history suggests that whether empires or republics they have an underlying understanding of what it is to be expansive on the Asian continent, to be enemies of Japan, and to live in tension with whatever they mean by “the West.” Why they would need “ideology” to further consolidate their affinity is not clear, but realization of what they have in common could be an ideology in itself.

#### Another sino-soviet border dispute causes nuclear war – US gets drawn in when Russia or china attack each other

Bolton 10 [Kerry R Bolton, "Sino-Soviet-US Relations and the 1969 Nuclear Threat", www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/17/sino-soviet-us-relations-and-the-1969-nuclear-threat/, DOA: 6/25/16]

The mainstream press has just come out with a Chinese expose that has informed an undoubtedly surprised world that in 1969 the USSR wished to settle its historical score with China and launch a nuclear attack. The USSR merely wanted an assurance of U.S. neutrality. Far from the USA welcoming this de-clawing of the growing dragon, it instead threatened that there would be retaliation from the U.S. against Russia. According to a report first carried in the Daily Telegraph, Chinese historian Liu Chenshan, writing in an officially sanctioned newspaper, stated that the threat “came in 1969 at the height of a bitter border dispute between Moscow and Beijing that left more than one thousand people dead on both sides.” [1] Liu quotes Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin as stating to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on October 15 that “Washington has drawn up ‘detailed plans’ for a nuclear war against the USSR if it attacked China.” The Telegraph writers also speculate that Liu is likely to have had access to official archives given the appearance of this as part of a series of six articles in an official news source. The Telegraph article continues: “The historian claims that Washington saw the USSR as a greater threat than China and wanted a strong China to counter-balance Soviet power…” They also conclude: “Mr Liu, the author, admits his version of history is likely to be contested by rival scholars.” However, this Chinese revelation is not “new” to informed observers. The Russian desire to settle with China, despite the cynically named Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance that had been signed between Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin in 1950 – which relegated China to colonial status rather than pave the way to super-power status[2] – came amidst the culmination of border disputes that had been ongoing since 1960.[3] The largest conflict had taken place on March 2, 1969, when Chinese troops ambushed Russian troops on the uninhabited Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, killing 32 Russians. The Soviets responded on the night of March 14 by shelling 20 kilometers into China. Approximately 60 Russians and 800 Chinese were killed in the conflict. So extensive was the Russian attack that Mao feared a Soviet invasion. It was then that the USSR intended to drive home their offensive with a nuclear attack. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, in their book Mao: The Unknown Story, allude to an article at the time published in a London newspaper “by a KGB-linked Russian journalist Victor Louis”, who had been Russian emissary to Taiwan, stating that the Kremlin was discussing bombing China’s nuclear test site, and planning to set up an “alterative leadership” for the Chinese Communist party.[4] Moreover it was U.S. President Richard Nixon’s aide John Haldeman who seems to have first broken the nuclear attack story in his memoirs in 1978.[5] He stated that for years the USSR had been trying to warn the USA not to allow China to become a nuclear power. This claim by Haldeman seems to directly contradict the claim by Liu that Nixon, when responding to the 1969 Soviet request for neutrality, did so not only because he regarded China as a means of containing Russia, but also because he was still “smarting from a Soviet refusal five years earlier to stage a joint attack on China’s nascent nuclear programme.”[6] If we place this all into context, I believe that the 1978 Haldeman version is more likely than that of Liu’s present contention. If the USA had asked for support from the USSR to bomb China’s nuclear programme in 1964, this was a year following Sino-Russian border conflicts amounting to 4000 dead. In 1960, there had been 400 clashes; in 1962, 5000.[7] The USSR would have no sentimental, comradely, ideological, diplomatic, or geo-political reasons to oppose such a US proposal and then change her mind five years later and make a similar suggestion to the USA. The relationship between China, the USA, and the USSR is quite contrary to how it is generally perceived. A more accurate scenario is that the USA backed Mao and the USSR backed Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin, prior to Mao’s assumption to power, regarded him as a Trotskyite. While Stalin had previously backed Mao as a counter to a Trotskyite coterie in China headed by Prof. Chen Tu-hsiu, Mao’s onetime mentor, by 1938,[8] Mao was being denounced in the USSR as a Trotskyite.[9] During World War II, while the USA was pushing Chiang to make an alliance with Mao against the Japanese, Stalin was counselling Chiang against this.[10] Gen. George Marshall warned Chiang in 1946 at a crucial time that if he persisted in pursuing the beleaguered Red Army into Northern Manchuria, U.S. aid would stop. This provided Mao with a base from which to recuperate and finally defeat Chiang. On the other hand, Stalin’s aid to Mao was granted according to Russian interests as distinct from communist fraternity, one particularly dramatic example of which was the demand for repayment in food that resulted in 10,000 peasants dying of starvation in Yenan.[11] This was a prelude to the debilitating Sino-Soviet Treaty that was to result in the “Great Famine” for the same reason.[12] Mao thought that he could make China a great power on Stalin’s coat tails. This was a grave error. While the USA attempted to court China, Mao went out of his way to act “Bolshie” towards the “Paper Tiger,” in a futile effort to court Stalin. Chang and Halliday write: “It was widely thought that it was the U.S. that refused to recognize Mao’s China. In fact, Mao went out of his way to make recognition impossible by engaging in overtly hostile acts.”[13] In 1979, the year for the renewal of the 1950 “friendship treaty” between Russia and China, Mao gestured as to what he by then thought the fraternal relationship by invading Russia’s ally Vietnam, which was particularly significant in that in 1978 the USSR had entered into a 25 year defence treaty with Vietnam.[14] Given the historically strained (at best) relationship between China and Russia, even at a time when they were supposed to be ideologically aligned, what are likely future scenarios on the world stage? There seems to be a preponderant view that the USA and China will increasingly become rivals due to economical and raw material factors. There is also a view that the USA and Russia will align against China. Again turning to an article in the Daily Telegraph, there is an interesting item from 2009. This refers to the Russian ethnic population decline in the Russian Far East, in comparison to the burgeoning Chinese population across the border, coupled with the tremendous mineral resources of the area. David Blair writes: The endless silver birch forests of the Russian Far East might appear so desolate and windswept that no one could possibly be interested in them. Yet the vast swath of territory between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok may become a new theatre of confrontation between Russia and China in the decades ahead. For now, the two giant neighbours have been thrust together by their shared suspicion of America and they cooperate as tactical allies, working in the United Nations Security Council to contain Washington’s power. But this affinity is based on little more than having the same rival. The empty lands of the Russian Far East, far closer to Beijing than Moscow, contain major sources of tension between the two powers.

#### China has an incentive to attack the Russia border

Sharavin 4 [Alexander, director of the Political and Military Analysis Institute, What the Papers Say, Jan 14]

Question: In your view, who poses the greatest danger to Russia? Alexander Sharavin: In the Defense Ministry's latest report, known as the White Book, our likely opponents are not named - they remain anonymous. However, we believe in being specific. And we name China first. At present, China appears to have good neighborly relations with Russia, and constantly declares that its intentions are friendly; but some of its actual actions prompt the thought that not everything is quite that simple. For example, the state borders issue hasn't been fully resolved - and such matters are always time-bombs. The Russian media pays a lot of attention to the territory dispute with Japan over four small islands, but it totally ignores China's pretensions, even though China aspires to claim much more territory - virtually all of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Or rather, official Beijing remains silent, but articles do appear in China's newspapers sometimes, and discontented voices are raised. It's hard to believe that anyone could permit themselves to speak out like that without authorization in totalitarian China. I repeat: there is no threat from China in the short term - Beijing's policies are entirely loyal in relation to us at present. But what might happen ten years from now? What guarantee is there that somebody won't try to play the territory card? Question: And we're selling Beijing modern fighter jets with extra engines. Alexander Sharavin: Yes, that's an alarming point. So it seems China is allowing for the possibility that the situation might change, and Russia might stop supplying spare parts for military hardware to its neighbor? And is it any coincidence that China's strongest military forces are concentrated along our borders, even if they're at a distance of 200 kilometers? Is that any distance at all, to them? And let's not forget that on our side of the border there are regions with depressed economies, with vast natural resources and small, ever-shrinking populations.

#### That causes extinction

Sharavin 1 [Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3]

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

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